Israel’s Strategy Against Iran: Will It Succeed?

As the Israel-Iran confrontation extends day after day, while officials claim it could last weeks, it’s useful to take a dispassionate look at the goals and likely outcomes. Readers will recall that this columnist covered a comparable events on site in Israel a year or so ago. This after decades of covering the wider region for Newsweek and the Wall Street Journal. So, peering through the fog of war let us find areas of clarity where possible.

This latest round of the conflict began with precision strikes by Israel successfully targeting top members of the Iranian regime’s military and nuclear leadership. One should pause there a moment and put that in context. Russia and Iran ratified a security treaty in April which, inter alia, included Russian anti-aircraft defenses. Did they not function? What happened to their efficacy? If such a strategic treaty means anything it means at least defending the regime, if not the country. Russia doesn’t want regime change in Iran – certainly not a Western-style democracy hostile to Moscow. There will undoubtedly be leaders in Tehran wondering about the value of the Russian alliance, its weapons and guarantees. Or indeed there will be suspicions of Russian perfidy – as happened over Syria.

In the first days, Israel limited its attacks to military and nuclear affiliated leaders and sites. Moscow wouldn’t (in private) necessarily mind that scenario – it would rather have a non-nuclear Iran on its southern borders anyway or at least one dependent on Russian nuclear installations. Plus Moscow would doubtless welcome the spike in oil prices that a regional conflict spurs – which indeed is happening now. The problem is that the momentum of events is turning into a test of the regime’s legitimacy – that is to say, threatening the regime’s power.

The success of Israel’s initial attacks meant Tehran had to respond. And not just as a piece of theatrical son et lumiere as happened last time when Israel got off virtually unscathed. But as Tehran fired back repeatedly and began to get through sporadically, Israel has widened the range of targets. Attacks on energy installations will certainly spike the price of oil. But damaging the regime’s oil revenues, blacking out Tehran’s electricity grid, and causing civilian disorder definitely weakens the government’s grip on power. These latest additional targets, combined with the rising civilian casualties in Israel, constitute an escalation where both sides are striving to alienate the opposing side’s public from its leadership.

There is some media talk that Israel asked President Trump for permission to take out Supreme Leader Khamenei and Trump refused. This sounds implausible in its literal form. Did they ask permission before launching the attacks in the first place? And taking out other top leaders? If not, then why consult the US about Khamenei? No, it’s more likely to be a form of subtle or not-so-subtle messaging – Trump kept Khamenei alive this time. In return, nuclear concessions should be forthcoming otherwise the US might not be able to restrain the Israelis next time. This exact strategy, scaled up, is likely the core calculation of Israel’s strategy for the full-scale renewal of hostilities.

Why suddenly attack a number of nuclear installations if you can’t take them all out in a first strike or after several strikes? Iran has nuclear plants buried deep inside mountains, inaccessible to air strikes and others that would, if flattened, contaminate large areas of the Persian Gulf. Including Arab states potentially friendly to the US and Israel. Short of a ground attack with US troops included, these parts of Iran’s nuclear network are to some degree invulnerable. So why then launch the attacks in the first place? The answer lies in the Khamenei protocol above. Remember that top nuclear and military personnel were also neutralized in the first strikes. In other words, because the installations cannot all be destroyed, those responsible for them can and will be.

In short, this is a kind of anti-personnel war disguised as a strategic anti-infrastructure campaign. Israel has repeatedly shown that it can knock out vital component parts of hostile leadership from Hezbollah to Iran. That is the nature of this latest Israeli casus belli too. Nuclear and military officials will either negotiate away Iran’s nuclear threat or they themselves will pay. The principle applies equally to Khamenei himself. Time will tell if the regime leaders react as desired. Thus far, it seems not. Iran’s counterstrikes at Israel and the widening of the domestic damage in each country suggests that a much longer attritional struggle to induce regime change by each side is on the cards.