The Risk Of A Turkey-Israel S-400 Missile Crisis In Syria

Turkey has reportedly mulled transferring its strategic, Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defense missile systems to Syria. Such a move may be a gambit to regain authorization to buy American F-35 stealth strike fighters. However, doing so could risk igniting a crisis with Israel.

In coordination with the new Syrian government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Turkey recently scoped out airbases in central Syria to deploy drones and air defenses. Israel expressed its opposition by bombing those same bases.

Israel and Turkey are now negotiating a deconfliction mechanism to avoid potential accidents or clashes. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has already warned about Israeli and Turkish fighter jets encountering each other in Syrian airspace, emphasizing the necessity and urgency for deconfliction.

Turkey reportedly plans on establishing a multilayered air defense around the central Syrian T4, or Tiyas, airbase. These would initially consist of short- to medium-range Turkish Hisar systems but could include a deployment of the S-400. Israel would undoubtedly view any deployment of the latter as provocative, as would the United States.

In a recent letter to the State Department, Representatives Brad Schneider and Gus Bilirakis sought to emphasize the dangers of any Turkish deployment of the system to Syria. They highlighted the S-400’s purported maximum range of 250 miles and “anti-stealth detection” capabilities, warning that its deployment could “fundamentally alter the regional air defense landscape” of the country.

“If positioned along Syria’s western corridor, it could severely constrain Israeli operations against Iranian assets or Hezbollah supply routes,” they wrote. “This would degrade Israel’s operational flexibility in the region and erode the technical basis of its qualitative edge that the United States has long worked to preserve.”

The letter also touches upon who would ultimately control the systems in Syria.

“Moreover, ambiguity around system operators only adds fuel to the fire,” Schneider and Bilirakis wrote. “If Turkish personnel retain operational control, the risk of direct confrontation with Israeli forces becomes real. If Syrian or proxy forces take over, the U.S. loses even more visibility and influence, introducing a new layer of strategic instability into an already combustible environment.”

Presumably, the systems would remain under the exclusive control of the Turkish military during any Turkish deployment at T4 or any other central Syrian airbase, much like Russia’s S-400s in Syria did. On the other hand, there has been recent speculation in Turkish media that Ankara may ultimately donate the high-end systems to Damascus to have the F-35 ban lifted. The U.S. banned Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 after Ankara acquired S-400s. Washington has maintained that Ankara must remove the systems from the country or dismantle them to end the ban. Others in Turkish media previously speculated that deploying the S-400s in Syria could resolve the issue.

While any S-400 deployment would certainly raise eyebrows, transferring them to the Syrian military could prove much more provocative for Israel and may incur a preemptive attack.

Russia has repeatedly stated that the end-user certificate for the Turkish S-400 doesn’t permit Ankara to sell the system to a third country without explicit Russian consent. Moscow is eager to establish friendly ties with the new government in Damascus to retain access to its military bases on the Syrian coast but has refused Sharaa’s request to extradite former President Bashar al-Assad. It’s not inconceivable that Moscow may authorize a potential Turkish S-400 transfer to Sharaa, but it’s probably not all that likely.

Interestingly, Schneider and Bilirakis also argue in their letter that any S-400 transfer would not undo the triggering of sanctions under the CAATSA—Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act—legislation. After all, those sanctions were triggered by Turkey’s $2.5 billion transaction with the Russian defense sector, and simply relocating the S-400s to another country six years later doesn’t undo that transaction.

While Russia deployed S-400s at its coastal airbase until Assad’s regime collapsed in December 2024, Israel had a deconfliction mechanism in place by the time they were deployed in late 2015. Furthermore, Moscow seldom interfered with Israeli Air Force incursions against Iran-backed forces and weaponry across the country throughout the civil war. Therefore, Israel may view S-400s under the control of the new Syrian military as a much graver threat.

Israeli airstrikes have already destroyed what was left of Assad’s strategic military arsenal since the Syrian dictator fled to Moscow, including his Russian-built air defenses, to prevent other factions from acquiring them. Consequently, it would not sit idly by if Turkey supplied Damascus with a system more advanced than anything Assad could have even dreamed of having.

The Republic of Cyprus sought to acquire Russian S-300PMU-1 systems in the 1990s to deter persistent Turkish overflights. The Cyprus S-300 crisis rapidly ensued when Ankara threatened a preemptive attack to destroy them once they arrived, fearful that those strategic missiles would undercut its overwhelming air superiority over that divided island. Eventually, a deal was worked out, and Greece received them instead, averting a potential war.

A Syria S-400 crisis could occur if Damascus receives Turkey’s Russian-built systems. The likelihood of a preemptive Israeli strike may even prove significantly higher than a Turkish strike in those days.

It’s probably more likely that if Turkey does transfer its S-400s to Damascus in tandem with a military deployment in the country’s center, they would be Syrian in name only. That’s precisely what happened with the “Syrian” S-300PMU-2 Russia deployed in 2018. Ostensibly delivered to modernize Syria’s outdated air defenses in the face of Israeli airstrikes, the system remained under direct Russian military control until Moscow withdrew it in 2022 after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Turkey could similarly “gift” Syria its S-400s while its military retains exclusive access to and control over them. Either way, Syria’s new military would require extensive training on how to operate and maintain that sophisticated system.

Ankara may ultimately try to convince the Israelis during deconfliction talks that its S-400s will pose no more threat to them than Russia’s did for almost a decade.

Whatever ultimately happens, it’s already clear that any movement of Turkey’s S-400s over its southern border will be highly consequential.