SECDEF Shutters 250 Million Gallon Fuel Storage Site. Navy Looks For Options.

In a terse memo, Lloyd Austin, America’s Secretary of Defense, ordered the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, “to take all steps necessary to defuel and permanently close the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility” on Hawaii.

This comes in response to a festering water contamination crisis that started in late November, after a series of avoidable leaks from piping serving the fuel storage facility enabled fuel to contaminate a significant amount of Hawaii’s drinking water. Austin’s move settles months of dithering as the Navy struggled to find a cost-effective and face-saving way forward.

But the closure order alone wasn’t enough for Austin. In the directive, the Secretary of Defense issued some tough deadlines. According to the Defense Secretary, the Secretary of the Navy, “in cooperation with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency,” has just twelve weeks to provide a plan of action with milestones to defuel the facility.” Layering on the complexity, the defueling plan must begin “as soon as practicable after the facility is deemed safe for defueling,” but be completed within 12 months.

The Secretary of Defense also notified the Navy that America’s Sea Service needed to foot the bill, directing the Navy to “plan and budget for all necessary corrective action.” In addition, the memo states that the 250 million gallons of reserve fuel originally stored at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility will be redistributed “across the Indo-Pacific” both “on land and afloat,” putting the Navy on the hook for new tankers and fuel storage sites throughout the Pacific.

The abrupt announcement and brutal timeline is a big win for Hawaii, and a refreshing affirmation that the opinions of base hosts and neighbors do matter. For Hawaii, it suggests that the Department of Defense is set to address local concerns more directly than they have in previous basing controversies elsewhere.

In the end, fighting to keep Red Hill open, particularly as the Department of Defense prepares to renegotiate long-standing leases for several critical Hawaii military facilities, wasn’t worth it.

What’s the Navy Going to Do?

For the Navy, the challenge is daunting. In the space of a single memo, the Navy lost 250 million gallons of fuel storage on Hawaii. But all is not lost. The transition away from centralized bulk storage to widely distributed and smaller, more manageable facilities makes certain sense. It won’t be easy, but it can be done.

The figures are pretty daunting. To hold all of Red Hill’s stored fuel at sea, the Navy would need about 38 additional John Lewis (T-AO 205) Class Replenishment Oilers beyond the 20 already planned. That’s an impossible ask. But some extra offshore fuel storage may already be baked into the Navy’s latest long-term shipbuilding plan. On February 18, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Gilday, offered a broad outline of a future 500 ship fleet. In the new plan, the number of naval auxiliary ships would gradually grow from the present fleet of 62 ships to about 100 vessels of various types. While Gilday was coy about specifics, the extra auxiliaries in Gilday’s plan certainly won’t all be tankers. But they don’t need to all be tankers; just adding nine more cheap, civil-spec State Class tankers fits within the 500-ship plan and offers the Navy the capability to “mobilize” about half of the fuel that was originally locked into the Red Hill Bulk Fuel storage tanks.

Bulk fuel can also be distributed to shore facilities throughout the Pacific. At out-of-the-way places like the U.S. Coast Guard Kodiak Support Center Bulk Fuel Storage Facility, some six million gallons of JP-5, gas and diesel is already available. The Navy can easily add a few more storage tanks at Kodiak and elsewhere, at similar facilities. A few million gallons may not look like much in comparison to Hawaii’s massive storage facilities, but, in time, those extra tanks add up. Fuel tucked away someplace in American Samoa, throughout Alaska, on the islands of Guam, Saipan and elsewhere offer the Navy both an added measure of operational resiliency as well as fewer opportunities for catastrophe, where the Navy can, though years of mismanagement and chronic neglect, destroy a community water supply and erode local good-will.

It’s Not Over Without Accountability

The Navy has yet to complete their internal investigation into the case of the Red Hill leaks. Given the closure order, the Navy probably doesn’t come out looking very good. But Secretary Austin has done everything he can to assuage angry Hawaiians. The only other option left is to demand accountability. The memo sets a framework for moving forward—if the Navy fails to meet the Department of Defense timeline, heads can and should roll. The same should be true for the Navy’s investigation. Chronic mismanagement and chronic underfunding of the logistical underpinnings of the Navy really do matter, and those responsible should be shown the door.