John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, speaks at the Hill & Valley Forum 2025 at the U.S. Capitol Visitor Center.
Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images
Earlier this month, the bipartisan House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party disclosed that hackers linked to Beijing tried to impersonate its chairman, Representative John Moolenaar (R-Michigan). Using his name and title, the attackers sent emails circulating draft American sanctions legislation to various stakeholders: prominent Washington law firms, business and trade associations, think tanks and at least one foreign government.
The language of the proposed legislation was real. But the hackers were trying to get into the targets’ computer systems.
Investigators believe the campaign began earlier in the summer. One so-called “lure” sent this past July contained malware attributed to APT41, a prolific Chinese espionage group known for mixing state-directed intelligence operations with criminal activity.
Significant Timing
The timing of the phishing campaign is significant.
The July message coincided with highly sensitive negotiations between Washington and Beijing over the future of the bilateral trade relationship. The talks had a loaded agenda: U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods, Beijing’s countermeasures and the wider strategic contest over global technology access and supply chains. Senior American officials were weighing whether to escalate restrictions on Chinese semiconductors and cloud services while also exploring limited tariff relief to ease pressure on American importers.
The obvious objective of the phishing campaign was the collection of insight into America’s negotiating positions.
It’s unclear whether the effort succeeded in breaching accounts or exfiltrating data. The Select Committee has not indicated that congressional systems were compromised. Despite the absence of any confirmation of a successful intrusion, the scope, timing and intent of the campaign carry significant implications.
A Familiar Playbook
On the surface, the episode is consistent with past efforts by states to engage in similar information-gathering activities through subterfuge. Impersonation, spoofing and social engineering are some of the hallmarks of modern cyber espionage.
Russia’s military intelligence services attempted to obtain Senate log-in details in 2017 and 2018 by creating websites that looked like official portals. Iran has long relied on operators posing as journalists or scholars to obtain information from policy analysts. North Korea’s Kimsuky group has targeted think tanks and academics for years by masquerading as reporters or researchers. China itself has conducted a wide array of cyber campaigns in past years, from phishing attacks to the exploitation of flaws in commercial cloud services.
Viewed against this backdrop, the use of fraudulent emails to harvest information follows a well-established playbook of adopting a credible persona, crafting a plausible request and waiting for a hurried recipient to click on a dubious link or respond. In this sense, the campaign impersonating the Select Committee chairman belongs to a long tradition of adversaries probing the seams of open systems.
An Unprecedented Attack
At the same time, the incident has unprecedented features. Rarely have foreign hackers appropriated the identity of a sitting committee chairman at the center of American foreign and national security policy. By trying to impersonate Moolenaar, the cyber operatives did more than attempt to compromise inboxes. They targeted the credibility of Congress itself and the process by which Congress shapes foreign and national security policy.
Congressional practice depends on speed, informality and trust. Staffers routinely circulate draft language of bills or other important documents to a wide variety of stakeholders. They frequently ask outside experts for comment, and they prize speed in the responses. These practices are integral to democratic governance and sit at the center of law and policymaking in the United States.
They also create opportunities for manipulation. By trying to exploit that process, even clumsily, China’s hackers demonstrated that the legislative process itself was a credible target for intelligence gain.
That evolution is what gives this episode its significance. The weaponization of Congressional identity illustrates the potential vulnerability of the democratic institutions and the policymaking process when adversaries focus less on systems and more on the underlying processes that animate them.
Lessons for Washington
For Congress, the implications are stark. Unlike the executive branch, which has centralized cybersecurity resources, the legislative branch’s protections remain uneven. Some offices use multi-factor authentication; others do not. Secure portals for outside engagement exist but are rarely used. Responsibility is diffuse. That patchwork of protections invites exploitation. Until Congress embraces uniform standards, risk remains high.
For companies, the lessons are equally clear. The target list in this campaign extended well beyond Capitol Hill. Law firms, trade associations and think tanks were chosen because they aggregate information from multiple sources and often sit at the intersection between business and government. A successful breach of one association or advisory firm can yield insight into an entire sector.
The risks are evident. If adversaries gain access to internal corporate views on tariffs, supply-chain vulnerabilities or sanctions, they can anticipate strategy, reduce pressure and adjust their own policies accordingly. If confidential communications with Congress are exposed, companies may face regulatory disclosure obligations or reputational damage. The cost of being named in connection with a foreign espionage campaign during delicate negotiations can be considerable, even absent legal liability.
Evolving Terrain
There is also a broader lesson about the trajectory of cyber operations. For years, the focus has been on defending networks and hardening infrastructure. Those remain essential prerogatives.
But the Moolenaar incident underscores that the real contest is shifting toward credibility and process. Adversaries do not need to defeat firewalls if they can convincingly imitate the rhythms of democratic life. Stealing data is one form of advantage. Counterfeiting identity is another, and in many cases more effective.
As a result, the impersonation of a congressional committee chairman by Chinese hackers should be regarded as more than just a curious episode in Washington’s cyber history.
It is a warning that the processes of governance are now a theater of strategic competition. Protecting institutions will require not just stronger defenses of servers but more disciplined practices around consultation and verification. Companies will need to treat engagement with policymakers as contested terrain, not routine business. And lawmakers will need to recognize the importance of defending the credibility of its most ordinary functions.