Russia’s Shadowy Mercenary Air Force Is Losing More And More Jets In Ukraine

The Sukhoi Su-24M supersonic bomber that was shot down and crashed practically on top of Ukrainian positions outside Bakhmut on Dec. 2. was flown by a pair of veteran aviators on contract with The Wagner Group, Russia’s notorious and mysterious mercenary firm.

The Su-24 is at least the third Wagner-flown warplane the Ukrainians have shot down since Russia widened its war on Ukraine starting in February. Wagner also has lost a pair of Sukhoi Su-25 attack jets.

The losses underscore the enduring threat Ukrainian air-defenses pose to Russian planes, and also highlight Wagner’s sizeable—perhaps even growing—share of the Russian air campaign over Ukraine.

It’s apparent that, when Wagner deploys significant ground forces, it also puts its own pilots in the cockpits of older Russian warplanes—and flies those planes in direct support of its fighters on the ground.

The legal, logistical and command framework for Wagner’s air operations remains murky, however. Does Wagner buy or rent Russian planes or merely borrow them? Does the Kremlin exercise any direct control over Wagner’s pilots or does the mercenary firm choose all its own targets and plan all its own sorties? Who compensates the families of the growing number of Wagner pilots who’ve died in combat?

Wagner’s involvement in the Ukraine air war became evident no later than late May, when Ukrainian troops firing a Stinger shoulder-fired, infrared-guided missile shot down an Su-25 over Popasna, 20 miles east of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

The BBC confirmed the man who died behind the Su-25’s controls while supporting the Russian attack around Popasna was Kanamat Botashev.

The 63-year-old Botashev was retired. He left the Russian air force as a general back in 2012 after “borrowing” a Sukhoi Su-27 fighter—a type he was not qualified to fly—and crashing it after a brief, acrobatic joyride. Following his retirement, Botashev reportedly signed with Wagner.

A month later, Ukrainian 72nd Mechanized Brigade troopers packing an Igla shoulder-fired missile shot down another Su-25 and captured Andrey Fedorchukov, the jet’s aging pilot. Fedorchukov told his interrogators he was on a $3,200-a-month Wagner contract.

Ukrainian troops also used a shoulder-fired missile to down the Su-24 over Bakhmut in December. The pilot and co-pilot both died and Russian forces retrieved the bodies. Russian media identified the crew as Alexander Antonov and Vladimir Nikishin. Photos indicate both aviators were in late middle age—and presumably had retired from active military service before joining Wagner.

If Wagner has lost three jets, it almost certainly operates several times that number. Consider that the wider Russian aviation enterprise since February has written off around a fifth of the 300 or so tactical jets it has deployed in and around Ukraine. If the same loss rate applies to Wagner, the mercenary company might oversee dozens of jets.

It’s apparent the airframes are, or until very recently were, in the Russian air force’s active inventory. The Su-24 that crashed in Bakhmut at the time of its destruction still wore air force markings and its government serial number, RF-93798.

But the Su-24, like the Su-25, is among the older types in Russian air force service. The air arm steadily is replacing both types with newer variants of the Sukhoi Su-27. Perhaps the Kremlin allows Wagner to put its pilots in the cockpits of jets the air force already has tapped for retirement.

That doesn’t clarify exactly how Wagner supports the planes with fuel, weapons and parts—and how it plans sorties. It is clear, however, that Wagner conducts air strikes in the same sectors where the company’s battalions conduct ground operations. Wagner for months weirdly has focused on capturing Bakhmut, a town with little strategic value. The company’s air raids mostly target Ukrainian forces in the same area.

Wagner’s air corps appears to be new and might be immature. “In both Libya and Ukraine there are reports that Wagner Group members have flown fixed-wing Russian air force aircraft—and that in Ukraine the pilots have included retired Russian air force officers,” Kimberly Marten, a Columbia University political scientist, told a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee back in September. “But there were no reports of an air force connection before 2020,” Marten added.

The eventual resolution of the battle for Bakhmut—whenever that might be—could shed some light on Wagner’s business model for aerial warfare. Once Wagner captures Bakhmut, or gives up on capturing Bakhmut, will it add its pilots to Russia’s wider air campaign? Or will Wagner pilots, in the cockpits of government jets, continue only supporting Wagner ground forces?