These Concurrent Developments Could Have Wide-Ranging Ramifications

Two concurrent developments in August relating to Russian-built S-300 air defense missile systems in Greece and Syria could have substantial ramifications for both regions.

Crete lock-on

On Aug. 28, Turkey’s state-run press reported that the tracking radar of a Greek S-300 system on Crete locked onto Turkish F-16 fighter jets flying at an altitude of 10,000 feet west of the Greek islands of Rhodes on Aug. 23. According to Turkey, its F-16s were undergoing a reconnaissance mission in international airspace.

If confirmed, the incident raises serious questions about the status of those Crete-based missiles.

The Republic of Cyprus originally ordered those S-300s on Crete back in the mid-1990s. They were ultimately diverted to Greece after Turkey threatened to preemptively destroy them if they ever arrived on the divided island. Greece put them in storage and later test-fired them in 2013 for the first time.

If a Greek S-300 radar did indeed lock-on to Turkish F-16s this August, that could indicate Athens may either be testing the system again or considering putting them into active military service.

Greek Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos ruled out the prospect of Greece transferring its S-300s to Ukraine in early June, proclaiming that Greece faces “a real threat” and would not transfer “What we need, what is useful, and mainly operationally active.”

Panagiotopoulos undoubtedly had Turkey in mind when he spoke of the threat Greece faces. While tensions between Greece and Turkey have heated up again in recent months, putting Greek S-300s into active service could further increase tensions and possibly even trigger a crisis.

When Greece first obtained those S-300s, Turkey claimed that the threat of conflict was merely being relocated from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Aegean Sea. Raising similar points that the U.S. and NATO recently raised to Turkey for its acquisition of newer and more advanced Russian S-400s, Turkish officials warned that S-300s in Greece’s arsenal could undermine NATO security. After all, those missiles were designed to shoot down NATO warplanes.

In 1999, a senior NATO diplomat warned that Greek S-300s could threaten Greek and Turkish warplanes alike, given that they lacked NATO standard Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems. At the same time, a senior Western diplomat also warned that those missiles could inadvertently trigger a war, stating: “It’s absolutely possible for Turkish warplanes to fly within range of the missiles during routine flights in international airspace, for the missiles to lock onto them and for the Turkish planes to respond.”

Twenty-three years later, if Ankara’s latest allegation is indeed accurate, an S-300 radar has locked onto Turkish warplanes.

It’s unclear if Greece has resolved the IFF and other issues mentioned above by those diplomats late in the last century. However, their firing of S-300s in training exercises suggests the Greeks are at least adequately familiar with operating them.

Either way, putting these strategic Russian missile systems into active service now could risk a significant escalation in recurring Greek-Turkish tensions over the Aegean with unpredictable consequences.

Syria redeployment

Recent satellite imagery released by the private ImageSat Intl. firm shows that Russia has taken the ostensibly Syrian S-300 system based in Masyaf in northwest Syria and shipped it out of the country.

Russia first delivered the S-300 in 2018. It claimed the battery would help modernize Syria’s antiquated air defenses after a vintage Syrian S-200 missile shot down a Russian military transport while attempting to target Israeli jets attacking targets in Latakia province. All 15 Russian servicemen aboard that plane perished.

However, since that delivery, it has been clear that Russian personnel alone were in charge of those Syrian missiles. Consequently, Syria was never permitted to use them against Israeli warplanes that frequently penetrate the country’s airspace to attack suspected Iran-related targets. That’s why it was noteworthy when one S-300 missile was fired off on May 13 for the first time shortly after Israeli jets attacked targets near Masyaf. The missile did not have a radar lock on any of the jets, and, as speculated here at the time, the firing was clearly a shot across the bow merely intended to warn Israel against crossing Russian red lines.

Indeed, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz described it as “a one-off incident” in late July and stressed that the Israeli jets were in no danger and “weren’t even in the area” when the missile was launched.

On Aug. 14, Israeli jets targeted a shipment of Iranian-made missiles just outside Russia’s Tartus port in western Syria. That incident demonstrated that Israel had not been deterred from striking Iranian targets in Syria, even if they are in areas that Russia views as a violation of its red lines.

With Russia having packed up and shipped “Syria’s” S-300 out of the country, Damascus air defenses remain limited, antiquated, and incapable of preventing continued Israeli airstrikes. Russia retains its military’s S-400 missiles in its airbase in Syria’s Latakia province but is unlikely to use them against Israeli jets on Syria’s behalf.

While Russia draws down some of its forces in Syria to support the Ukraine war, there have been recurring fears and speculation that this is allowing Iran to entrench itself more deeply in the country in their place.

At the same time, the removal of the Maysaf S-300 has, in the words of one oped in the Israeli press, cleared the way for Israeli strikes. Furthermore, the S-300 redeployment is concurrent with the revelation, disclosed by the New York Times on Aug. 26, that Syria has told Iran that it doesn’t want any retaliation for Israeli strikes carried out from Syrian soil, fearing it could spark an all-out war. Consequently, Iran and its proxies retaliated for the Aug. 14 Israeli attack by targeting U.S. bases in Syria the following day.

The Syrian S-300 redeployment ultimately proves what was already long clear: Russia’s 2018 deployment of the system to Syria was a wholly futile gesture (as was its May 13 firing), which was never going to deter Israel from striking Iran’s proxies in Syria. Its redeployment could also signal that the Israeli Air Force has even greater freedom of action over that country as Russia focuses more of its resources and attention on its costly war in Ukraine.