Russia Now Has Little Hope Of Becoming A Major Middle East Arms Supplier

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will likely prove to be the final nail in the coffin of Moscow’s goal of becoming a major supplier of military hardware to the Middle East and North Africa.

On Sept. 30, 2015, Russia intervened militarily in the Syrian civil war on the side of President Bashar al-Assad, whose regime was then on the defensive. Over the next few months, Russia gave a combat debut to several new weapons systems, striking targets across Syria and helping Assad’s forces regain the offensive against his ragtag rebel opponents.

Russia seized the opportunity the conflict presented to showcase and put its military gear to the test. While the Russian expeditionary force based out of western Syria included Soviet-era workhorse aircraft like the Su-24 Fencer and Su-25 Frogfoot, it also featured sleek new planes like the Su-34 Fullback. Russian Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers that had never been in combat before flew long-range missions from Russia itself to bomb targets in Syria. In another demonstration of the Russian military’s reach, Kalibr cruise missiles were launched from the Caspian Sea into Syria early in the conflict.

In January, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of the U.S. Army, admitted that he was surprised “when Kalibr missiles came flying out of the Caspian Sea, hitting targets in Syria.”

“That was a surprise to me, not only the capability, but I didn’t even know they were there,” he confessed.

Hodges called Syria a “live-fire training opportunity” for Russia’s military. This view was echoed by none other than Russian President Vladimir Putin, who described his Syrian campaign as “a more effective training for the country’s military than drills.”

It seemed the “new” Russian military was taking the opportunity to improve the deficiencies that were so evidently on display in its infamous five-day war against Georgia back in August 2008, a conflict that Michael Kofman, a noted expert on the Russian military, once suggested “should be considered the Soviet military’s last hurrah.”

Early in the Russian Syria campaign, rumors abound that Algeria, a long-time buyer of Russian hardware, wanted Su-34s after seeing them in action. Putin certainly sought to use the Syrian conflict to market Russian hardware, and Moscow was never shy about using war as an opportunity to increase its share in the volatile region’s arms market.

“As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands this. The more conflicts there are, the more they buy weapons from us,” said Sergei Chemezov, the head of Russia’s state-owned Rostec defense conglomerate and a close ally of Putin, in 2015

Putin clinched a lucrative sale of long-range S-400 air defense missile systems to NATO member Turkey in an unprecedented deal. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan even hinted his country might be interested in Russian Su-35 Flankers or even the fifth-generation Su-57 Felon Moscow has long been developing. Putin personally showed Erdogan these aircraft on a visit to Russia in 2019 after buying the Turkish leader ice cream.

Then there is Egypt. In the mid-2010s, Egypt bought more military equipment from Moscow than at any other time since the 1970s. These procurements included a fleet of MiG-29M2 fighters and S-300VM air defense missile systems. Iraq also bought T-90 main battle tanks from Russia instead of more U.S.-built M1 Abrams, following its earlier purchase of a fleet of Russian attack helicopters, and repeatedly contemplated buying S-400s in recent years.

After drones damaged Saudi Aramco oil facilities in September 2019, Putin seized the opportunity to push for regional countries to buy Russian air defenses, claiming they were far superior to the U.S.-built defense systems operated by the Saudis. In 2017, Russia and the United Arab Emirates were reportedly developing a fifth-generation jet based on the MiG-29. Russia proposed the UAE could co-produce its purported fifth-generation Su-75 Checkmate in late 2021.

However, shortcomings in what Russia can actually offer, what regional countries want, and the difficulty of doing business with Moscow became evident even before the Ukraine war.

For one, the U.S. introduced the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017. That law, among other things, mandates the imposition of sanctions against any country that purchases high-end Russian military hardware. CAATSA sanctions were imposed on Ankara in December 2020 over its S-400 purchase.

Then there were the proposals that never got off the ground and the deals that fell through.

While Saudi Arabia had agreed to buy the S-400 in 2017, it ultimately opted for the American THAAD system instead. Since talk of co-developing a fifth-generation fighter with Russia, the United States permitted UAE to buy 50 fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II jets in late 2020. While Abu Dhabi has suspended talks on that landmark deal that doesn’t mean it will turn to Russia for an alternative. It also remains to be seen if Russia can even fully develop either the Su-75 or the Su-57. In the meantime, the UAE seems content with its multi-billion-dollar order for 80 highly-formidable 4.5-generation French Dassault Rafale F4 jets it signed in late 2021.

In 2018, Egypt ordered a fleet of Su-35s, running the risk of incurring CAATSA sanctions. Egypt made that order since the United States had refused for decades to sell it either advanced long-range air-to-air missiles or heavyweight air superiority fighters. However, Egypt is reportedly unhappy with its purchase. For one, the Su-35s Russia built for it lack Actively Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar. Furthermore, Egypt found that the electronic countermeasures of its Rafale jets swiftly overpowered the Su-35’s Irbis-E radar. Now, Washington seems willing to finally sell Cairo F-15s for the first time, which would completely negate its need for Su-35s.

It’s worth reiterating that Moscow faced all these setbacks before its military trundled into Ukraine on Feb. 24 and suffered hardware losses that fatally undermined Putin’s carefully cultivated image of a modern and proficient Russian military. CAATSA will retrospectively look like a mild irritant compared to the sweeping sanctions imposed on Moscow over its aggression against its neighbor.

Not only will Russia find it much harder to sell new weapons systems, but it will also find it challenging to provide maintenance for and supply spare parts to present operators of Russian hardware. This could make even long-time Russian arms clients, such as Algeria, reconsider their options going forward.

“I do think many countries that have these legacy Russian systems will be worried – not only worried about buying new fancy systems like the S-400, but we’re just talking ammunition, spare parts, basic supplies for Russian legacy systems that they already have,” Donald Lu, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs, told a Senate Foreign Relations subpanel in early March.

All these difficulties, obstacles, and uncertainties will most likely lead more countries in the Middle East, like most other parts of the world, to conclude that going into the arms business with Russia is more trouble than its worth.