A Barak ER (extended range) missile during a March 2021 trial in Israel. Photo by IAI.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)
Despite taking delivery of its new Barak MX air defense missile systems from Israel discreetly, quite literally under the cover of night, the Republic of Cyprus has nevertheless received warnings from Turkey. The acquisition is the most significant Nicosia has received since ordering S-300 missile systems from Russia in January 1997, which triggered a tense crisis with Turkey. Despite some parallels with that historical episode, Cyprus’s latest acquisition is less likely to see that history repeat itself.
After footage emerged of a Barak MX system being transported at night on the streets of Cyprus’s Limassol, Turkish defense officials and politicians voiced strong criticism. Officials from the Turkish defense ministry claimed it could destabilize the partitioned island, where Turkey has approximately 35,000 troops garrisoned in the separatist, internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, and have “dangerous consequences.”
Others directly referenced the 1997-1998 crisis. For example, Yanki Bagcioglu, deputy chairman of the Republican People’s Party, charged that the Barak MX represents “a more dangerous system than the S-300, and it is likely that it also has the capability to share data with Israel through an advanced surveillance system.”
Turkish analyst Arda Mevlutoglu echoed Bagcioglu, dubbing the new Cypriot system “much more dangerous than the S-300” since it can detect launches of mortars and rockets from 100 kilometers (62 miles) away. The Israeli system has an official range of 93 miles and can intercept a range of threats from drones to tactical ballistic missiles. The range is comparable to the S-300 PMU-1 Cyprus ordered in 1997. Back then, Turkish officials dismissed Nicosia’s stance that the missiles were purely defensive since their range theoretically enabled Cyprus to fire missiles into Turkish airspace.
During that crisis, Turkey threatened to destroy the missiles when they reached the island and flexed its military muscles in the TRNC. Ultimately, by December 1998, Nicosia agreed to a compromise, and the systems were diverted to the Greek island of Crete, where they remain to the present day.
An S-300 PMU-1 anti-aircraft missile launches during a Greek army military exercise near Chania on the island of Crete on December 13, 2013. Greece is the first NATO country to try the Russian long-range missile system. AFP PHOTO / Costas Metaxakis (Photo credit should read Costas Metaxakis/AFP via Getty Images)
AFP via Getty Images
In early 1999, Turkey loudly objected to Greece receiving the missiles, charging that they endangered NATO aircraft and could serve as a Trojan horse for Russian espionage and intelligence-gathering in that sensitive and strategic region. Similar issues were raised by NATO and the United States when they warned Turkey against proceeding with its contentious acquisition of more advanced Russian S-400 in the late 2010s. The Turkish Defense Ministry has officially denied a report that Russia wants to buy back those S-400s, affirming that they remain “in our inventory, and there is no change in our position.”
Averting a potential second S-300 standoff between it and Turkey, Greece put the missiles into storage on Crete for over a decade, only using them for training in 2013. Greece permitted Israel’s air force to train against them, likely learning valuable lessons it put to use against Iran’s newer S-300s in airstrikes in April and October 2024 and the 12-day war in June 2025. Greece has repeatedly refused to supply the S-300s to Ukraine, stressing it still needs them for its defense. Athens eventually seeks to replace them with Barak MX systems. The more modern Israeli systems seem quite popular with countries seeking replacements for their older S-300s. Aside from Greece, Slovakia, which earlier donated its Soviet-inherited S-300 to Ukraine, is also acquiring the Barak MX for its air defenses. Cyprus, having given up on acquiring S-300s, undoubtedly views its current acquisition as a significant upgrade over its existing air defenses, which consist of older, short-range Russian Tor and Buk systems.
One crucial difference between that 1990s crisis and the republic’s present acquisition, which already began last December, is that the missiles have already arrived on Cypriot soil. Unless Ankara wants to preemptively destroy them before they are introduced into service, which seems highly unlikely, then the Eastern Mediterranean probably won’t witness a second Cypriot missile crisis, or at least not one of comparable intensity.
Cypriot Defense Minister Vasilis Palmas also contrasted this delivery with the 1990s crisis. “Today we chose the path of silence, low tones, and ultimately because we chose this method and this path, I can declare to you with full responsibility that we have the capabilities to defend the Republic of Cyprus anti-aircraft and anti-missile, if and when this is needed,” he said, adding that everybody “hopes that there will not be such crises and such situations in the Republic of Cyprus or in our territory.”
It’s worth mentioning that Cyprus is not the only regional country undertaking a significant buildup of its armed forces—which, hitherto, were primarily supplied with military hardware by Russia and France—and enhancement of its air defense. As mentioned above, Greece is also interested in the Barak MX and is building an integrated Achilles Shield air defense system with input from Israel and the acquisition of advanced Israeli systems. No doubt, these upgrades with Israeli hardware will make Greek and Cypriot air defenses more compatible than ever.
Turkey is also investing heavily in developing and building a national, integrated air defense called Steel Dome. However, unlike its Greek and Cypriot rivals, it is doing so primarily with its indigenous systems, most notably the Siper, rather than importing Israeli systems or jointly developing air defenses—as Israel did with India for the Barak.
These rival Greece-Turkey air defense efforts will no doubt see the deployment of systems capable of firing significant distances into each other’s respective airspace. In this broader context, while the Barak MX will immensely improve the island’s air defense, Cyprus’s acquisition isn’t likely to alter the fundamental balance of military power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Furthermore, unlike Cyprus and Greece, Turkey has invested significantly in developing ballistic missiles, which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan once boasted could hit Athens.
So, while tensions in this area may well flare up, they are not likely to revolve around Cyprus’s recent air defense acquisition, which, again, unlike the S-300 predecessor, is now a done deal.