Russian Military Will Face Challenges Securing Occupied Territory In Ukraine

During their initial invasion of Ukraine, the Russian offense failed to break through a staunch Ukrainian defense. Although the Russians have regrouped and have seized portions of the Donbas region in southeast Ukraine, the tide of war has not necessarily turned in the Russian favor. While they face a tough counter-offensive from the Ukrainians, the Russian military’s biggest challenge will likely be in securing the regions that they have taken, militarily referred to as stability operations.

These stability operations are already underway in Russian-occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin has indicated that they expect to hold a “referendum” in these regions to annex them into Russia on September 11. Meanwhile, Ukrainian partisans in these occupied territories are resisting the occupation, including destroying Russian political buildings in Melitopol and Mariupol. The Russian military is actively involved in stability operations to garner support for the referendum and suppress the Ukrainian partisans. Given the nature of the Russian military, they will likely fail in these operations.

Fundamentally, the Russian military is not set up to perform stability operations. The basic component of the Russian military structure is the Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), which consist of approximately 800 soldiers, 10 tanks, 40 infantry fighting vehicles, and a large amount of artillery. These units rely strongly on their tanks and artillery units, which can lay down heavy bombardments at fairly long ranges. The Russian military is currently piecemealing together new BTGs from volunteers, conscripts, and the remnants of old BTGs. While some of these units are intended to fight the Ukrainian Army, many are destined into occupied territory to perform stability operations.

One of the complexities of stability operations is that it involves urban combat, which typically requires infantry soldiers. Less than a quarter of the soldiers in a BTG are infantry. To overcome this issue, the Russian military is relying on proxy troops or paramilitary units to augment their infantry soldiers. However, these units are fairly disorganized and under equipped. Additionally, recent evidence shows that some of these paramilitary units may be at odds with the Kremlin.

Another issue is that the Russian military excessively uses artillery, even in stability operations. Artillery, especially the older equipment common in the piecemealed BTGs, is not necessarily accurate, and they are likely to hit civilian targets in crowded urban areas. This in turn can destroy critical infrastructure and increase the animosity of the local population, thus decreasing the security of the region.

With these limitations, the Russian military, especially in conjunction with paramilitary groups, use fear and intimidation to subjugate the local populations. In Syria, the Russian military indiscriminately fired at both civilian and military targets with the goal of intimidating anyone into not opposing them. In Georgia and Crimea, the Russian occupation forces denied essential services to people unless they renounced their original citizenship and got Russian passports. It appears the Russians are following similar trends in the portions of Ukraine that they occupy.

These techniques typically fare poorly for the Russian military. For example, during their ten year occupation of Afghanistan, the then Soviet Army lost 15,000 soldiers, as compared to 2,500 American deaths over twenty years. In their more recent activities in Syria, Chechnya, and Georgia, their stability operations have resulted in humanitarian issues, refugee crises, and international rebuke. Further, in none of the cases did the Russians achieve their desired end-state.

The occupied Ukrainian territories will likely be harder for the Russians to control than Syria, Chechnya, or Georgia. A survey found that 77 percent of Ukrainians living in regions controlled by the Russians do not support the occupation. Another survey from prior to the war indicated that a large portion of Ukrainians, including those of Russian ethnicity, were willing to take up arms against Russian occupiers. These Ukrainian partisans will have access to advanced weapons supplied from the Ukrainian military and from the international community. Given the geography of the region, it would be challenging for the Russians to stop this equipment flow. Furthermore, the Ukrainians have shown themselves to be technology savvy, leveraging commercial technology for military purposes.

Meanwhile, the Russian military has depleted their resources – both personnel and equipment – on the invasion of Ukraine. Recent moves to mobilize its defense industrial base and creating “volunteer” units will alleviate some of these issues. However, many of these resources will be allocated to fighting the Ukrainian counter-offensive. The personnel going performing stability operations will likely be undertrained with little to no urban or counterinsurgency training. Additionally, the Russians will lack the raw materials and resources necessary to rebuild the portions of Ukraine that they destroyed in the conquest. Without restoring key infrastructure, they will further fuel an insurgency.

Should the Ukrainian counteroffensive fail and the Russians annex portions of southeast Ukraine, the war is far from over for the Russians. As seen from the American military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Russians will likely be committing their military to being in the occupied portions of Ukraine for a substantial amount of time. Given their tactics and organizations, they will have numerous challenges in securing the region and may never gain full control of the region.