Iran Is Once Again Talking About Upgrading Syria’s Air Defenses

Iran is openly talking about upgrading Syrian air defenses to help Damascus fend off continued Israeli airstrikes. However, as has been the case for a decade now, Israel will undoubtedly take preemptive military action if Tehran takes any serious steps toward implementing this stated objective.

On Feb. 24, Iranian state television reported Tehran’s intent to supply its advanced, long-range indigenous air defense missile systems to Damascus.

“Syria needs to rebuild its air defense network and requires precision bombs for its fighter planes,” the report said. “It is very likely that we will witness the supply by Iran of radars and defense missiles, such as the Khordad 15 system, to reinforce Syria’s air defenses.”

Any deployment of the Khordad 15 would almost certainly incur immediate Israeli strikes. The indigenous Iranian system carries Sayyad-3 missiles with a purported 120-mile range, which could potentially constrain Israel’s Syria air campaign if successfully deployed.

Interestingly, an anonymous intelligence source told Newsweek in January that Iran has been promoting a project for establishing air defenses in Syria over the past two years. As part of that project, Iran has helped Syria upgrade its radars. Tehran also reportedly has plans to deploy its Bavar-373 air defense system with new Sayyad 4B missiles, which have a purported 186-mile range. Iran has claimed this system is comparable to Russia’s advanced S-400 system.

The source hinted that one possible aim of this project is “enabling independent Iranian operation of the aerial defense systems from within parts of Syria.” This suggests that any deployment of the Khordad 15 or Bavar-373 systems would be controlled and operated exclusively by Iranian military personnel, if they are not immediately destroyed.

Such an arrangement would, therefore, be similar to the ostensibly ‘Syrian’ S-300 system Russia deployed in 2018.

Moscow also pledged to upgrade Syrian air defenses over the past decade. In a May 2018 interview with Russian state media, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not mention Iran when discussing Israeli airstrikes, instead arguing that Russian help was the only way his forces could improve their air defenses.

“Our air defense is much stronger than before, thanks to Russian support,” he claimed at the time before readily acknowledging that large parts of it had been destroyed during the civil war by rebels and Israeli strikes.

“The only option is to improve our air defense, this is the only thing we can do, and we are doing that,” he said.

In 2013, the same year Israel launched its ongoing air campaign against Iran and its allies in Syria, Russia discussed potentially supplying Damascus with S-300s but ultimately did not do so due to strong American and Israeli objections. In the fall of 2018, Moscow did deliver an S-300 system after a much older Syrian S-200 missile accidentally shot down a Russian military transport while attempting to intercept attacking Israeli warplanes.

That ‘Syrian’ S-300 was only ever fired off once against an Israeli air attack in May 2022, but that launch did not appear to be a serious attempt at actually hitting any Israeli jets. In an ultimate demonstration of how the battery’s deployment was more symbolic than anything, Russia withdrew it the following August putting an end to that charade.

While Iranian personnel will, most likely, similarly control any advanced system Tehran transfer to Syria, there would be a crucial difference regarding their rules of engagement.

Russia has maintained a communications mechanism with the Israeli military that was set up shortly after it militarily intervened in the Syrian Civil War in September 2015. Moscow did little to hinder or even protest the hundreds of Israeli strikes targeting Iranian forces and their allied militias, even though its forces had the most advanced long-range air defenses and fighter jets deployed in Syria and controlled much of its airspace.

On the other hand, Iran is a sworn enemy of Israel, and there is little reason to believe it would not, unlike Russia, attempt to use any air defenses it deploys in Syria against Israeli warplanes. That is another reason Israel will most certainly target any system Iran attempts to deploy.

There is already a precedent for this. In April 2018, an Israeli airstrike on the T-4 airbase in central Syria targeted and destroyed an Iranian Russian-built short-range Tor air defense system, killing seven Iranian soldiers.

Israel’s air campaign continues unabated to this day. It carried out its “deadliest” strike on Damascus in February since the civil war began in 2011. That attack reportedly targeted a meeting of Syrian and Iranian experts on drone manufacturing in the capital.

Syrian officials have requested that Tehran and its various militia proxies avoid using its territory for attacking Israel since it wants to avoid igniting a major war. Damascus has reason to fear any large-scale Israeli retaliation. In February 2018, Israel estimated it destroyed almost half of Syria’s entire air defenses following an escalation in clashes with Iranian forces. With Russia focused on Ukraine, Syria undoubtedly wants to avoid having a large-scale and destructive Iran-Israel confrontation fought on its soil.

Another interesting thing mentioned in the Feb. 24 Iranian report was the Syrian air force’s need for precision-guided munitions. As with the country’s air defenses, Syria’s fighter jets are hopelessly outdated. Even Syria’s most advanced fighter jets, its MiG-29 Fulcrums, have shown clear signs of immense wear and tear. Russia claimed in mid-2020 that it had delivered modern MiG-29s to help upgrade that air force. However, that was merely a ruse to conceal the delivery of unmarked MiG-29s via Russia’s airbase in western Syria to Libya. With Russia now embroiled in Ukraine, it is less likely than ever to provide a cash-strapped Damascus with new fighter jets.

Iran may use its experience modifying its older Russian-built Su-22s and Su-24s to carry long-range cruise missiles for upgrading Syria’s air force. Although it will unlikely prove capable of improving that aged air force to the extent that it could pose any substantial challenge to Israeli Air Force operations over Syria.

While the Feb. 24 report was noteworthy and demonstrative of Iran’s ultimate goal and intent in Syria, it remains highly unlikely that Tehran will prove capable of establishing any formidable air defense capabilities in that war-torn Arab state.