Will Putin Nuke Ukraine?

The most important question about the war in Ukraine is not whether Russia will win, whether NATO will hold fast, or whether Ukraine will link its fortunes to the West. The answers to these questions are already clear. When a stronger state is stalemated in war, it’s the functional equivalent of a loss. The more ground Russian forces gain, the more soldiers, tanks, and other heavy military equipment Russia loses. NATO has held fast, due in no small measure to the Biden administration’s leadership efforts. And thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukraine will henceforth look westward instead of bowing eastward.

A negotiated settlement is coming, sooner or later. The big question remaining is whether Putin will use a nuclear detonation in warfare for the first time since 1945. This situation is much less fraught than the Cuban missile crisis, but it is still worrisome. The norm we depend on to live uneasily with the Bomb — no mushroom clouds in warfare — is at stake here.

This norm has survived harrowing crises, close calls, and accidents for over seven decades. During the Cuban missile crisis, the primary potential trigger of nuclear weapons’ use was inadvertent escalation resulting from U.S. and Soviet military operations. The closest calls came when Soviet air defense forces shot down a U.S. spy plane and with the U.S. Navy’s aggressive implementation of orders to maintain the quarantine around Cuba. The primary trigger in Ukraine appears to be quite different — whether Putin will deliberately decide to authorize a detonation.

Putin might decide to break the norm of no use that has held for three-quarters of a century if he concludes that this is the best way to end the stalemate, cut losses, and try to secure gains. He might conclude that a mushroom cloud on Ukrainian territory could persuade the West to stand down and provide leverage on Volodymyr Zelensky to reach agreeable terms.

Putin might think that a single demonstration shot would place NATO and Washington squarely on the horns of a dilemma. NATO unity could be shattered. Standard deterrence strategy points toward retaliation in kind — at a minimum. But there is no good target for a retaliatory nuclear strike.

If this is where Putin is heading, he will again be would again be badly mistaken. He has already placed himself in the pantheon of the world’s worst war makers, no mean feat. A single nuclear detonation would be ruinous for him personally, and for Russia’s attempts to recover from this war.

Using a nuclear weapon against a country that voluntarily returned warheads to Russia and that received security assurances from Putin’s predecessor would be beyond the pale — even for Putin. It would mark him as the 21st century equivalent to Adolf Hitler. His use of chemical weapons would, as well. Using nuclear or chemical weapons against Ukraine could well change the terms of NATO involvement. Putin could once again be surprised and punished by this train of events.

A demonstration shot on Ukrainian territory would turn the “war-winning” weapon unveiled in 1945 into an “avoid losing” weapon. This might be what Kim Jong Un has in mind, but it hardly suits Russia. Nuclear use would be a stark sign of desperation and weakness, the very opposite of the traits Putin seeks to project.

After the Russian Army’s poor showing in Ukraine, Putin’s nuclear arsenal is his sole remaining trump card. But deterrence is strongest in the absence of use; it fails when the nuclear threshold is crossed, and is weakened thereafter. The world would change after the first use of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki. Russian national security would be damaged. So would the national security of every other state. And for what? A mushroom cloud wouldn’t turn a stalemate in Ukraine into a victory.

The first battlefield use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would shake the very foundations of a wobbly global nuclear order. States that possess nuclear weapons would compensate by trying even harder to strengthen nuclear deterrence, while hedging strategies would increase among abstainers.

A mushroom cloud would further impair arms control as well as deterrence, inviting a new era of nuclear anarchy and nuclear proliferation. The edifice of arms control built during the Cold War is already battered, thanks to Putin, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump. The strongest remaining pillar is the norm of no use. If this norm is cast aside, a resumption of nuclear testing might well follow.

There are many compelling reasons for Putin to reject the idea of using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. The stakes here are uncomfortably high, even if the probability of use isn’t. Even as NATO downplays Putin’s nuclear threat making, there is utility in highlighting how much he stands to lose by making another supremely bad decision. By using a nuclear weapon in this war, Putin will make life far worse for Russia — and for the rest of us.