America’s Tough M2/M3 Bradley Mini-Tanks Are Perfect For Ukraine

A report from Bloomberg suggests the U.S. Government is “considering sending Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine” in a future military support package.

While nothing has been decided, the aging forty-year-old M2/M3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles are unprovocative battlefield support vehicles, but they are available in large numbers, operable by Ukraine forcers, and are hard-hitting enough to sweep Russia’s ragtag armor off the field. They could be a perfect solution to a tough problem.

Bradley mini-tanks are exactly the type of “inoffensive” and non-escalatory tool NATO is looking for to help meet Ukraine’s need for modern armor. As an amphibious troop carrier, clocking in at half the weight of an Abrams tank, the Bradley offers Ukraine a defensive, albeit robust, armored presence. Not considered a weapon for offense, the Bradley is still quite capable of dispatching almost any Russian vehicle on the battlefield.

Speedy and with longer range than most main battle tanks, it is perfect for armored break-outs Ukraine has employed to win back territory.

And while the fighting vehicles are not considered surplus quite yet, the U.S. Army is rather desperate to improve the chances that the their controversial Bradley replacement project will get underway with ample Congressional funding. By being accommodating and sending as may extra Bradley fighting vehicles off to war as possible, the U.S. Army can both exploit lessons-learned on the Ukraine battlefield and make a strong case for funding a replacement.

The gambit just might work. America’s large stockpile of almost 6,000 M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles may well offer Ukraine just the right combination of armored mobility, supportability, and “inoffensive” offensive punch to evict Russian invaders.

What Is The M2/M3 Bradley and Why Does It Work For Ukraine?

Ukraine is perfect territory for America’s mini-tank. The M2/M3 Bradley, when it entered service in 1983, was designed to take on Russia’s emerging fleet of infantry support vehicles. As a faster, better protected update to the M113 armored personnel carrier, the Bradley worked in tandem with the far larger Abrams Main Battle Tank.

It wasn’t a popular vehicle. As an uneasy compromise between a highly-protected tank and a lightly-armored fighting vehicle, the platform was tarred as being a poor fit for most battlefield tasks. While those initial qualms were overcome, with the U.S. producing almost 7,000 of the vehicles, the Bradley has always operated in the background, overshadowed by the more glamorous M-1 Abrams tank, or sidelined by counterinsurgency-focused vehicles.

Today, the Bradley comes two basic flavors, the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. But the only real difference is that the M3 swaps out infantry space for a larger ammunition load. Both are “mini-tanks,” centered around a turret-mounted 25mm M243 Bushmaster and a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun. Firing specialized tungsten armor-piercing ammunition, a Bradley can use the big chain gun dispatch T-72 tanks. But that may not be necessary, since both Bradley variants carry Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles, capable of destroying any tank currently in Russian service.

Battle-tested twice, the advantages and limitations of the Bradley in the field are, by now, well understood. In 1992, the GAO released a report on the platform’s utility during Desert Storm, reporting that almost 90% of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle fleet could move, shoot, and communicate over the course of the battle. While crews came up with a range of minor suggestions and improvements, they reported killing Soviet-made tanks with the main gun and employing the TOW missile to destroy tanks up to 3,700 meters away.

Logistically, the Bradley is a better fit for Ukraine than almost any large NATO main battle tank. Air transportable, C-17s can quickly get the vehicles to Ukraine frontiers. On the ground, they are equally mobile. In the first Gulf War, Bradley crews reported that they could have completed their deployments of up to 120 miles—missions that took place over the course of 82 hours—on a single tank of gas. In contrast, Abrams tanks needed refueling every few hours.

Dillard Johnson, in his Bradley-driving memoir Carnivore: A Memoir of a Cavalry Scout at War, described how the rugged mini-tank could withstand near hits from Soviet-era artillery and keep on fighting. He also highlighted the mobility differences between his armored personnel carrier and America’s big main battle tank, explaining, during America’s second invasion of Iraq, how the Abrams’ width and weight forced the tank to stay largely on established roads, while the Bradley was better able to handle off-road operations.

Johnson has a point. In general, Russian tanks range between 37 and 46 tons. The most modern Abrams variant weighs in at over 65 tons, more than twice the weight of a Bradley. Even America’s earlier-generation M-60 tanks—a potential “defensive tank” option for Ukraine—weigh more than a Bradley. Ukraine’s infrastructure may not be up to the task of handling heavy NATO tanks, and Ukraine’s improvised tank recovery teams may not be up to the task of moving disabled heavy NATO tanks either.

A glance at the military gear provided to date suggests that Ukrainian forces have already been getting some experience with various components of the Bradley fighting vehicle. The U.S. has given Ukraine some 1,500 TOW missiles, and several countries have donated M270 multiple launch rocket systems. The tracked launcher—overshadowed by the wheeled HIMARS—is based on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis, sharing parts. Given that Ukraine has been using the M270’s efficiently, and, by all reports, have been employing the TOWs effectively, Ukraine may be able to field the Bradley far faster than most observers expect.

While Risky, Precedent Exists:

Providing Ukraine with an active-duty armored personnel carrier will raise concerns. Detractors of Ukrainian aid will quickly take to their fainting couches over the prospect of stripping heavy gear from active-duty U.S. troops, fretting that the donations increase the risk to America’s national security.

Those concerns are overblown. The Bradley may be a mini-tank, but it is primarily a support vehicle. We have done similar things before. To bolster allies, America has provided our friends modern armored vehicles under far more dire conditions.

In the early days of World War II, the soon-to-be-ubiquitous M4 Sherman tank was just entering full production, and U.S troops, preparing to invade French Morocco and Algeria, were just beginning to train with the new tank themselves.

But, after an appeal from UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin Roosevelt, rebuffing the Army’s readiness concerns, yanked the new tanks from U.S. units, promptly dispatching some 318 Shermans and 104 new self-propelled 105mm guns to hard-pressed British units in Africa. Adding to the Army’s concern, more than 10% of the new tanks were sunk in transit, forcing the U.S. to send 52 more.

But the British put the tanks to work right away. A mere month after the new tanks arrived in Africa, 252 operational Sherman tanks were on the front lines, helping the British turn the tide at the epic battle of El Alamein. The Germans never recovered from that loss, and, shortly after American troops landed in Africa, the German invaders were expelled from African soil.

These are old lessons, but they are worth recalling today as America mulls sending large numbers of their aging Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine, to fight the type of war these mini-tanks were designed to win.