Rosatom’s construction of nuclear reactors is a key geopolitical asset for Vladimir Putin, as sanctions weaken Russia’s economy during the war in Ukraine.
Alamy Stock Photo
While Russia’s economic performance has been lackluster as its war economy struggles to underpin growth, a clear bright spot remains: nuclear energy. Following the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, where the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline progress dominated headlines, Rosatom signed a memorandum with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) on personnel collaboration, building on recent wins in Central Asia, Europe, and North Africa. Rosatom has customers lined up worldwide, but as financing problems and global competition build, the jury is out on whether they can expand on their recent success. As the United States seeks to modernize its moribund nuclear power capabilities, Russia’s Rosatom stands as both a competitor and a model.
Rosatom’s Nuclear Successes
Rosatom is one of the world’s most prominent players in global nuclear exports, with 40% of global enrichment capacity and nearly 40 domestic and international projects concurrently under development. The firm’s most recent victories in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate a continued competitiveness despite intensifying Western sanctions. In addition to its technical capabilities, including small modular reactor construction, Rosatom leverages its status as a massive state enterprise by leaning on Vladimir Putin’s salesmanship (“we will make you an offer you cannot refuse”) while offering generous financing terms from state coffers that rivals cannot match.
However, financing is not the main competitive advantage here, as China could offer even more generous conditions. Rosatom uniquely provides “turnkey,” one-stop shop services, unlike Westinghouse, GE Hitachi, and other Western companies that require a country to have their own well-trained specialists. Rosatom provides the ability to build a plant in a country with minimal nuclear expertise by assisting in developing legislation, establishing a regulator, offering suitable funding models, and managing spent fuel and waste.
Rosatom’s advantage comes from its ability to negotiate as a single entity backed by the state, barring the need for additional contractors, which slow competitors down.
ANS
In June 2025, Kazakhstan selected Rosatom as the contractor for its first nuclear power plant, a major diplomatic victory in a field crowded by both legacy and upstart global nuclear companies, such as China’s CNNC, France’s EDF, and South Korea’s KHNP. Construction, which the International Atomic Energy Agency defines as pouring concrete, is likely to begin in 2027. Initial work started last month on the 2.4 GW VVER-1200 reactor, which will help partially meet Kazakhstan’s growing population’s energy needs.
Moscow’s nuclear export plans don’t end here. In 2022, Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding with Kyrgyzstan on energy cooperation, spurring discussions over a future nuclear plant. As of August 2025, Kyrgyzstan and Rosatom agreed on the joint construction of a wind farm, expected to begin construction in 2026. In May 2024, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with Rosatom on the construction of six 55 MW RITM-200N small modular reactors, the first of which will commence construction this year or next. Serbia is also in talks with Rosatom on the construction of a nuclear power plant, with the country’s representatives expressing faith in its loan mechanisms and capabilities too.
A Unified, State-Controlled Model
Beyond its traditional energy export markets in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Russia is conducting nuclear diplomacy further afield, including a 4.8 gigawatt USD 25 billion Akkuyu plant in Turkey, Africa’s largest El Dabaa facility in Egypt, and Bangladesh’s Rooppur plant. Additionally, the Trump administration recently lifted sanctions on the expansion of Hungary’s Paks nuclear plant, also built by Rosatom. Barring their premature decommission, these plants will keep Russia involved in global energy production for at least six decades.
Rosatom’s competitive edge comes from its unified, state-controlled structure. Rosatom showcases the pinnacle of Russian nuclear power engineering, developed through both civilian and military research, and it is not limited solely by traditional market forces. While U.S. nuclear energy export projects must navigate a lengthy public-private process at the Department of Energy/Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State Department, and the Treasury, Rosatom negotiates as a single unit backed by the Kremlin in a government-to-government manner.
While other vendors, like French and U.S. companies, still benefit from state-owned operations and government support, respectively, Rostom’s model prevents clients from having to deal with multiple bodies and agencies with differing interests. For example, a supplier building the nuclear island will focus on constructing a safe reactor according to their blueprints, while a balance of plant contractor responsible for ancillary components is only accountable for their part, with neither party paid to cover interface risks. As a result, delays and risks in the project lead to cascading delays among vendors as they try to meet their contractual obligations. By working with Rosatom instead of other nuclear providers, risk-averse customers can set the payment terms and leave the rest to Moscow, avoiding situations like France’s EPR project in Finland, which was plagued by cost overruns and setbacks.
In Turkey, as elsewhere, Rosatom’s business structure and access to the entire nuclear enrichment cycle have enabled it to deploy a “Build-Own-Operate” mechanism. In Egypt, Rosatom will bear most of the construction costs, estimated at $25 billion, at 3% interest over 22 years. Few global companies could commit to the logistical and financial prerequisites for this kind of agreement.
These projects can serve geopolitical goals beyond economic benefits. Beyond transporting nuclear fuel between the two countries, personnel exchanges, government visits, and educational collaborations create new connections that boost Russia’s influence. Many of these plants, like those in Turkey, Egypt, and Kazakhstan, are the first of their kind in their respective nations, establishing Russian technology as the foundation of developing nuclear industries. However, although resilient, Rosatom faces financial hurdles in its expansion efforts. Andrei Petrov, an official at Rosatom, stated that the firm would need “financial injection” for its projects starting in 2027.
A shelter construction covers the exploded reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, in Chernobyl, Ukraine. Though cost overruns and supply chain issues can seem minor, Russia’s own history has shown the risk that comes with nuclear power plant mismanagement. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)
Copyright 2021 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
As Russian officials admit the need for further funding, the country’s war in Ukraine is impacting its ability to extend it. Projects in Turkey already face delays due to frozen funds, and forced changes of suppliers have created complications. Such supply chain and operations failures, alongside sanctions and pressure from the EU, exacerbating an already growing fiscal deficit, inspire skepticism in potential customers concerning Russia’s ability to fund these projects as it has in the past.
Stiff Competition in the Nuclear Industry
China, which once imported nuclear tech from the USSR, is now a serious threat to Rosatom, its biggest long-term challenge. China has pledged to sell 30 reactors to the international customers before 2030, an initiative directly competing with Russian plans. In Kazakhstan, where Rosatom secured the first contract to build a nuclear power reactor, China’s CNCC secured the contracts to build the second and the third contracts. Technologically, China continues to develop competitive advantages. It deployed the world’s first fourth generation nuclear power plant and has pulled ahead in small modular reactor development. China’s combination of investment money, infrastructure development experience, and technical expertise is difficult to compete with on a global scale, even considering Russia’s long presence in the nuclear export space.
Though SMRs will likely play a role in the future of nuclear energy, the idea that factory manufacturing of the units would reduce costs and compensate for higher cost per MW of capacity (due to their smaller size) is not yet borne out by the evidence. Rosatom has made a good start, operating the world’s only commercial floating nuclear plant powered by SMRs and building an SMR plant in Uzbekistan. As these technologies have yet to reach maturity, China’s current threat to Rosatom lies in its advancements in construction in series, which reduces cost and construction risks.
Competition from Chinese and US SMR and fourth-generation technologies, along with Rosatom’s ability to respond and develop new technological solutions, will be the true test of its resilience as a global power player.
For Western firms, the main challenge in trying to outcompete Rosatom remains commitment and political capital. Without the diplomatic and financial support of Western governments and the ability to balance bureaucratic requirements with the need to outperform Russia and China, even the most innovative Western companies might find competition unwinnable. By empowering their nuclear industries and streamlining regulatory processes, Western nations can help foster a nuclear renaissance. The future of the nuclear energy sector will depend on how effectively countries can leverage innovation, financing, and political will to provide power for a world that demands more electricity than ever before.