Are Corporate Crime Victims And The Trump Department Of Justice On A Collision Course?—What Companies Should Know.

The week of May 12, 2025, began with the Trump Department of Justice announcing its revised—and business-friendly—policies toward corporate criminal enforcement; it ended with families of the Boeing 737 Max crash victims decrying as “morally repugnant” the Justice Department’s alleged tentative deal to give Boeing a non-prosecution agreement. In corporate criminal matters, are victims and the Trump Justice Department on a collision course? The answer is likely yes for certain cases. This article addresses the intersection of victims’ federal rights and the Justice Department’s new corporate criminal enforcement policies, and what companies should know about victims’ rights when negotiating resolutions with the government.

Victim Rights in Federal Criminal Cases

Let’s start with the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA). Passed by Congress in 2004—out of concern that the government too often ignored or dismissed the legitimate interests of crime victims—the CVRA gives crime victims the right to participate directly in federal criminal cases. It reads like a bill of rights because that’s what it is. The CVRA compactly sets forth ten victim rights in federal criminal proceedings, at least five of which can come into play when companies negotiate criminal resolutions with the government. Namely, victims have rights:

• to confer with the prosecutor;
• to be informed “in a timely manner” of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement;
• to receive “full and timely restitution” as provided in law;
• to be treated with “fairness and respect”; and
• to be reasonably heard at any court proceeding.[i]

These rights are mostly procedural, giving victims “a voice, not a veto” in how prosecutors ultimately decide to proceed in any given case.[ii] But effectuating those CVRA rights is also mandatory for prosecutors and courts. When the CVRA applies, prosecutors and courts must follow it. And as the CVRA turns 21 this year, one might say that it has “come of age”—with victims increasingly unwilling to sit by quietly while prosecutors and companies negotiate case-ending resolutions. Victims have brought litigation to, among, other things: allege CVRA violations by the government because prosecutors failed to notify victims, or meaningfully confer with them, before reaching corporate criminal resolutions; allege violations by courts in failing to allow victims’ full participation in court proceedings; and victims in some cases have vocally urged courts to reject the proposed resolution reached between the government and company-defendant.[iii] Thus, it is cold comfort for companies that the CVRA imposes no burdens on defendants; when CVRA problems arise, those problems disrupt the closure that companies seek—and bring negative publicity, delay and litigation cost.

But there is an important catch: Victims’ rights under the CVRA are triggered only when the government decides to criminally charge a company in the first place, such that charges are publicly filed in court. The following dichotomy thus exists: on the one hand, victims’ CVRA rights are in full force when the government and company negotiate corporate guilty pleas and so-called “deferred prosecution agreements,” both of which require court approval. (In a deferred prosecution agreement, criminal charges are publicly filed but the government agrees to dismiss the charges after a period of good corporate behavior.) On the other hand, when the government declines to prosecute or offers the company a “non-prosecution agreement”—an agreement resolving the company’s criminal exposure without criminal charges ever being filed—CVRA rights do not come into play. That is how the CVRA was drafted, much to the chagrin of victim groups, but in recognition of the fact that one cannot be adjudged a “crime victim” when no crime has been charged.

The dichotomy of when the CVRA applies drew intense scrutiny in the case of Jeffrey Epstein, the now-deceased sexual predator and financier. Outraged victims sued the government after the Florida U.S. Attorney’s Office gave Epstein a non-prosecution agreement without ever notifying or consulting with victims in advance. After years of litigation, the full Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that, no matter how awful Epstein’s conduct, and no matter how disrespectful prosecutors had been to victims, Epstein’s victims could not sue for relief under the CVRA. Because the government gave Epstein a non-prosecution agreement, there was never any “criminal proceeding” to trigger the CVRA’s application.[iv]

(Epstein was later federally indicted for sex-trafficking in the Southern District of New York but was found dead in his jail cell in 2019 while awaiting trial.)

In the fallout from the Epstein case, the Biden Department of Justice issued nonbinding guidance telling prosecutors to use “best efforts” to consult with victims before entering non-prosecution agreements; but that guidance is unenforceable and not a legal requirement guaranteed by the CVRA.[v] In 2024, victim rights groups pressed Congress to amend the CVRA to cover non-prosecution agreements, but the Congressional bill that was introduced stalled in committee and never proceeded to a vote.[vi]

Trump’s New Policies Widen the Path for Declinations and Non-Prosecution Agreements for Corporate Wrongdoing

Enter now the Trump Justice Department’s recently revised policies on corporate criminal enforcement. Matthew Galeotti, who heads the Department’s Criminal Division in Washington, unveiled the updates on May 12, 2025—calling them “a new page” in the Justice Department’s approach to white-collar crime and one that gives corporations a “clear path to declination” of prosecutions.[vii]

First, under those policies, and absent aggravating circumstances, the Justice Department “will decline” to prosecute any company that timely and voluntarily self-discloses its wrongful conduct, fully cooperates with the government, and appropriately remediates its misconduct. Second, the policies create a new “near miss” category under which the Justice Department “shall provide” a non-prosecution agreement to companies that fully cooperate and remediate corporate wrongdoing in good faith but don’t qualify for full declination due, for example, to some aggravating factor. Third, even where companies do not self-disclose or cooperate, the policies provide that prosecutors can resolve corporate criminal matters by offering a reduction of up to 50% off the fine under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

These newly announced policies are of a piece with other Trump Administration actions signaling the Administration’s lighter touch toward corporate criminal enforcement in the name of promoting American enterprise and reducing criminal investigation costs for businesses. Those other actions include, President Trump’s executive order pausing criminal actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; the “Blanche Memo” (issued by Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche) announcing a friendlier approach to companies in the cryptocurrency industry; and the Department’s dismissal of various pending criminal cases that were inconsistent with those directives.[viii]

It remains to be seen whether these new Justice Department policies will produce a rash of voluntary self-disclosures by companies seeking to secure declinations for corporate misconduct. It further remains to be seen what “aggravating circumstances” the Trump Justice Department will regard as disqualifying a company from receiving a declination or non-prosecution agreement. But we should certainly expect, given these new policies and the business-friendly impetus behind them, that more corporate criminal investigations (particularly if they involve American companies) will resolve during the Trump Administration without the filing of criminal charges.

So are the Department’s new policies on a collision course with corporate crime victim rights?

The answer is probably yes in some cases.

To be sure, in his May 12 speech announcing the new white-collar enforcement plan, Mr. Galeotti emphasized that the Department’s focus will include “vindicat[ing] victims’ rights.” The Justice Department’s policies also continue to prioritize victim restitution; indeed, companies must “timely and appropriately remediate” victim harm to be eligible for either a declination or non-prosecution agreement. Well beyond written policies, too, most federal prosecutors and agents deeply care about protecting victims’ interests and give serious weight to victims’ views in resolving cases.

But the more often the Trump Justice Department resolves corporate criminal matters without criminal charges against companies, the less often victims will have enforceable rights under the CVRA. This will cause tension, particularly in cases where victims seek the strictest penalty possible be imposed—a criminal conviction—such as where the alleged corporate wrongdoing resulted in death or bodily harm.

That tension is now playing out in the Boeing case. Victims had already battled the Biden Justice Department. Intense CVRA litigation resulted in the Texas district court ruling that families of crash victims are in fact “victims” of Boeing’s charged fraud on the Federal Aviation Administration, and that Boing’s alleged criminal conduct was the “but for” cause of the Max 737 crashes that killed 346 people. The Boeing case also reflects that when corporate wrongdoing results in death or serious bodily harm, victims often advocate strongly for criminal conviction and maximum penalties. The Boeing victims are now furious with the Trump Justice Department for signaling that it will likely resolve the criminal matter through a non-prosecution agreement.[ix] The criminal trial of Boeing had been scheduled to begin in June.

Five takeaways for companies negotiating resolutions under the new Trump policies

Much remains a wait-and-see for the new Trump corporate crime enforcement policies. But here are five takeaways relating about federal victim rights that companies should bear in mind as they negotiate criminal resolutions in the current regime:

1. In all negotiations of corporate criminal resolutions with the Department of Justice, the remediation of victim harm remains an important component of securing the best outcome for the company.
2. For negotiated resolutions that require court approval (guilty pleas and non-prosecution agreements), to which CVRA applies, companies have their own interest in ensuring that CVRA requirements are respected, because violations can prevent or delay companies from obtaining the closure they seek.
3. Where corporate criminal investigations resolve without filing any criminal charges (through a declination or non-prosecution agreement), companies should expect victims to still voice their views loudly to the Justice Department and beyond. But victims will be unable to invoke the CVRA and courts will have no role to play.
4. An area to watch is the extent to which prosecutors in the Trump Justice Department confer in advance with victims about the terms of non-prosecution agreements being negotiated with companies. The Biden-era Justice Department encouraged such engagement, but it is not statutorily required. Companies should also be prepared for media leaks and press repercussions in the event victims are consulted by the government and strongly disagree with the government’s position.
5. The Trump Administration’s signaled move away from corporate criminal prosecutions (except in the most egregious of cases) will likely meet with protest from victim advocates—particularly in cases where corporate wrongdoing led to catastrophic events resulting in death.

Lisa Zornberg is a partner at Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello PC. Rachel Blumenstein, an associate at the firm, contributed to this article.

[i] 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).

[ii] Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (quoting U.S. v. Rubin, 558 F.Supp.2d 411, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)).

[iii] See e.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (Fifth Cir. 2008) (holding that there was a CVRA violation when the government failed to confer with victims of the BP Texas City refinery explosion before finalizing a plea agreement with BP); U.S. v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005) (granting crime victims the right to personally address the court at sentencing as per their right to be reasonably heard under the CVRA); Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the CVRA required courts to allow victims to speak at sentencing hearings for all defendants in a case, not just some); Motion and Memorandum of Recognized Crime Victims’ Families Naoise Connolly Ryan et al. Requesting That the Court Not Accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Binding Plea Agreement Proposed by the Government and Boeing, United States v. The Boeing Co., No. 4:21-cr-00005-O (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2024) (ECF No. 268-1) (arguing that the court should reject the plea agreement between Boeing and the government in part because of the government’s failure to confer with victims’ families as is their right under the CVRA).

[iv] In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2021).

[v]U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, at 14 (2022), https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2022/10/21/new_ag_guidlines_for_vwa.pdf.

[vi] See Reinforcing Crime Victims’ Rights Act, H.R. 9858, 118th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2024).

[vii] May 12, 2025 remarks by Matthew R. Galeotti at SIFMA’s Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference in Washington, DC; Justice Manual 9-47.120, as updated May 12, 2025.

[viii]See Todd W. Blanche, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum for All Department Employees: Ending Regulation by Prosecution (Apr. 7, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,209, 90 Fed. Reg. 9587 (Feb. 10, 2025); Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Coburn, No. 2:19-cr-00120 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2025); Letter from Defense Counsel to Hon. Richard M. Berman, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:24-cr-00082 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025).

[ix] Mike LaSusa, Families Rip DOJ Bid to Ditch Boeing 737 Max Criminal Case, Law360 (May 16, 2025), https://www.law360.com/articles/2341563/families-rip-doj-bid-to-ditch-boeing-737-max-criminal-case.