Ukraine Can Now Target Russian Bases With Western Missiles—But How Many Remain?

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced Monday that Berlin, as well as the UK, France and United States has extended permission to Ukraine to use Western-supplies weapons to broadly attack military targets anywhere in Russia—marking the definitive end of a longstanding self-imposed taboo.

However, Merz’s declaration may feel as frustrating as it’s welcome to Kyiv, because Ukraine’s military has likely expended most of the long-range missiles it received in 2023-2024. That outlook could improve, though, if Germany in particular finally transfers such weapons to Ukraine.

Per Le Monde, Merz stated: “There are no longer any range restrictions on weapons delivered to Ukraine – neither by the British nor by the French nor by us nor by the Americans. This means that Ukraine can now defend itself, for example, by attacking military positions in Russia… With very few exceptions, it didn’t do that until recently.”

This new stance, likely made in response to Putin’s repeated failures to genuinely engage with ceasefire negotiations, marks a major change in policy, even if it was preceded by earlier relaxation of the no-strikes-on-Russia policy in 2024.

The most notable long-range weapons concerned include the SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow air-launched missiles from France and the United Kingdom (different national designations for the same missile), and ATACMS ballistic missiles delivered by the United States for ground launch by HIMARS and M270 launchers.

Despite nuclear threats from Putin, ATACMS and Storm Shadows both were already used to strike targets in Russia in Fal 2024, after France, the U.K. and U.S. first each separately authorized use of such weapons on Russian soil under specific conditions (generally targeting military assets involved in direct attacks).

Now in theory Ukraine can use such weapons against a much wider range of military targets—but the question of inventory looms.

Ukraine is thought to have received “less than 50” ATACMS (both older, shorter-range M39 missiles and newer variants) by Fall 2024, and likely expended multiple missiles on more than a half-dozen known strikes.

Meanwhile, France, Italy and the UK originally procured 1,600 Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles (split 500/200/900 respectively), of which some were expended prior to 2022 and portion of which now likely require refurbishing. It’s believed Ukraine has received a few hundred Storm Shadows, including 40 delivered by France this January.

More will follow, but both France and the UK will want to retain hundreds for their own air forces in the event of future conflicts. Missile expert Fabian Hoffman estimates that factory production of SCALPs to be around 50 new missiles per year (and unlikely more than 100) though Paris’s recent allocation of €2 billion to broadly increase missile production rates might improve that.

The Taurus question

Merz also reiterated that Berlin would stop declaring its arms transfers to Kyiv. That implies it’s hypothetically possible a new transfer of long-range weapons to Ukraine could be underway (or soon will be) but hasn’t been made public.

The remaining elephant in the room is Germany’s KEPD-350 Taurus stealth cruise missile—long on Ukraine’s wish list, but which Merz’s predecessor Olaf Scholz balked at donating. Though Merz previously supported transferring Taurus to Ukraine, he has remained ambiguous on this topic since assuming the chancellorship.

The 3.5-ton Taurus missile was developed jointly by Germany and Sweden, and features jam-resistant guidance, a heavy two-stage bunker/bridge-buster warhead, and has a range exceeding 310 miles (perhaps even over 400) thanks to its fuel-efficient Williams F122 turbofan engine. Germany procured a total of 600 Tauruses, many needing refurbishment. However, a potential forthcoming Swedish order may reopen Taurus’s presently closed production line, which historically produced 40-60 per year according to Hoffmann.

If launched over Ukraine’s Chernihiv region, Taurus, and full-range SCALPs on paper should be capable of reaching targets around Moscow roughly 300 miles away. However, in practice the need to launch from lower altitudes to avoid Russian air defense may reduce range.

The impact of long-range strikes

Ukraine has already had successes using Western-supplied long-range missiles striking Russian forces on Ukrainian soil. Storm Shadow missiles released by Ukraine’s Soviet Su-24M bombers killed a Russian Major General at his command post, ruptured several key bridges, devastated the Black Sea Fleet HQ, and knocked out two large landing ships and the first Russian submarine lost to enemy fire since World War II.

Meanwhile, ATACMS strikes knocked out 21 or more Russian helicopters landed at a forward bases and later blasted an S-400 air defense battery.

Over time Russia adapted to Ukraine’s longer-range weapons by pulling vulnerable assets out of easy striking range and distributing more broadly air defenses and satellite-navigation jamming (which degrades munition accuracy) to counter missile attacks. Ukraine’s long-range drone attacks on military and economic targets deep inside Russia have further compelled broader air defense deployments. Thus, Kyiv’s preferred targets on Russian soil may be less vulnerable than they were 2-3 years ago.

Nonetheless, exposing airbases and munitions depots on Russian soil to attack by missiles that are much harder to intercept, faster, and more destructive than Ukraine’s long-range kamikaze drones has potential to cause headaches.

Ukraine might particularly benefit from targeting bases of Russian fighter-bombers used for glide-bombing attacks on the frontline, or to strategic bombers, ballistic missile and kamikaze drone assets raiding Ukrainian cities. These threats can be killed more efficiently on the ground than when in the air, as related by the maxim “target the archer, not the arrow.”

The question from Kyiv’s standpoint remains exactly how many long-range missiles has it set aside? And how many more might it receive this year or the next, with a particular eye turned towards Germany’s still ‘untapped’ stock of Taurus missiles? Will any more weapons be forthcoming from the U.S., perhaps purchased via European financing—whether more ATACMS or even the AGM-158 JASSM cruise missile compatible with F-16 fighters?

And ultimately: do the resulting numbers suffice to execute successful strikes that meaningfully affect Russia’s slow-grinding ground campaign, and sustained missile and drone raids?

Unless Ukraine has managed to set aside more munitions than is generally estimated, lifting of targeting restrictions may have limited initial impact. However, if there’s meaningful sustainment of long-range missile transfers to Ukraine, it might extend Kyiv’s ability imperil key assets within a few hundred miles of Ukraine—at least selectively.