Cubans Could Soon Become Russia’s Largest Foreign Fighting Force

TOPSHOT – Russian Foreign Ministry building is seen behind a social advertisement billboard showing Z letters – a tactical insignia of Russian troops in Ukraine and reading “Victory is being Forged in Fire” in central Moscow on October 13, 2022. Five Russians drafted to fight in Ukraine, as part of the “partial” mobilization ordered in September, died after joining the army, authorities said, as similar announcements have multiplied in recent days. (Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP) (Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images)

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Russia is increasingly outsourcing its war in Ukraine. To offset record losses and dwindling recruitment, Moscow is importing manpower from abroad. What began as a regional invasion has turned into a multinational proxy campaign of authoritarianism against Ukraine.

According to Ukrainian officials, as many as 25,000 Cubans could soon be fighting for Russia, overtaking North Koreans as the largest contingent of foreign troops on the battlefield. “It is beneficial for Putin’s regime to attract Cuban mercenaries,” said Andriy Yusov of Ukraine’s military intelligence in evidence shared with members of the U.S. Congress on Sept. 19. “If a foreigner dies, there are no social payouts and no responsibility; there are no relatives inside Russia who are unhappy with the war; and of course, fewer dead Russians.”

British intelligence estimates that Russia has suffered over one million casualties, forcing the Kremlin to recruit or coerce foreigners from Africa, Latin America and Central Asia to fill the gaps.

The Lure and Deception Behind the Cuban Deployment

For many Cubans, the appeal is financial. With promised salaries of around $2,000 per month, far higher than wages at home, thousands have reportedly signed contracts that place them on the front lines. Others say they were duped with offers of construction jobs in Russia, only to find themselves sent to the trenches.

Cristina Lopez-Gottardi, an assistant professor at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, told me in an interview that Cuba is in a severe economic and energy crisis. She noted the average monthly wage on the island is roughly $20, while recruits are reportedly being offered about $2,000 a month to fight for Russia, a sum astronomical by local standards. “The economics alone make this a powerful draw,” she said.

Havana has denied direct involvement, but analysts say the scale of recruitment would be impossible without tacit approval from Cuban authorities. An unclassified Oct. 2 State Department cable seen by Reuters instructed U.S. missions to press allies to oppose the annual U.N. resolution on Cuba, citing Washington’s assessment that 1,000–5,000 Cubans may be fighting in Ukraine.

Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian member of parliament, told me in August that Cuba’s deployment is about politics, not necessity. “The North Korean and Cuban deployments are political gestures, not signs of Russian shortages,” she said. “Russia has recruited around 20,000 Cubans; more than 1,000 are already fighting in Ukraine, and we’ve killed about 40. We literally have their passports as proof. It’s about showing they have reliable partners.”

She added that Russia’s reliance on authoritarian allies is part of a broader divide reshaping global politics. “The world is increasingly split between democratic nations and authoritarian regimes – Russia, Iran, and North Korea among them,” Ustinova said. “If Russia needs 10,000 extra troops, its partners send them. North Koreans haven’t gained much; they’re mostly being used as expendable infantry.”

Cuba’s motivations, meanwhile, are both economic and ideological. “Cuban soldiers are paid exceedingly well,” Alexander Motyl, professor of political science at Rutgers University, told me. “If they die, their widows will be rich. If they live, they’ll be rich heroes. Either way, much-needed money is brought into Cuba, and the regime can take credit.”

He noted that Havana may also be seeking to enhance its revolutionary credentials and “poke Washington in the eye” by openly aligning with Moscow. “It’s a symbolic gesture that plays well at home,” Motyl said.

At the same time, Russia’s dependence on such partnerships reflects a more fundamental weakness. “Sourcing soldiers from places like Cuba, North Korea, and across Africa and Central Asia is a sign of weakness – possibly even desperation,” Motyl noted. “Putin sees that Russians are increasingly unwilling to die for nothing, so he lets foreigners fight and die in their place.”

By July 2025, foreigners made up 49% of captured Russian fighters, up from 1% in 2022. Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, told me in an interview, “Without foreign recruitment, Moscow would likely be unable to sustain offensive operations.”

Russia’s reliance on foreign fighters now extends far beyond its traditional allies. A Bloomberg investigation from June 2024 revealed that the Kremlin has coerced thousands of African students and migrant workers into joining the army, threatening them with deportation if they refused. Using tactics pioneered by the Wagner Group, officials have pressured young Africans and Central Asians to fight in Ukraine, often under false pretenses, with many suffering catastrophic losses on the front lines.

An investigation from The Telegraph from June 2025 uncovered an even darker side. Desperate Africans were lured to Russia with fake job offers – including positions in “shampoo factories” – only to be detained on arrival and forced into the army. Dozens of captured recruits from Cameroon, Senegal, and Zimbabwe described being promised factory or kitchen work, only to be sent to the front lines after a week of training.

Even as Russia relies on North Korea for manpower, Pyongyang has turned the war into a propaganda tool to cement loyalty at home and signal strength abroad. According to DW, state media in North Korea recently aired a documentary showing soldiers fighting – and dying – in Ukraine, portraying their deaths as “heroic sacrifices.” The program highlighted two young soldiers who detonated grenades to avoid capture, hailing them as martyrs.

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov warned that the experience North Korean troops are gaining in Ukraine is transforming their army. “There are currently only three countries in the world with experience fighting a modern war on a long front line using nearly all conventional means – Ukraine, Russia, and North Korea,” Budanov told The Japan Times in August.

An Axis of Authoritarian Support

This reliance on foreign fighters goes beyond manpower. It underscores a growing military axis linking Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela and now Cuba – regimes trading weapons, technology, and battlefield experience.

Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, told me, “North Korea and Iran also benefit from their engagement with Russia through technology transfers. It’s likely that North Korea is receiving assistance to advance its nuclear program, particularly in submarine-launched nuclear missiles.”

Ukraine’s defense analysts warn that this partnership is not just transactional. It is transforming the battlefield into a shared classroom for authoritarian militaries. Volodymyr Dubovyk, a professor at Odesa Mechnikov National University, told me, “With Ukraine having its own personnel issues, this ups the pressure.” He notes that the North Koreans are proactive as “they believe they’re defending their own country against imperialists. For Russia, this external supply of capable fighters is invaluable.”

Learning From the War

But the greatest danger may not be the number of foreign fighters, it’s what they’re learning.

For Bill Cole, founder and CEO of the Peace Through Strength Institute, the danger extends far beyond Ukraine. “Putin has no shortage of manpower, he just conscripted another 130,000 men,” Cole told me in an interview. “What’s really happening is that Russia’s partners want a piece of the action. North Koreans, Cubans, and Chinese are on the ground not only to fight for Russia but to gain experience in modern warfare, especially drones.”

He added that each foreign unit is effectively a rotating military academy. “Every foreign unit that rotates through Ukraine is learning how to fight in the world’s first large-scale drone war,” Cole said. “That’s the danger. It’s not just Russia’s power, it’s the fact that its partners are gaining battlefield skills they can export to other conflicts across Europe, Latin America, and Asia.”

For the Kremlin, sourcing Cuban and North Korean soldiers is a convenient way to wage war while minimizing domestic backlash. For its partners, it’s an unprecedented opportunity to study and export the tactics of modern drone and electronic warfare.