The Decline Of Russian Artillery In The Ukraine War

Commonly dubbed the “King of Battle,” artillery is a critical asset to any military. Indeed, modern warfare leverages the destructive nature of artillery to shape the battlefield from extended ranges. The Russian military has built their military structure around the tactical use of artillery, such that each individual Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) includes an artillery battery. This allocation provides substantial firepower for these smaller, tactical units. Russian artillery has historically provided their forces with a large advantage on the battlefield. However, as the war in Ukraine continues to evolve, Russian artillery has become one of their largest vulnerabilities.

In theory, a Russian BTG centers around the artillery. When used as intended, the infantry and armor units, which comprise the bulk of the BTG, are intended to protect the artillery battery, allowing them to position themselves in an advantageous location. The artillery then targets enemy forces in coordination with drones, electronic warfare, and forward observers; they then inflict significant damage and force the enemy to withdraw from an area. The BTG can then quickly seize this territory and repeat the process, driving forward. This tactic worked well in Crimea in 2014, where artillery was responsible for 80 percent of the Ukrainian casualties. Given its relative importance, the Russian military has invested heavily in their artillery systems, with many of the newer systems having enhanced ranges and firepower.

During the wider invasion of Ukraine that began last February, the Russian employment of artillery did not go as intended. Russian drones were inadequate for locating Ukrainian targets, and the communication networks were too unreliable for units to share information about the battlefield. As such, the BTG commanders opted to use their artillery to blast away at large areas with the hope of hitting Ukrainian targets. Estimates give that as many as 60,000 rounds of artillery were fired by the Russian forces per day, most of which did not hit any military target. Indeed, Oryxpioenkop.com only reports 1,810 destroyed or damaged pieces of Ukrainian military equipment.

This overuse of artillery results in a number of issues. First, the high expenditure of rounds resulted in a staggering load on the Russian supply networks and logistic trains. Ukrainian reports claim that the Russians have depleted most of their artillery reserves. In addition to the rounds, the artillery pieces themselves are typically not made to handle firing that many rounds. Even with proper maintenance, the barrels must be replaced after a certain number of shots, and the Russians are likely depleting these barrels as well. These resupply lines have been a frequent target of Ukrainian artillery, drone and missile attacks.

A larger issue arises with the employment of counter-battery systems by the Ukrainians. These advanced systems can detect an incoming round and pinpoint the round’s origin prior to it even making impact. As such, modern doctrine requires that artillery systems move immediately after firing to avoid counter-battery fires.

However, the Ukrainians are not necessarily targeting the artillery pieces themselves. Indeed, the Ukrainians have only destroyed a small percentage of the Russian artillery carried into the war, with fewer than 400 pieces destroyed. Rather, once the Ukrainians know the location of the artillery cannons, they also know the general vicinity of the BTG. The Ukrainians can then use their arsenal of drones and electronic warfare systems to pinpoint Russian command posts, vehicles, and troop concentrations, which are subsequently targeted and destroyed.

These issues with artillery likely arose from a lack of training among the Russian ranks. Prior to the invasion, many of the units were under-trained, with large training events likely cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the Ukrainians have decimated the Russian officer corps, forcing the Russians to deploy under-trained officers with little experience into a ferocious fight. These somewhat overwhelmed officers would naturally be attracted to artillery given its firepower and standoff; however, they lack the experience to know the second order effects from over-using artillery.

Artillery at its most basic level requires three things: ammunition, cannons and soldiers to fire it. The Russians are quickly depleting their supply of all three. As these items continue to dwindle down, the Russians will increasingly turn to other alternatives, including loitering munitions and cruise missile strikes. However, the Ukrainian forces are establishing a robust network of air-defense systems to handle these weapons, and the Russians are reportedly depleting their inventories of them as well.

Since the start of the invasion, very little has gone as planned for the Russian forces. The lack of training and experience, particularly by Russian officers, has led to the overuse of artillery. The Ukrainians have successfully exploited this issue, turning what should be a large Russian strength into one of their largest vulnerabilities.