U.S. Navy To Make Do With 10 Flattops As Latest Carrier Running Late

The future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) is now expected to join the fleet in March 2027, nearly two years later than the previously scheduled date. The second Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarrier was scheduled to have a delivery date of July 2025, but the handover was pushed back to March 2027. The delay is attributed to issues with the Advanced Arresting Gear and Advanced Weapons Elevator, two critical systems on the warship.

The carrier’s prime contractor, Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding, explained that there have been challenges in implementing improvements to those systems with USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78).

“Specifically, John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) construction was fairly advanced when many Ford lessons were realized, precluding timely implementation of lessons learned for Kennedy,” HII spokesperson Todd Corillo said in a statement to the media.

This is the most recent delay for CVN-79, as the carrier previously had an expected delivery date of June 2024, but that was pushed back two years ago. The only good news is that the most recent delays shouldn’t further impact the next two Ford-class flattops.

“In contrast, Enterprise (CVN-80) and Doris Miller (CVN-81) have been able to incorporate, leverage and capitalize on Ford lessons learned earlier in the construction process,” Corillo added.

That sugarcoats the fact that CVN-80 had seen its delivery date shifted from September 2029 to July 2030. This resulted from supply chain issues and limited material availability. The lead vessel of the new class of supercarriers, USS Gerald R. Ford, had run about two years behind schedule, but then faced further delays as numerous systems were far from combat-ready.

That resulted in initial delays with the USS John F. Kennedy, but problems persist.

One Fewer Flattop In Service

In the long run, these delays may help HII and even the United States Navy streamline the construction process with this newest class of nuclear-powered supercarriers. Yet, the bigger issue is that the delay will cause some severe near-term headaches for the U.S. Navy.

Its oldest nuclear-powered carrier, USS Nimitz (CVN-68), is scheduled to be retired next May. That will reduce the number of carriers in service on paper, but in practice, the situation may be even more dire. USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) is currently undergoing her Refueling and Complex Overhaul, which was initially scheduled to be completed next month.

The RCOH is now running at least 14 months behind schedule, and although it will extend the service life of the carrier by 25 years, CVN-74 won’t return to service until October 2026 at the earliest. Then there is the fact that the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) is preparing to begin the same process, which could mean that next year, two carriers are sidelined, while one is taken out of service entirely.

“The news of yet another potential delay to the next Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier lands at a precarious moment for the U.S. Navy, and not simply because of a production timeline,” explained geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of threat assessment firm Scarab Rising.

She said it underscores a more profound strategic vulnerability, one of overreliance on aging leviathans and an industrial base increasingly outpaced by geopolitical necessity.

“With the USS Nimitz approaching retirement and already deployed in a high-tension theater, the Navy faces a narrowing operational margin at precisely the wrong time,” warned Tsukerman.

Rotating Carriers To Multiple Hotspots

USS Nimitz is now operating in the Red Sea to deter further aggression from Iran and its regional proxies. It isn’t alone, as USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) has been in the Middle Eastern waters since early this spring, relieving CVN-75, which had been deployed to the region last November.

The U.S. Navy has rotated multiple carriers to the region. Still, it has also left much of the Indo-Pacific without a carrier on station, even as China has continued to rattle sabers by deploying its two conventionally-powered flattops further into the Pacific.

Tsukerman said that the U.S. Navy’s growing dependency on a handful of nuclear-powered flattops reflects a kind of strategic inertia.

“These ships project overwhelming force and remain indispensable to U.S. power projection, but they are also complex behemoths tethered to an industrial process that is slow, expensive, and prone to disruption,” Tsukerman added. “A 20-month delay is not just a schedule slip. It is a signal flare for adversaries and an indictment of a procurement strategy that concentrates capability into a brittle few.”

She further compared the U.S. Navy’s ability to juggle its limited carrier resources to a house of cards, as in it is “visually impressive but easily compromised.”

Every nuclear-powered supercarrier that is in maintenance following an extended deployment or undergoing a lengthier RCOH represents a void in the sea service’s forward presence. That void is increasing measured in years, not weeks.

“Operational tempo strains personnel and ships alike, while carrier availability often resembles a shell game: a high-stakes maneuver to maintain appearances without the necessary depth of capacity,” Tsukerman noted. “This imbalance exposes critical seams in U.S. naval readiness, particularly in an era when pacing threats are growing more sophisticated and opportunistic.”

The Cost Of Power Projection

It remains true that nothing can do what a carrier can do, notably in terms of moving a vast number of aircraft and personnel to hotspots. However, the most significant selling point of a nuclear-powered carrier is increasingly its greatest weakness. It may have unlimited range and endurance, but it is still dependent on a supply of food, water, and crucially, aviation fuel.

Last September, that became crystal clear when the USNS Big Horn, a key oiler, ran aground and partially flooded off the coast of Oman. It briefly left the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group without its primary fuel source, exposing a significant vulnerability in the U.S. Navy’s reliance on aging oilers.

Moreover, China has put great effort into developing its so-called “Carrier Killer” intermediate-range ballistic missiles and, more ominously, hypersonic missiles. Such weapons raise questions about whether the U.S. should be building such massive carriers at all.

“The cost-benefit calculation for these ships has shifted,” said Tsukerman. “Once a cornerstone of deterrence, their price tag now invites hard questions. Are they still the most agile answer to modern threats? Or have they become gilded symbols of a bygone era, perpetually behind schedule and vulnerable to both budgetary politics and technological disruption?”

It isn’t just the missiles that could strike a carrier; surface and underwater drones could also pose another threat, while satellite targeting has significantly narrowed the operational sanctuary these vessels once enjoyed.

“None of this renders carriers obsolete,” suggested Tsukerman. “Rather, it demands a doctrinal recalibration. The U.S. Navy cannot afford to tether its global posture to a few slow-turning ships. Diversification, in platforms, propulsion, and deployment models, is no longer a theoretical consideration. It is a strategic imperative. Without it, America risks being outmaneuvered not by lack of will or ingenuity, but by its ponderous designs.”