UNITED STATES – OCTOBER 12: A grain bin stands in a corn field in Marne, Iowa on Saturday, October 12, 2024. (Bill Clark/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)
CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images
When a nonpartisan and cross-sector group of U.S. leaders founded the Council on Competitiveness in 1986, they did so facing a sobering reality: the U.S. economy was poised, teetering on an economic cliff — on the verge of falling off, and landing on a rocky path leading to lower productivity growth and declining living standards.
And others seemed to be on a different path.
Japan’s and West Germany’s export-driven growth models were challenging the U.S. economy across a variety of sectors that employed millions of workers. “Japan, Inc.” had made total quality management the competitiveness differentiator of the 1970s and 1980s. Without broad, significant, and systemic change, the United States was standing at a crossroads, heading in the direction of a future in which the next generation of Americans would be substantially less well off than its predecessors.
This generational — some would say existential — threat led to the creation of the Council on Competitiveness: a group of highly concerned and motivated industry, academic, and labor leaders who would come together and develop tangible solutions to derail the projections that, by 2000, the United States would trail Japan and other G7 economies in productivity growth and economic leadership, and would see an erosion in the hard-fought battles to create the world’s largest and most successful middle-class.
But much like the invention of the steam engine in 1712 and its improvements between 1765 and 1781 drove an industrial revolution, and much like the introduction of John Deere’s self-scouring steel plow in 1837 completely transformed agricultural productivity, another technological inflection point unexpectedly reset the world’s innovation and competitiveness race in the late 1990s.
The emergence of the internet — seeded by decades of dual-use research investments by the U.S. government — coupled with its rapid adoption and adaptation by U.S. industry, thrust the U.S. economy onto a higher wave of productivity growth and prosperity than its 1990s peers. What followed in the decade to come was not incremental progress but a structural break — a moment of economic discontinuity and creative destruction that sparked new industries, business models, and job creation. The United States captured a disproportionate share of the value generated by the internet-driven digital revolution — and with it, a generation of economic growth, technological leadership, and geopolitical advantage.
Now, as the Council celebrates its 40th anniversary — and as the United States approaches its 250th birthday — we face another moment of transition and transformation. But this time, the competitive milieu is more turbulent, more complex. Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s the United Statates faced one or two viable economic competitors, today the nation faces a major economic and security competitor rolled into one: China.
At the same time, we are living through what may be an even more fecund technological moment than the early 1990s – with artificial intelligence diffusing rapidly across sectors; with quantum science and technologies advancing from theory to early deployment; with energy on the cusp of revolution on the fusion front, as well as evolving at the frontiers of next generation nuclear; and with genetic engineering and biomanufacturing transforming how we produce materials, fuels, medicines, and food.
Prof. Erik Brynjolfsson of Stanford recently has projected U.S. productivity growth could have approached 2.7 percent in 2025 — nearly double the average of the previous decade — suggesting AI may already be contributing to drawing a new productivity curve for the nation. If sustained, such growth would represent a powerful, structural shift in economic performance and living standards.
History teaches us something important: once a nation captures the value that emerges from such an inflection point — the market share, the profits, the innovation ecosystems — it is extraordinarily difficult for competitors to dislodge that advantage. So, if we fail to lead at the front edge of these converging revolutions, it is unlikely we could later easily regain lost ground.
That is why the Council’s 40th year is focusing not only on vertical technology races — AI, quantum, advanced manufacturing, the bioeconomy — but also on the ways in which these technologies are converging to produce the unexpected, potentially cross-sectoral, productivity-enabling jumps we need to compete with a nation like China.
For example, the bioeconomy is not just about agriculture or pharmaceuticals. It is about engineering biology to produce advanced materials, sustainable fuels, chemicals, fibers, food, and even inputs for mining and energy systems. It intersects with AI-driven design, advanced manufacturing, and resilient domestic supply chains.
Globally, the bioeconomy is projected to represent trillions of dollars in economic activity in the coming decades. Nations from China to Germany are investing heavily in biomanufacturing scale and infrastructure. Whoever leads in bio-based production platforms will shape next-generation industrial systems.
For the United States, the bioeconomy offers something distinctly powerful: a pathway to accelerate growth in America’s heartland, revitalize domestic manufacturing, strengthen supply chain resilience, and advance national security — while creating high-productivity jobs that cannot be easily offshored.
But technology alone does not determine competitive outcomes.
In the 1990s, the United States did not simply invent the internet — it built the ecosystem that allowed it to scale: talent, risk capital, infrastructure, regulatory agility, and entrepreneurial culture. Today, we must do the same again — intentionally.
That means investing in the competitiveness platforms that underpin every technological revolution — we call it TTII: talent, technology, investment, and infrastructure. For example:
- Talent and skills systems that produce the world’s best AI scientists, quantum engineers, and biotechnology leaders
- Technology like the advanced energy systems capable of powering compute-intensive and industrial-scale innovation
- Capital markets and investment that support scaling, not just invention
- Modernized physical infrastructure and domestic production capacity, coupled with the “soft” policy infrastructure that supports innovation (from IP, to standards and regulations)
Under the leadership of our Council Chair, Erik Fyrwald, the Council’s 40th anniversary work is focused on developing the policy insights and strategic roadmap necessary to ensure the United States does not become a victim of this technological transition — but its architect.
This April, we will carry forward this work in Nebraska — a state emblematic of the bioeconomy’s potential. From advanced agriculture to biomanufacturing, from research universities to production-scale industry, Nebraska represents the convergence of science, industry, and heartland growth.
Forty years ago, the United States faced a competitiveness crisis and responded. An unexpected technological wave — and our ability to harness it — changed our trajectory. Today, we stand at another inflection point. The question is whether the United States will once again organize itself to lead — and capture the value — or watch others do so.