Italian air force F-35 fighters prepare for take off during the “Blue Flag” multinational air defence exercise at the Ovda air force base, north of the Israeli city of Eilat, on October 24, 2021. (Photo by JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images)
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Saudi Arabia wants to buy up to 48 of Lockheed Martin’s premier fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II stealth strike fighter aircraft. President Trump has already endorsed a deal during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House this week. While the jets would give Saudi Arabia a potentially game-changing technological edge over Iran, there are concerns in the U.S. and Israel that they could compromise the latter’s qualitative military edge over the Middle East.
“I know they’d (Israel) like you to get planes of reduced calibre, but as far as I’m concerned, I think they are both (Israel and Saudi Arabia) at a level where they should get top of the line,” Trump remarked to the crown prince during their Tuesday meeting.
Comments like these, and a sale in general, raise questions over the U.S.’ commitment under law to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, QME, over the region.
The Israeli Air Force has explicitly objected to any sale, declaring it could erode its air superiority over the region, aptly demonstrated during the 12-day June war against Iran. Nevertheless, the current Israeli government reportedly hopes that Washington will condition the sale on Riyadh agreeing to normalize relations with Israel. Riyadh consistently refuses to do this without Israel first committing to a clear and credible path toward Palestinian statehood.
Furthermore, Reuters reported on Wednesday that the F-35s Washington sells the kingdom, contrary to Trump’s remark, will be less advanced than the F-35s in Israel’s air force.
Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, has doubts that the U.S. would provide Saudi Arabia F-35s with capabilities “on par” with Israel’s fleet, given its legal commitment to Israel’s QME.
“Saudi Arabia could potentially be provided with lower capability F-35s, eventually, but only if the Israelis are sufficiently convinced that the Saudis would not pose a threat,” Heras told me. “And when the F-35 system is older and an alternate advanced system is available to the Israelis.”
“This is why the F-16 pathway for Saudi Arabia is appealing to the Americans because advanced F-16s are still highly capable fighters that can serve numerous roles,” he added. “But they’re not so advanced as to threaten Israel’s QME over Saudi Arabia.”
After Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May, the White House boasted that it had secured up to $142 billion in arms deals with Riyadh. Fearing that could include F-35s, Senator Lindsey Graham and members of Trump’s National Security Council reportedly pushed for selling Saudi Arabia less advanced fourth-generation F-16s instead. Riyadh never bought F-16s. As far back as the late 1970s, the kingdom outright rejected them as an alternative aircraft to the more advanced F-15s it sought at that time and ultimately received.
Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, noted that ties between Washington and the Saudi crown prince have “noticeably deepened” since Trump’s return to office. That’s the case even though the Saudi stance on Israel remains unchanged, as it reemphasizes its insistence that Israel first establish a credible path to statehood for the Palestinians before it agrees upon any normalization in relations.
“From Washington’s perspective, supplying F-35s would strengthen Saudi Arabia’s deterrence against shared adversaries without posing a threat to Israel, despite the absence of formal normalization,” Khoueiry told me. “And, even if QME reasons don’t block the deal, there are other reasons that might.”
These reasons, Khoueiry outlined, include Riyadh’s “interests in end use requirements” and “using the deal to leverage better deals and terms from other countries.” The latter isn’t unlike what the UAE did with France in December 2021, when it immediately reached a deal with Paris for 80 advanced 4.5-generation Dassault Rafale F4 multirole fighters after suspending the F-35 deal. Another reason, of course, is pending Congressional approval.
“The U.S. can choose to supply F-35A jets to Saudi Arabia without technically violating its commitment to Israel’s QME by taking either or both of two key approaches,” Khoueiry said.
“First, Washington could offer Saudi Arabia a downgraded version of the F-35A, by restricting certain weapons, limiting software baselines, among other things, so that the Saudi capability remains meaningfully less advanced than what Israel flies,” he added.
“Second, the U.S. could make the case that Israel’s unique variant, the F-35I ‘Adir,’ already has custom Israeli systems, software and integrations that place it above the baseline F-35A the Saudis might receive, thereby fulfilling the legal requirement that Israel maintain a superior qualitative capability.”
In the RANE analyst’s estimation, these paths could “help satisfy” the QME requirement. However, he noted that both pose “political and technical challenges,” as Congress and Israel would insist on detailed assurances.
“Israel under its current government and regional posture is unlikely to want an equally capable neighbor, especially one that hasn’t normalized ties, unless this package is supposed to be, with Israel’s nod, an incentive for Saudi Arabia starting negotiations to normalize,” Khoueiry said.
Another potential issue raised by Pentagon officials ahead of Trump’s meeting with bin Salman concerned potential Chinese espionage of any Saudi F-35s. A central factor in the suspension of the UAE deal for 50 F-35s, agreed at the end of Trump’s first term after the UAE joined the Abraham Accords, was Washington’s opposition to Abu Dhabi allowing Chinese firms to develop its 5G infrastructure. The U.S. charged that this could have enabled Beijing to obtain sensitive data related to the capabilities of any F-35s in Emirati service.
A similar outcome may prove less likely with Abu Dhabi’s western neighbor.
“Saudi Arabia wants to do business with China but stay married to the United States,” Heras of the New Lines Institute said.
“Despite China’s increased efforts to become more prominent as an arms dealer in the Middle East, it is not close to replacing the United States,” he added.
“The Saudis want the F-35s because even ‘lower end’ F-35s are combat-proven aircraft that would give Saudi Arabia its own qualitative military edge against potential adversaries such as Iran in future conflicts.”
A finalized Saudi F-35 deal could prompt Qatar and the UAE to also seek F-35s, in Abu Dhabi’s case, for a second time, or equivalent fifth-generation combat aircraft. RANE’s Khoueiry doubts Washington would approve any sales to them in the near term, or would at least “prolong negotiations,” especially with the UAE.
Furthermore, Qatar already “enjoys unprecedented U.S. security guarantees,” including one granted by Trump through executive order after Israel’s unprecedented Sept. 9 attack targeting Hamas political leaders in Doha. Such guarantees, Khoueiry reasons, give Washington a “strong argument” that Doha doesn’t need F-35s while under such direct U.S. protection.
“In contrast, despite strong relations, there is some degree of skepticism in Washington on the UAE due to its expanding defense partnerships with Russia and China and its diversified arms purchases from multiple suppliers like France,” Khoueiry said.
He cited the UAE’s previous request for F-35s as part of the deal that “fell through, given the preconditions” Washington insisted upon. Abu Dhabi used the talks it suspended to get a better deal from France for Rafales.
“These concerns make it highly improbable that the UAE would secure F-35s anytime soon, even if they ask and despite its normalized ties with Israel,” Khoueiry said.
That could result in a peculiar outcome in which the preeminent Arab Gulf state that first normalized diplomatic relations with Israel doesn’t ultimately acquire any F-35s, while the one that didn’t does.