Rwanda’s Nuclear Bet: Powering Growth Before Decarbonization

KIBUYE, RWANDA – MARCH 09: Engineers travel by boat to the gas extraction barge during a shift change on March 09, 2023 in Kibuye, Rwanda. The KivuWatt power plant, built through international cooperation with the Rwandan government, is located in the middle of one of the great Rift lakes, between Rwanda and DR Congo, and produces electricity from the immense quantities of gas trapped in the depths of Lake Kivu. (Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images)

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Rwanda is not approaching nuclear energy as a climate statement. It is approaching it as a development strategy.

The country’s leadership sees electricity demand rising faster than its current system can reliably supply, particularly if Rwanda is to meet its ambitions for industrial growth, digital services, and regional competitiveness. Hydropower and renewables remain central to its mix, but they are constrained by variability, land availability, and the growing need for firm, always-on power.

In that context, nuclear—especially small modular reactors (SMRs)—has entered Rwanda’s planning not as a leap of faith, but as a calculated response to scale, reliability, and cost. SMRs also align with Rwanda’s push into energy‑intensive sectors such as data centers, advanced manufacturing, and mineral processing, all of which require stable baseload power that intermittent renewables alone cannot promise.

Rwanda has already licensed SMR sites, hosted a continent-wide nuclear summit, and begun building regulatory capacity—signals that its interest is no longer theoretical. For Kigali—Rwanda’s capital—the appeal is straightforward: a dense, land‑constrained country needs power that is dependable, compact, and capable of supporting long-term economic expansion.

“Energy abundance is the objective,” Lassina Zerbo, a senior Rwandan advisor and nuclear science diplomat involved in the country’s nuclear planning, told me. “Decarbonization matters—but it follows from having enough reliable power to grow the economy in the first place.”

Zerbo, who also served as Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister from 2021 to 2022, says the country must roughly triple its power generation using SMRs by the mid-2030s to meet its economic objectives. That projection reflects anticipated growth in industrial parks, logistics hubs, and digital infrastructure—sectors that require firm, high‑quality power.

That framing is increasingly common across the Global South—and it helps explain why nuclear energy is quietly regaining attention in places where it was once dismissed as too expensive, too complex, or too politically fraught.

Across low‑income and developing economies, leaders tend to prioritize one thing above all else: access to stable, affordable electricity at scale. Decarbonization is often viewed as a complementary benefit—not the primary driver—of energy policy.

That is where the nuclear case is being rebuilt. According to a new analysis commissioned by the Rockefeller Foundation, integrating nuclear power into national portfolios can reduce total system costs from 2% to 30%, depending on country-specific conditions. These savings go well beyond plant operations, encompassing transmission buildout, fuel costs, storage requirements, and the need to overbuild renewable capacity to compensate for intermittency.

Nuclear, the study argues, does not compete with renewables—it complements them, providing firm baseload power that allows solar and wind to scale without destabilizing the grid or driving up system-wide costs.

“Renewables will continue to be the fastest and cheapest way to add generation,” says Cassady Walters, Vice President for Power at the Rockefeller Foundation, in an interview. “But nuclear can be additive—allowing countries to avoid overbuilding their systems while providing the baseload power needed for industrialization.”

For countries facing rapid demand growth, land constraints, and tight budgets, that combination is increasingly difficult to ignore.

From Early Adopters to Emerging Aspirants

Not all developing countries are starting from the same place. South Africa and India represent the more advanced end of the spectrum, with existing nuclear infrastructure and long-term expansion plans. India already operates roughly 8 gigawatts of nuclear capacity, has another 5 gigawatts under construction, and has set a target of 100 gigawatts by 2047.

South Africa’s progress reflects decades of early investment and institutional capacity—advantages many peers lack.

Others, like Ghana and Rwanda, are at a much earlier stage. Ghana has no operating nuclear plants but is actively pairing nuclear planning with an industrial strategy centered on mining and mineral processing. Rwanda, similarly, sees nuclear as a way to avoid the cost and complexity of overbuilding renewables, storage, and transmission in a small, densely populated country. Both countries view nuclear not as a prestige project but as a practical tool for meeting industrial demand.

In Rockefeller’s modeling, nuclear’s potential contribution across emerging economies ranges from 8% to 31%, depending on national circumstances and development goals. The takeaway is not uniformity, but flexibility: SMRs are one tool among several, scaled to local needs.

None of this minimizes the obstacles. Nuclear projects remain capital-intensive, politically sensitive, and slow to deploy. Financing, in particular, remains the most formidable barrier—especially for countries already burdened by high debt.

Public trust is another constraint. The Philippines offers a cautionary tale: a completed nuclear reactor that never operated due to public opposition. Safety concerns, whether grounded in outdated perceptions or legitimate governance failures, can derail projects. Rwanda has not yet faced significant public pushback, but the absence of opposition today does not assure acceptance tomorrow, making early engagement essential.

“Governments have to build public confidence in safety and safeguards,” Walters notes. “That challenge can be as decisive as financing.”

SMRs may ease some of the upfront cost pressure, but they are still at an early stage of commercial deployment. Timelines from concept to operation remain ambitious, even under ideal political and regulatory conditions. Cost projections also vary widely, and while many analysts expect prices to fall with scale, that outcome is not guaranteed.

Why the Financing Argument Is Shifting

Still, the financing landscape is changing. In 2024, both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank lifted longstanding bans on nuclear financing—an institutional signal that nuclear is compatible with development lending. The shift reflects rising electricity demand, concerns about grid reliability, and recognition that industrialization requires firm power sources that intermittent renewables cannot fully replace. The Rockefeller Foundation hopes the African Development Bank will follow.

Rwanda, for its part, is already engaging with international partners and structuring mixed financing approaches that combine public, private, and multilateral sources. Whether those deals ultimately close remains an open question—but nuclear energy is gaining traction globally, driven by its abundance, reliability, and climate benefits.

“The cost of these technologies isn’t static,” Walters says. “We saw dramatic cost declines in renewables over time. There’s no reason to assume nuclear won’t follow a similar trajectory.” Even so, early projects will likely be expensive, and countries must plan for long‑term cost recovery rather than short‑term savings.

But chronic power shortages that cap economic growth may be even more expensive. And, Rwanda does not present itself as a nuclear evangelist. Instead, it positions itself as a test case.

If a small, land‑constrained, low‑income country can responsibly integrate nuclear into its energy mix—building regulatory capacity, securing financing, and earning public trust—it could offer a model for others facing similar constraints. Success is far from certain. But the status quo is not a lasting solution either.

“In the years to come, I bet most African countries will deploy SMRs, says Dr. Zerbo. “The bigger plants can’t link up to the infrastructure they are building. Rwanda has the political will and, with that, follows the technological capacity and the ability to train workers. And then, we will attract investors.”

In much of the Global South, the nuclear debate is no longer about ideology. It is about whether energy systems can provide the abundance needed for growth. Emerging countries are therefore considering nuclear energy, which explains why international financial institutions have shifted their lending policies. For many governments, the question is no longer whether nuclear aligns with climate aims, but whether their development goals are achievable without it.