World Events Demand Congress Reset Administration F-35 Cuts

Speaking to a joint session of Congress on March 16, Ukrainian President Zelensky issued an emotional plea: “I have a need—I need to protect our sky.” Shocking images of wounded children, homes, apartments, and refuges under attack further amplified the dire nature of his pronouncement. On the very same day, news leaked regarding Department of Defense plans to slash F-35 procurement by a third in the Biden administration’s FY 2023 budget request. The incongruity of the two episodes is obvious.

The F-35 embodies America’s ability to secure the sky for decades into the future. Cutting its procurement sends a signal to allies and enemies alike that America is failing to prepare for the very real threats that we may face sooner rather than later. As a result of chronic underfunding, the Air Force fighter fleet is now the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. That trend—that continues in the DOD 2023 budget—must be reversed. We need to reset U.S. airpower capacity and capability.

Control of the air is the backbone of any successful military operation. Ships at sea, ground forces, space and cyber centers, logistical hubs, and our operating bases will not survive if subject to attack from the sky. It is precisely why our adversaries have developed advanced aircraft and munitions to challenge our superiority in the air. President Zelensky clearly recognizes its importance as his number one priority is to control the air over Ukraine. His very real situation should be a reminder that we cannot take the capability to achieve and maintain control of the air for granted.

During Operation Desert Storm—America’s last major regional conflict—the Air Force had 134 fighter squadrons. Today it has 55, or about 60 percent less. About 80 percent of the aircraft that make up those squadrons are now operating beyond their planned service lives. For over three decades, Air Force modernization was deferred. This resulted in running the aircraft and the associated personnel too hard for too long as they strained to keep up with surging demand in three decades of back-to-back combat engagements.

Compounding the situation, the Air Force was forced to reduce F-22 buys from 750 of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world to just 187 by a defense secretary who did not appreciate the rapid rise of China and an increasingly aggressive Russia. At that juncture, the Air Force was left with the F-35 as its only alternative to modernize with 5th generation attributes. Subsequent events saw budget cuts and technical challenges delay the program. By 2020, the Air Force expected to have over 800 F-35s but ended up with only 272 by that time. Meanwhile, Cold War-era F-16 and F-15 fighters are growing older and increasingly less survivable against modern enemy defenses. They are also costing a fortune to sustain as they age.

At current inventory levels, if the Air Force had to deploy its F-22s and F-35s to war, they would only be able to sustain around 30 F-22 and 50 F-35 sorties at any given time. That is an anemic capacity to deal with the very real multiple threats of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The Air Force needs to grow. The F-35 is the only fighter option presently in production affording the necessary combination of stealth, sensors, weapons, and processing power to achieve an optimal advantage over modern threats.

Air Force leaders have long known about this fighter crisis. They have repeatedly explained that they need to procure a minimum of 72 fighters a year or the fighter force will continue to shrink, and the average age will continue to grow—currently at 30 years. The FY 2023 DOD budget request shorts the Air Force of this target once again, requesting only 57 fighter aircraft (33 F-35s and 24 F-15s). As a result, the Air Force will continue to get older, and smaller, and less ready.

Slowing Air Force modernization by cutting the F-35 buy also risks triggering a death spiral for the program. That is when reduced procurement sees per-unit cost spike due to a lack of cost amortization. Faced with growing costs, programmers institute another round of procurement cuts, which then raises costs further and nets further cuts. It is a vicious cycle.

The F-35s currently coming off the production line today are performing well. At less than $80M for the Air Force’s F-35A model, they cost less than the F-15EX to buy—the other fighter the Air Force is currently buying. In terms of cost per-tail per-year—a measurement of sustainment expenses—the F-35 costs less than the F-15E. Cost per flying hour statistics also shows the F-35 on par with the F-15C/D. Said another way—F-35 operating expenses are becoming nominal for the fighter force. Costs will continue to fall as the F-35 inventory grows and fixed expenses are amortized across more aircraft.

Moreover, there is an operational side to cost savings—the effectiveness part of the cost-effectiveness equation. The F-35 requires significantly fewer aircraft to achieve operational objectives in a fight—that means spending less and getting more from a perspective of cost-per-effect. In other words, given that four to five F-35s can accomplish what it takes 16 to 20 or even more non-stealth aircraft to achieve, F-35s are dramatically cost-effective. On March 30, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Tod Wolters, testified to Congress that it is “critical” to get more F-35s delivered to Europe.

Fundamentally, the Air Force is forced to reduce its F-35 buy due to its prolonged inadequate funding. The Air Force has been the least funded of all the service departments for the last 28 years in a row—receiving less money than the Army and the Navy in every one of those years. With the FY23 budget, DOD extends that record to now 29 years in a row, with the Air Force again in last place relative to the Army and the Navy. To get the to the actual amount in the Air Force budget submission you have to subtract the $40.1 billion that is “pass-through” that is included in the Air Force budget but which the Air Force has no control over as it goes to other DOD agencies, and you have to remove the $24.5 billion allocated to the Space Force. The final figures for FY23 (figures in billions): Navy $180.5; Army $177.5; Air Force $169.5.

In the 20 years since 9/11 (FY02 to FY21), the Army received over $1 trillion more in funding than the Air Force. That is an average of over $53 billion a year more to the Army than the Air Force. The Army made up the preponderance of forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan for 20 years, so no one begrudges them that support, but we are no longer in Iraq or Afghanistan, and it is time that money be redistributed back to the Air Force to reconstitute its combat forces that were underfunded as a result.

With the Biden administration having made its decision not to fund the Air Force at a level required simply to sustain the average age of the fighter force, it is imperative for Congress to redress the cuts to the F-35 in the FY 23 budget submission. In doing so, they would do well to reflect upon the words President Zelensky recently shared with them: “Being the leader of the world means to be the leader of peace. … Strong doesn’t mean weak, strong is to be brave and ready to fight.”

The disaster unfolding in Ukraine painfully illustrates the price a country pays if it cannot secure the sky. The U.S. has taken far too much risk in this regard for too many decades. Restoring the F-35 production numbers in FY23 is an essential step that the Congress can make in reversing this decline and responding to the world as it is, not as the current administration wishes it to be. The Air Force officer in charge of resource planning said after the FY23 budget release that the Air Force would have, “bought more F-35s if we had more resources.”

We cannot be strong unless we control the sky. Strength demands the F-35 in the numbers that maximize industry’s production capacity. That is what is necessary to rebuild the Air Force to meet the demands of the national defense strategy.