Why The Biden Administration Wants To Sell Turkey F-16s And Greece F-35s

The Biden administration hopes to win approval from Congress to sell modernized F-16s to Turkey and fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters to Greece. If approved, these multi-billion dollar deals will undoubtedly have significant ramifications for the balance of power in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

According to the Wall Street Journal, which broke the story, the administration hopes that by getting the Turkish F-16 deal approved Ankara will drop its objections to the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO. Turkey has blocked the admission of both Nordic countries, demanding that they sever their ties with various Kurdish groups. Furthermore, administration officials told the publication that approval of the sale by Congress “is contingent on Turkey’s acquiescence” on this issue.

Turkey first requested to purchase 40 brand new F-16 Block 70 jets and 79 modernization kits for its older F-16s in October 2021 in a deal valued at $20 billion. It opted for more F-16s since it had been removed from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in 2019 and barred from buying any of the jets after it received S-400 air defense missile systems it bought from Russia. Ankara had plans to buy up to 100 F-35s for its air force.

In recent years, Greece has contemplated buying between 20-40 F-35s. Washington will most likely authorize any request Athens makes for these advanced aircraft. The same cannot, however, be said about the Turkish F-16 request.

President Joe Biden has long favored selling Turkey new F-16s and has repeatedly expressed optimism he can win approval from Congress. At the June 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, he said that an F-16 sale would not be a “quid pro quo” for Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession, which requires unanimous agreement among all alliance member states.

Following the publication of the WSJ report, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New Jersey Democrat Bob Menendez, issued a statement welcoming a Greek F-35 deal but “strongly” opposing the sale of any “new F-16 aircraft to Turkey.”

Menendez has broader objections to selling Turkey any American weaponry, ranging from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s crackdown on independent media and opposition parties in his country and his dealings with Russia. Consequently, he may not give his critical approval, even if Turkey agrees to grant NATO membership for Sweden and Finland in return.

A Greek acquisition of F-35s – coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration – will give the Hellenic Air Force a technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.

“The content of the WSJ report is, at first, highly significant because it functions as an indication that Greece could arguably enjoy a qualitative military edge in the long-term,” George Tzogopoulos, a senior fellow at the Centre International de Formation Européenne (CIFE), told me.

“A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to envisage a situation where the U.S. might sell more advanced weapons systems (of every kind) to Greece – and not Turkey,” he said.

“The fact that we are now analyzing the potential sale of F-35 to Greece and F-16 to Turkey sketches out the new, unprecedented trend that showcases some adjusting priorities of U.S. foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.”

Tzogopoulos believes that the potential F-16 sale to Turkey “ought to be placed into context and not discussed in isolation.”

“What matters is which country might maintain a qualitative military edge in the long-term, a discussion that goes beyond the discussed sales of F-16 and F-35,” he said. “This is the key question and not whether American-Turkish military cooperation continues.”

He described Turkey as a NATO member that “behaves autonomously” on several fronts.

“The U.S. does not want to lose Turkey but is calibrating its strategic decisions on the grounds of the new realities,” he said. “Even so, members in Congress (Senator Menendez in particular) remain mistrustful of Turkish motivations. A potential sale of F-16s (and other weaponry in the future) will not mark the end of complicated processes.”

“The ability of the U.S. to practically link the sale(s) of military equipment of Turkey to the maintenance of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the anchoring of Ankara’s choices to Western preferences will be assessed in the future,” he added. “This is what will matter and will define American leadership in the region.”

Tzogopoulos concluded by noting that Turkey’s “bargaining tactics” go beyond NATO membership for Finland and Sweden.

“The real problem for the U.S. is how to formulate policies which will not empower Ankara to insist on the very same methodology in negotiating, especially within the family of the Alliance,” he said. “An initial success will motivate the Turkish government to look for another one, and another one, and another one.”

“It is the responsibility of Washington to secure both the enlargement of NATO and the rationalization of Turkish behavior — for example, the daily threats against another NATO member state, Greece.”

Suleyman Ozeren, a professorial lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, pointed out that the Biden administration’s support for selling F-16s to Turkey had already been on the agenda before the Russia-Ukraine war began in February 2022.

“By adding the condition of Turkey’s consent for Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the Biden administration aims to put more pressure on Ankara and, in doing so, to put forward a more convincing argument before Congress,” he told me. “The administration seeks to sweeten the deal by including the F-35 sale to Greece to overcome any resistance from Congress.”

Furthermore, Ozeren believes the deals aim to maintain the balance of power between Turkey and Greece but noted that the balance has changed in the latter’s favor in recent years.

“By selling F-35s to Greece, the United States gives an upper hand to Greece,” he said. “Unless Ankara’s regional policies shift, the U.S. short terms strategy is more like balancing Turkey with Greece in the region than seeking a balance of power between the two.”

While this may be possible, the Biden administration also does not want to alienate Turkey entirely, given its critical position in both NATO and the region.

“Therefore, the administration is struggling to find a way to please all parties involved in the process,” Ozeren said. “Because the S-400 crisis created a deep distrust toward Turkey’s position vis-à-vis US-Turkey relations, overcoming this predicament would require Ankara to make a major shift in its domestic and foreign policy.”

Turkey had chosen to use the Sweden and Finland NATO accession issue as leverage from day one since it found it politically profitable to do so for domestic and international consumption.

“However, for some politicians with the power to veto the F-16 deal, the ball is in Ankara’s court,” Ozeren said.

“By overplaying its hand, Ankara could weaken its position further while strengthening other actors opposing the F-16 sale.”