Russia Captured Three Of Ukraine’s Smallest Helicopters. So Ukraine’s Allies Sent Three Replacements.

When Russian troops overran the port city of Kherson in southern Ukraine early in Russia’s wider war with Ukraine beginning in late February, they seized some unusual prizes. Three inoperable Mil Mi-2 light helicopters that the Ukrainians had used for training and liaison missions.

The loss of three Mi-2s reduced by around a quarter the Ukrainian army’s inventory of the four-ton, three-blade helicopters.

It’s possible that, in the chaotic early months of the wider war, the Ukrainian army didn’t terribly miss its old Mi-2s—the tiny rotorcraft reportedly aren’t very popular. In any event, Ukraine’s foreign allies stepped up to replace the Mi-2s … with more Mi-2s.

That might actually matter now that the war shows no sign of ending anytime soon. Replacement Mi-2s should help to sustain the Ukrainian army’s pilot-training program as the service looks ahead to months, even years, of further fighting.

The Ukrainian army has four front-line aviation regiments—the 7th and 16th in the west, the 11th in the south and the 18th in the east. On paper, each has around a dozen Mil Mi-24 attack helicopters, 20 Mil Mi-8 or Mi-17 transports and three Mi-2s.

The 12-ton Mi-8s and Mi-17s are the workhorses. They haul troops and supplies, rescue wounded personnel and even perform a limited ground-attack role with their rockets and machine guns.

The 13-ton Mi-24s are more heavily-armed and armored—and faster—and thus better-suited for more dangerous missions closer to the front lines.

There’s no evidence the Ukrainians ever have operated their Mi-2s anywhere near the front—and for good reason. It’s the smallest, slowest and most vulnerable of the army’s helicopter types.

There was an effort a few years ago to transform the 1980s-vintage Mi-2s into miniature gunships. In 2015, Ukrainian firm Motor Sich proposed to upgrade the Mi-2s and arm them with pods for 80-millimeter rockets and pintles for crew-served machine guns on the cabin doors.

The army didn’t take up Motor Sich on its offer, perhaps recognizing that adding weapons to the lightweight Mi-2s would only make them slower and more vulnerable—and sending them into harm’s way would be nearly suicidal for their crews.

So the Mi-2s remained in the training and liaison roles, flying only in uncontested air space. They apparently were a low priority for repairs, which might explain why the three Mi-2s belonging to the 11th Aviation Regiment were still on the tarmac when the Russians overran the regiment’s base in Kherson in early March.

Two months later, a driver photographed Russian army trucks hauling away the three now-rotorless, ex-Ukrainian Mi-2s.

So the 11th Aviation Regiment was short its three Mi-2s—until mid-August, when Latvia pledged to Ukraine a pair of its own Mi-2s. Earlier, Poland had pledged a specially-modified Mi-2 medical-evacuation helicopter.

The Latvian Mi-2s should restore the Ukrainian army more or less to its original Mi-2 strength, allowing the four aviation regiments to continue training new pilots while also flying combat missions.

That’s not nothing. Defying the odds, the Ukrainian army’s helicopter force weathered the most dangerous early months of the war, losing just nine Mi-8s and Mi-24s that analysts can confirm. Foreign donations of fresh transports and gunships already have made good those losses.

As it braces for a potentially very long war, the Ukrainian army will need to induct and train new pilots—potentially hundreds of them. They’ll need training helicopters. The Mi-2s aren’t glamorous, but they’re perfectly adequate for practice.