Gulf States Only Likely To Supplement Arsenals With Non-Western Arms

This photo provided by the US Navy 14 March 2003 shows military from the United Arab Emirates, a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member, offloading a BMP3 Tank at this Kuwaiti port facility from its L62 Elbahia – a landing craft similar to that of the American LCU. The GCC, which is comprised of Kuwait, UAE, Suadi Arabia, Baharain, Oman and Qatar continues its 12-year cooperation with a show of support for its Gulf neighbor. AFP PHOTO/HO (Photo by US NAVY / US NAVY / AFP) (Photo by US NAVY/US NAVY/AFP via Getty Images)

US NAVY/AFP via Getty Images

Less than a week after Israel launched an unprecedented airstrike targeting Hamas’ political leadership in Qatar’s capital, Doha, and several of the Arab Gulf states are questioning the value of their security partnership with the United States. If history serves as any guide, none of these six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain—is likely to do more than merely supplement their military arsenals with armaments from non-Western countries.

Several reports and analyses in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s September 9 airstrike on Doha observed how the Israeli strike had led the Arab Gulf states to ask fundamental questions about their existing security arrangements with the United States.

For example, the Los Angeles Times observed that the GCC states had “staked their defense” on hosting U.S. bases on their soil—Qatar hosts the largest, Al-Udeid outside Doha, mere miles from the site of Israel’s strike—and buying billions of dollars worth of predominant American and European weapons systems.

“The thinking was that being users of U.S. weaponry and having a U.S. military presence was a virtual guarantee of protection if enemies came to call,” the report noted, adding that Israel’s strike has “upended” that thinking.

However, it’s unclear if anything will fundamentally change when it comes to the procurement choices of these wealthy Gulf states. As already speculated here, Qatar may seek to signal its displeasure to the U.S. over Israel’s attack by buying advanced Chinese air defense systems to diversify its arsenal with non-Western military hardware. But even that would merely supplement a largely Western-equipped military arsenal, not replace it, and again, that’s only if Doha even buys such systems.

The same goes for the other Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have diligently worked to diversify their military arsenals. Still, these arsenals primarily consist of Western-made weaponry, particularly the more sophisticated systems.

That has been consistently the case for decades. GCC members have always exercised their right to buy non-Western weaponry when they saw fit, but never to an extent that saw these alternative weapons form the spearhead of their respective militaries.

Some Gulf states bought military hardware from Moscow in the days of the Soviet Union. Kuwait started this trend with its acquisition of 2K92 Luna-M artillery rocket systems, dubbed Frog-7s by NATO, in 1977.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute’s arms transfers database, Kuwait would also acquire hundreds of man-portable Strela-2 air defense systems shortly thereafter.

Washington’s refusal to sell certain weapons to the GCC countries in the 1980s also benefited Moscow. For example, Kuwait signed a $300 million arms deal with Moscow in 1984 after Washington refused to sell it shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger missiles. The deal was for equivalent Soviet Strela-3s and low-altitude 9K33 Osa mobile air defense systems.

In 1986, Iranian warplanes attacked Emirati oil platforms off the coast of the capital, Abu Dhabi. Reeling from the unprecedented incident, the UAE requested Stingers from Washington. As with Kuwait, the Reagan administration refused. Consequently, Abu Dhabi turned to Moscow for Strela-3s.

Saudi Arabia turned to China due to Beijing’s willingness to export ballistic missiles. Consequently, Riyadh received DF-3A missiles in the late 1980s, only parading them in public for the first time in 2014. Riyadh also turned to Beijing for more accurate DF-21s in 2007. Qatar later revealed it had acquired Chinese SY-400 missile systems in 2017.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf states continued to purchase significant quantities of Russian military hardware.

In the 1990s, both Kuwait and the UAE bought hundreds of Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and BM-30 Smerch multiple launch rocket systems to augment their respective land forces.

More significantly, Abu Dhabi funded the development of Russia’s unique Pantsir-S1 medium-range air defense system, receiving units up to three years before the Russian Army even did. Saudi Arabia discreetly ordered Pantsir-S1s, which could theoretically provide cost-effective point defense against threats like drones, in the early 2020s.

Still, these Russian systems only form part of the multilayered air defense of either neighboring Gulf state. The UAE’s more sophisticated air defenses undoubtedly remain its American-made MIM-104 Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems. Saudi Arabia’s air defense also relies heavily on the Patriot and the THAAD, which Riyadh has recently begun introducing into service.

Russia pushed for sales of its strategic S-400 system to the Arab Gulf in the 2010s but ultimately never won any export contracts, even though Saudi Arabia and Qatar seriously considered purchasing them and ultimately opted for alternatives. Furthermore, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also ordered South Korea’s KM-SAM system in recent years over Russian or Chinese systems.

Additionally, none of the GCC states operate Russian or Chinese-made main battle tanks.

The UAE turned to France for a large fleet of Leclerc main battle tanks and was the only foreign operator until recently. Similarly, Oman was the only foreign buyer of Britain’s Challenger 2 until the United Kingdom supplied some to Ukraine after the current war with Russia began in 2022. Muscat evaluated South Korea’s K2 Panther tank in the late 2010s, but there are no indications it has pursued a deal. There are no indications that it’s interested in Russian or Chinese main battle tanks. And while the Gulf states have acquired Russian and Chinese-made multiple rocket launch systems, these were purchased in addition to Western-made MLRS, such as the HIMARS.

Kuwait briefly considered Russian T-90MSs in the late 2010s but did not go ahead with it and seems happy with the American M1A2 Abrams, recently ordering the new M1A2K variant. The tiny island kingdom of Bahrain also ordered 50 M1A2s in 2024, and the backbone of neighboring Saudi Arabia’s armor consists of hundreds of Abrams tanks, despite reports in the late 2000s that it was considering a significant acquisition of T-90s.

China would make some inroads into the lucrative GCC arms market in the 2010s. Just as Riyadh turned to Beijing for ballistic missiles that no Western country would sell it, many GCC states did the same when China agreed to sell armed drones when the United States wouldn’t. Consequently, Chinese-made Wing Loong 2s began appearing in the Saudi and Emirati arsenals.

That looks set to change in the 2020s, with the Trump administration expected to reinterpret the Missile Technology Control Regime so the U.S. can sell Saudi Arabia 100 MQ-9 Reaper drones. Similar American drone sales to the UAE and Qatar will likely proceed once Washington reinterprets its obligations under that 1987 treaty, and will probably exceed the number China has sold to the region to date.

Fighter jet sales are an area where the U.S., Britain, and France have long had a lead among the GCC states. Qatar operates three 4.5-generation fighter types, all of them Western. Saudi Arabia operates advanced F-15s and Eurofighter Typhoons—and has explored acquiring France’s Dassault Rafale. The UAE has long operated a highly unique and advanced variant of the F-16, the tailor-made F-16E/F Block 60, and French Mirage 2000s, which it will soon replace with 80 Rafale F4s. And while Abu Dhabi explored co-developing a fifth-generation fighter jet with Russia in the 2010s, that project has since stalled, most likely indefinitely.

The UAE did purchase a small number of L-15A trainer jets from China. However, there are presently no indications that it will proceed with buying advanced 4.5-generation jets, such as the Chengdu J-10C Vigorous Dragon or Beijing’s upcoming fifth-generation Shenyang J-35. China is also unlikely to export its premier fifth-generation fighter, the J-20 Mighty Dragon.

Abu Dhabi has shown signs it’s potentially interested in partnering with South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae fighter project. Saudi Arabia is reportedly interested in acquiring Turkey’s upcoming TF Kaan stealth jet.

While the Gulf states may well reconsider aspects of their defense and procurement policies, a major re-pivot to primarily buying military hardware, especially sophisticated equipment, from China or Russia and other rivals of the Western powers seems highly unlikely. Even Iran, which severed relations with the U.S. in 1979, still operates a largely American-equipped air force and hasn’t had much success replacing and upgrading its antiquated fleet with more modern Russian or Chinese fighters.

Consequently, this decades-old trend of supplementing largely Western-equipped military arsenals will likely continue for the foreseeable future. Additionally, these states will likely utilize other U.S.-allied states, such as South Korea, as alternative suppliers to maintain their longstanding preference for procurement diversification while continuously improving and expanding their nascent arms industries to reduce their dependency on outsiders.