Does Greece ‘Need’ Those Russian S-300 Missiles On Crete?

In early June, Greek Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos was unambiguous when he stressed that his country would not transfer its long-range Russian S-300 air defense missile systems stored on the island of Crete to Ukraine.

“We will not provide anti-aircraft missiles from our islands or anti-ship missiles, no matter how much they ask us to do so, because we face a real threat,” he said.

“Greece will not be sending the S-300 weapons system,” he emphasized. “What we need, what is useful, and mainly operationally active, we do not intend to release.”

Panagiotopoulos’s assertion that Greece needs those S-300PMU-1 batteries on Crete is interesting. After all, unlike Turkey’s recent contentious acquisition of S-400s from Moscow and Greece’s own past procurement of shorter-range Russian 9K33 Osa and Tor-M1 systems, Athens did not seek out those S-300s for itself.

It was the Republic of Cyprus that originally ordered those systems now on Crete in the second half of the 1990s. Nicosia’s fateful purchase promptly sparked a crisis with Turkey, which threatened to bomb the batteries in a preemptive strike the moment they landed on the divided island. Athens ultimately agreed to take the systems to defuse that crisis and avert a possible war. It stored them on Crete, where they sat unused for over a decade.

In 2013, Greece took them out of storage and test-fired them for the first time in a military exercise. The Israeli Air Force reportedly took the opportunity to train against the system, likely in preparation for future engagements against Syrian or Iranian S-300s.

Panagiotopoulos probably did not have the S-300s specifically in mind when he said Greece would not give Ukraine any system it needs. Nevertheless, his remarks raise questions about the likely contingency plans the Hellenic armed forces has to press those advanced Russian missiles into service.

The “real threat” Panagiotopoulos referred to was undoubtedly Turkey. Tensions are presently pretty high between those two neighbors, although war remains unlikely.

Designed as they were to counter NATO warplanes and missiles, Greek S-300s could potentially pose a serious threat to Turkish F-16s over large swathes of the Aegean Sea. If Greece deployed the S-300 and had its powerful radars actively scan Aegean airspace and paint intruding Turkish jets, that would undoubtedly represent a major escalation in tensions. If Turkey responded by deploying its S-400s on its western coast, we would see an utterly ludicrous scenario unfold in which fellow NATO members aim their advanced Russian missiles at each other’s American-built fighter jets.

That extreme hypothetical scenario, of course, remains highly unlikely, even if tensions and mock dogfights increase in the coming months.

Panagiotopoulos also said Greece is “not going to send weapons for which we have not taken care of their replacement.” That could imply Athens would be open to transferring its S-300s to Ukraine in return for Western replacements and security guarantees, as Slovakia did with its lone S-300 battery in April. Greece could also be reluctant to transfer arms for fear of directly incurring Moscow’s ire, although that is far less likely.

“A relevant Greek-American arms swap deal might be theoretically feasible but appears complicated with reference to Patriot missiles,” said George Tzogopoulos, a senior fellow at the Centre International de Formation Européenne. “In the past, Turkey had asked the U.S. for Patriot missiles. The American administration will thus have to make decisions that will not add an extra burden to the strained status of its relations with Turkey.”

Tzogopoulos doubts that Athens is reluctant to transfer its S-300s to Kyiv to avoid antagonizing Moscow.

“Greek-Russian relations have reached their lowest point ever – and there is no hope for an end of the bilateral crisis in the short and medium-term,” he said. “The Greek government has made a clear strategic decision to stand on the side of the U.S. – more than just aligning with E.U. policies – and is expected to keep on the same path during the war. This means it is prepared to send more arms to Ukraine in close coordination with the U.S.”

“Against this backdrop, Greece’s main concern is not Russia’s ire, which is taken for granted and does not seem to prevent it (the Greek government) from shipping new arms, but the impact of its future decisions on the military correlation vis-a-vis Turkey,” he added.

Tzogopoulos does not believe the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war is high for now. Nevertheless, he noted that “conflicts could erupt as a continuation of small accidents, which are not excluded in the Aegean and the Mediterranean in the coming months.”

“The Greek government remains hopeful that Washington would act preemptively to avert dangerous scenarios but has failed to obtain security guarantees from Washington towards this direction,” he said. “The pre-election period in both Greece and Turkey does not favor calmness either.”

“The U.S. interest in protecting NATO’s Southern Flank generates some optimism,” he added. “However, the U.S. has lost control in some crises recently (Syria, Afghanistan, etc.) and lacks the leadership mastery of the previous decades.”

“More importantly, it is very hard to anticipate how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan might act in striving for foreign policy successes (or perceived successes for the domestic audience) by triggering Greece’s defense response in every possible way.”