Russian Aggression In Ukraine: Possible Scenarios

Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, and the threat to European safety that it represents, became the center of the discussion of the 58th annual Munich Security Conference this past week. Simultaneously, U.S. president Joe Biden stated that Russian president Vladimir Putin has already made the decision to invade his country’s smaller neighbor to the west. 

 “As of this moment, I’m convinced he’s made the decision,” president Biden told White House reporters. “We have reasons to believe that.” 

At this time, no analyst or military expert can precisely describe what would happen if Russia were to attack Ukraine. But given Russia’s historic aggression towards its neighbor, and Putin’s obsession with security and maintaining control over former pieces of the dissolved Soviet Union, some experts see clues that lead to their being several possible outcomes for the tense situation.

At the Munich Security Conference, at a special Ukrainian lunch now in its fifth year and organized by the Yalta European Strategy and Viktor Punchuk’s foundation, a handful of current and former military, political and intelligence operatives and thought-leaders focused their conversation on Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the possibility of war.

Among them was David Petraeus, former U.S. Army general and retired director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “What we assess, generally, are capabilities,” said Petraeus. Referring to the open-source intelligence about the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian border, he said that while they can’t determine intent or read Putin’s mind, there are pieces of intel that can be used for analysis. “What really has been striking and most worrisome in recent weeks has been the deployment not of the tanks and the infantry, and all the rest of that; it’s the deployment of so-called enablers–it’s the combat support for artillery and the rest; the refueling, hospitals.”  

The former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan continued: “When you see field hospitals set up–you don’t need field hospitals for an exercise, you need those for invasion. That is what is particularly concerning.”

While world leaders and NATO officials leave open the chance for a diplomatic solution to the current turmoil, Ukrainians are contemplating how the situation could possibly develop.  

“The danger is that Ukraine could be invaded from all sides,” says Pavlo Khazan, Russian-Ukrainian war veteran and chairman of the National Defense Foundation in Ukraine. “From Belarus in the north, from the Black Sea in the south, and from Luhansk-Donetsk territories that are now occupied by Russia.” Khazan suggests that it would be desirable for Russia to hold strategic cities like Mariupol, Odessa and Kharkiv. In Donbas, he said, there are industrial plants  and other infrastructure “that could be very dangerous for the environment” if they get into the wrong hands or were struck by missiles. “This could create serious problems with air and water pollution,” Khazan said.

Unless something changes at the last moment, Russia looks sure to further invade Ukraine’s Donbas region. Russian military forces in occupied territories in Eastern Ukraine – Donetsk and the Luhansk People’s Republic – have become increasingly active over the last week: shelling Ukraine-controlled areas of Donbas, evacuating orphanages and demonstrating a preparation to attack.

Taras Berezovets, 46, a political analyst, TV host in Kyiv, and the author of the book Annexation: The Island of Crimea. Chronicles of Hybrid War, thinks that besides activities in Donbas, an attack on Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is a real possibility. And it might happen disguised as an attack by another power. “It could be done from the Belarussian border,” Berezovets says. “Putin is a KGB officer, he always plays hybrid operations. He can say, ‘the army of Donbas is fighting in Donbas, and here Ukraine is attacked by Belarus because Ukraine shot at a Belarussian helicopter. It’s not us.’”

This wouldn’t be the first time Russia used military forces that weren’t in official Russian military uniforms. Pretending their forces are not really their forces provides Russia the possibility of avoiding sanctions or serious repercussions if the West choses to believe it. Recognized by many as a poor strategist but good tactician, Putin, suggests Berezovets, will likely try different approaches: pushing the red line, watching reactions and determining his next moves. He predicts the roller-coaster of escalation and de-escalation could become a long-term game for as long as Putin stays in power.

Among Ukrainian politicians, thought-leaders, military strategists and businessmen, the consensus is that the most optimistic scenario would be for the threat to remain just a threat. But that is unlikely. Russia’s goal seems to be to force Ukraine to incorporate the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk – run by Russian proxies – into Ukraine, thus gaining a foothold into Ukrainian parliament and the power to use its veto power to steer Ukraine away from the pro-western course the country has pursued in recent years. Putin’s ultimate wish is likely for the federalization of Ukraine, which he’d said he wanted for the country before sending Russian forces to invade parts of Ukraine in 2014.

If seizing all of Donbas isn’t enough to force Ukraine to give in to Russian demands, another possible scenario would be an airstrike or a military air operations on strategic targets like military bases, military arsenals, power stations and airports. This could result in a lot of casualties and civilian deaths. The ultimate intent would be to create chaos, and more fear and anxiety in Europe than there already is.

James Mattis, former U.S. secretary of defense, said: “There are only two kinds of states Putin wants to have on his peripheries: the ones that do exactly what he says and enemies. Unless Ukraine is willing to violate its own sovereignty, I would be very pessimistic within the next couple of days and weeks. He may very well move. He doesn’t have to–if he can keep the initiative without moving, he won’t. But he had put the enablers in place. He is ready to move. He has the capabilities. The problem for him is going to be the day after.”  

 The “day after” the start of any further invasion of Ukraine would bring the brutal sanctions the collective West is preparing to impose on Russia. 

If diplomacy and a united response by the West works, the most optimistic scenario, Berezovets said, would be the one in which “Ukraine avoids painful concessions with Putin and avoids war. Ideally, under the pressure of sanctions and unavoidable military losses, Putin may limit it to just threats and never start any attacks in Ukraine–in Donbas, nor elsewhere.” 

Indeed, some experts question Putin’s army’s capacity to fully invade and sustain the occupation of Ukraine. In Russia, the support for war in Ukraine is not thought to be high, although it’s impossible to conduct an accurate survey on such a matter in a non-transparent, authoritarian country. In Ukraine, the patriotic spirit is very high, and the army, as well as the general population, are willing to fight to the end.