Why Russian Officials Are Referencing The Cyprus Missile Crisis

Russian officials have referenced the Cypriot Missile Crisis of the late 1990s in their warnings to Greece about potentially transferring its Russian-built S-300 air defense missile systems to Ukraine. In doing so, they are also distorting the history of that crisis, which risked igniting a war over the divided island.

“There was a story when they (S-300s) were to be delivered to Cyprus, but then the West started doing everything possible to prevent this,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Dec. 28. “Given the island position of Cyprus and the fact that it was not a NATO member, a compromise was eventually reached that suited everyone. Greece bought the systems. But according to the contract that sealed this deal, Greece has no right to transfer them (S-300s) to anyone without our consent.”

He made the remark shortly after Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos suggested, in a meeting at the Greek defense ministry in mid-December, that Greece’s S-300 systems on Crete could potentially be transferred to Ukraine if the United States agreed to deploy a Patriot system in its place. The remark was notable since Greece previously turned down an informal request from Kyiv for the system.

Lavrov is certainly correct that the systems were initially designated for Cyprus and that a compromise was arranged with Greece. The Republic of Cyprus, which had a U.S. arms embargo imposed on it since 1987, turned to Russia in 1996 for S-300s after buying T-80 tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Nicosia wanted the systems to deter Turkish overflights. Russia agreed to sell, but Turkey stringently objected. Ankara warned it would destroy the missiles once they were delivered. Greece said it would retaliate to such an attack on Cyprus’s behalf. The crisis lasted until late 1998, when a compromise agreement was reached, under which the systems were instead delivered to Crete and placed under Greek control.

However, Lavrov conveniently omitted the credible reports that his predecessor from that time, Yevgeny Primakov, had pushed for the sale to undermine NATO’s volatile southern flank. The long-range S-300s could theoretically have enabled Nicosia to monitor and target Turkish warplanes operating inside Turkish airspace. In light of Primakov’s alleged gambit, it would, as previously outlined here, be historically ironic if those very same missiles ultimately end up in Ukraine’s arsenal and make their combat debut shooting at Russian warplanes.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova also noted that Greece would violate the original contract if it made the transfer when she said the proposal showed “a complete indifference by Greece on the international limitations on arms trading.”

States usually apply end-use conditions on arms sales. When Venezuela proposed supplying Iran with its F-16s in 2006, the U.S. objected, warning Caracas it would need Washington’s written permission before it could transfer those American jets to any third country. Russia is usually more lax with what buyers do with the military hardware it sells, especially regarding human rights violations and war crimes. The transfer of significant quantities of Soviet-era and Russian weaponry to Ukraine undoubtedly alarms Moscow and, at least partially, explains the likes of Lavrov citing contractual agreements on prior arms sales to dissuade countries from making such transfers.

Georgiy Lvovich Muradov, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Crimea under the President of Russia, also commented on the matter. Muradov served as Russia’s ambassador to Cyprus throughout the missile crisis.

“As the Russian ambassador to Cyprus at the time, I can remind you that they do not work against Russia, because they are equipped with a system of recognition of ‘friend-foe’,” he said. “However, transferring these systems to Kyiv would undoubtedly radically undermine the Greek defense potential.”

His reference to the system’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) was curious. After all, the potential threat the S-300 could have posed to the Hellenic Air Force because of its Russian IFF was raised in 1999.

“One of the things you build into a system like this is the ability to distinguish between good guys and bad guys,” warned a NATO diplomat at the time. “The Russians don’t have this in their software because we haven’t given them our codes. [The Greeks] have to go to the Americans for help, one presumes, if they don’t want the missiles to lock on to their own planes.”

Muradov’s claim that Greece dispensing itself of the S-300 could “radically undermine” its “defense potential” is downright ludicrous. Greek S-300s are the older PMU-1 variant. The U.S. objected to Athens having Moscow upgrade them to PMU-2 configuration, which would have substantially expanded the range and accuracy of the missiles before the Ukraine war began. Consequently, the missiles are of limited military value to Greece going forward, especially if it can get Western replacements.

Furthermore, military ties between Greece and the United States are rapidly expanding. Athens may field fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II stealth jets by the decade’s end. It is upgrading most of its F-16s to the latest Block 72 Viper configuration and has begun receiving Dassault Rafale jets from France. In light of all this, Athens has no further use for Russia as a military supplier. Even before Russia invaded Ukraine, Greece showed no intention of incurring sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) by buying any additional Russian weaponry or even upgrading its aging inventory.