Russian Throws In Kamikaze Drones To Slow Ukrainian Advance loitering

Videos and reports from the front line suggest that Russia is making heavy use of loitering munitions to slow Ukraine’s counter-offensive, in particular small FPV [‘First Person View’] improvised kamikazes. It comes as no great surprise that even modern armor like German-supplied Leopard 2 tanks and U.S.-supplied Bradley infantry fighting vehicles are vulnerable to these weapons. But while Ukraine has reportedly stockpiled tens of thousands of kamikaze drones, it is not clear whether Russia can field them in large numbers. Will they make a difference?

“Russian Telegram channels report that the Airborne Forces are using FPV drones to counter Ukrainian military,” says Sam Bendett, an expert on Russian uncrewed systems and adviser to the CNA and CNAS thinktanks. “Even if this is part of official propaganda, there was a massive push recently by Russian soldiers and volunteers to train on and adapt FPV drones for combat.”

There are two main types of loitering munition: the larger, military version, like the U.S. Phoenix Ghost and Russian Lancet-3M, and smaller, improvised FPVs made from modified racing drones. Both work in the same way; the operator, wearing immersive video goggles, flies the drone to the known location of an enemy vehicle, finds it and crashes the drone with its anti-armor warhead into the target.

One video dated June 10^th is claimed to show a Leopard 2A6 hit and destroyed by a Lancet, while another collection shows three more apparent hits on Leopards by FPV drones. Significantly, they do not show the results. Note that Ukraine only has about 70 Leopard-2s. Videos collected by Rob Lee, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, also show apparent FPV hits on an MRAP, Humvee and trucks as well as M113 and Bradley all in the last few days.

Loitering munitions present a fundamentally different threat to previous anti-tank weapons available to infantry, making them much harder to counter. For decades, foot soldiers have relied on two type of weapon: shoulder-launched rockets, like the Russian RPG
RPG
series and the descendants of the WWII bazooka such as the M4 Carl Gustav, and larger guided missiles like Russia’s Kornet and Ukraine’s Stugna-P. The standard way of dealing with both is twofold. Suppressive fire, artillery and machinegun fire on to defensive positions will prevent anti-tank gunners from taking aim, and the use of smoke screens, either delivered by artillery or from smoke grenade launchers on a vehicle will protect vehicles as they advance.

Neither of these methods works against loitering munitions. The operator can be some kilometers away, hidden in a bunker, and cannot be targeted for suppressive fire, unlike someone using a rocket launcher or guided missile who needs to be within line-of-sight. And loitering munitions can circle around or attack from above, making smoke screens useless.

In addition, loitering munitions have far greater ranges than traditional infantry weapons. Even a basic FPV drone can hit a target ten kilometers away, and the Lancet-3 has a reported range of 40 kilometres, allowing it to find and hit any concentration of forces across a wide area.

Jamming, which can be an effective protection against small commercial drones, is also limited to line-of-sight and is clearly less effective against attack drones coming in at very low altitude.

However, while Ukraine has wholeheartedly embraced the use of FPV attack drone in particular, with both volunteer groups like Escadrone and commercial companies like One Way producing them at a rate of thousands per month, in Russia the response has been more piecemeal and improvised, and against official opposition.

“Russian Telegram channels are posting that FPV drone use is happening organically and ‘rather contrary to the MoD,’” says Bendett.

In fact, in Russia the development of attack drones seems to have run in parallel with the Ministry of Defense’s suppliers. And volunteer efforts have been thwarted by a Soviet-legacy command structure which does not welcome outside initiatives or see any need to change.

“We built the (FPV) drone ourselves, with munitions and, most importantly, developed tactics for using this weapon by the troops,” said one Russian blogger on Telegram in March. “We tried to negotiate with military units that could test our drones. Unfortunately, what is understood at the tactical level is not always understood at the top of the command chain…For a couple of sensible division commanders, there will always be someone higher who will not only screw up all initiatives, but will make sure that there are no such initiatives at all.”

However, Bendett notes that the obstruction by the military seem to be lessening.

“They [FPV drones] are indeed getting embraced more at the tactical level,” Bendett told Forbes. “It is unclear to what extent the high command is on board, but at least it seems not to be in the way.”

Bendett points to a video recently posted on Russian social media showing around three hundred FPV attack drones assembled by the Revenge Swam project. It is not clear just how effective these are against armored vehicles. Most carry only a small warhead about two pounds, and both Escadrone and One Way mentioning the need for larger warheads to guarantee a kill against heavily armored vehicles like tanks. However, some images show larger Russian FPV attack drones with the KZ-6, the seven-pound warhead fitted to the Lancet. And at least one video of a small Ukrainian FPV completely destroying a Russian T-80 shows it can be done.

As Bendett notes, the Russian reports will contain a large element of propaganda, and many of the supposed kills may have inflicted little or no damage.

In one notable case, a video posted on Russian social media showing a supposed successful Lancet strike on a Leopard tank was undermined by a Ukrainian video showing the target was actually a wooden dummy, with the delighted builder laughing next to the burning remains. Unlike other weapons, loitering munitions provide the operator with a close-up view of the target, they can still be fooled.

Loitering munitions are an unwelcome addition to Russia’s arsenal. But while they may be causing casualties, there is no sign that they are stopping the Ukrainian advance yet. And, tellingly, we have not seen large-scale FPV attacks from the Ukrainians, even though they now possesses a genuine Army of Drones including dedicated drone assault units. These may be held in reserve for a later phase either to break defenses or to exploit a fast-moving situation when a breakthrough becomes possible and may show whether this new weapon gives more advantage to offense than defence. Either way, the effect may be far more dramatic than what we have seen from the Russians.