12 Reasons Why A Russian Attack On Ukraine Looks Imminent

Last Friday, Biden administration officials revealed they now believed Russia was likely to undertake military action against Ukraine before the conclusion of the Olympic games, following a massive buildup of Russian ground and naval forces begun in the fall of 2021.

Subsequently, the White House has ordered the withdrawal of diplomats and 150 U.S. military trainers in Ukraine and communicated to allies an attack might begin Wednesday (Feb 16.)

As some of the White House assessment was based on intelligence from classified sources including signal intercepts, administration officials have refused to provide supporting evidence for fear of exposing the means used.

Though Biden has stated clearly he will not send troops to defend Ukraine, some are mistrustful of Washington’s predictions, perhaps recalling how U.S. intelligence agencies furnished inaccurate intelligence on Iraq’s supposed WMD program in the early 2000s that resulted in the disastrous invasion of Iraq.

However, between videos posted on social media and commercially available satellite imagery, there is more than ample evidence with which to conclude a Russian attack seems likely.

Does this mean war is absolutely certain? No. Putin can still call off his forces before hostilities commence and then claim Washington was jumping at shadows.

But nearly all the developments in 2022 show Russia’s military acting as if genuinely preparing to invade Ukraine. And by mid-February, the buildup appears nearly complete, with elements missing in the early stages falling into place.

Let’s look at twelve indicators that explain the dire prospects security analysts see for the coming weeks.

1.     Diplomatic engagement keeps on failing

Unfortunately, multiple diplomatic encounters since January have made no headway. In the most seemingly positive exchange, assurances allegedly made by Putin in a meeting with French president Macron were walked back by the Kremlin the following day.

NATO is willing to jointly implement arms control measures on medium-range missiles, reduce military patrols and exercises near Ukraine and improve transparency and communication. But these do not satisfy on Putin’s core demands:

• To permanently close off not only NATO membership, but any NATO assistance to Ukraine or other non-NATO members.
• To permanently ban further expansion of NATO, and forbid the presence of international troops in NATO’s East European member states.
• To force Kyiv to legitimize Russian-backed separatist entities in Eastern Ukraine.

The first two provisions are so obviously unacceptable to NATO, some believe they were calculated to guarantee refusal.

The third demand is Kyiv’s matter to decide, but per Russian media, Moscow may have thought Washington would twist Ukrainian Prime Minister’s Zelensky’s arm to follow such a policy. This proved inaccurate, and in recent Normandy talks, Ukrainian officials refused to meet in person with the separatists (viewed as puppets of Moscow).

A subsequent Biden-Putin telephone call on Saturday has not yielded progress either. There is therefore little indication diplomatic efforts are going anywhere, or more importantly, that the Kremlin really wants them to.

2.     Russia’s Duma will vote to formally recognize pro-Russian separatists on Ukrainian soil.

Despite the ongoing war between Ukraine government forces and pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine’s military has been careful keep the temperature low in recent months to avoid incidents that could serve as a pretext for Russia to invade. This has apparently been frustrating enough that Moscow allegedly has been attempting to film a fabricated attack to justify a war, only for Washington to reveal intelligence on these schemes publicly on multiple occasions.

Plans to hold a vote on February 15 in the Duma formally recognizing the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk separatist republics (the LPR and DPR), however, could be used to create a new legal basis for Moscow to intervene in Ukraine at the ‘invitation’ of these entities.

3.     Moscow is evacuating most of its embassy in Kyiv

Moscow has consistently claimed it has no intention of invading, but actions sometimes speak louder than words. It’s also advised most of the staff of its embassy in Kyiv to leave. According to spokeswoman Maria Zakharova: “…fearing possible provocations, we decided to optimize the staff of Russian foreign missions in Ukraine.”

4.     Over half of Russia’s combat power is deployed around Ukraine

Moscow has stripped military districts across Russia down to the bone to move mechanized units called Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) by rail into Belarus and reinforce Russian troops deployed around Ukraine.

From the initial 30-35 BTGs permanently based close to Ukraine, military analyst Konrad Muzyka recently assessed Russia has deployed 90-95 of its 170 BTGs near Ukraine, a figure which has likely risen since..

With reports of units from the 2nd Combined Arms Army arriving at Yelniya, now all twelve of Russia’s armies have deployed elements to the Russia-Ukraine border or Belarus.

BTGs are by no means the only elements of the Russian buildup—there are powerful artillery and Iskander missile brigades and numerous support units deployed too.

5.     Personnel are flying into man the equipment

For most of the buildup, Russia’s military has focused on transporting heavy equipment (which must be done by rail and can take over a week) without necessarily bringing along a full complement of personnel to man the hardware. People, after all, can be whisked to western Russia or Belarus quickly by air, and there are otherwise compelling reasons to keep personnel at their home bases until absolutely necessary.

But in early February, a surge of flights by Il-76MD cargo planes suggest its military has been flying in personnel from across Russias.

6.     Russian armies are moving from bases merely ‘near’ Ukraine towards the border.

Until recently, a significant chunk of Russia’s buildup near Ukraine remained dozens of miles away from the border. But that has changed dramatically in February.

The 41^st Combined Army massing in Yelniya since October, 150 miles north of Ukraine, was spotted streaming southwards to join other Russian units much closer to the border at Klintsy and Novozybkov, in position to advance on Kyiv.

Furthermore, elements of the elite Moscow-based 1st Guards Tank Army assembling at the Pogonovo training range near Voronezh (120 miles northeast of Ukraine), as well as the 6th Combined Arms Army near Kursk, appear to be moving south towards Belgorod, which lies just 35 miles north of Ukraine’s second city of Kharkiv.

That implies these Russian units are departing long-term encampments to move towards staging areas on the border. At those areas, they will likely deploy in dispersed combat formations for protection from artillery fires.

7.     Russia’s airborne forces have moved into position.

Separate from Russia’s Ground Forces, Moscow maintains four elite airborne divisions in a separate branch called the VDV which, unlike U.S. or British airborne, have their own parachutable armored fighting vehicles (BMDs and BTR-Ds) for mobility, protection and firepower.

Russia had not tapped the VDV units earlier in the buildup, perhaps because they can be transported to theater comparatively rapidly. But that changed in January with deployment of up to six BTGs from the 76^th, 98^th, and 106^th Airborne Divisions, plus two more BTGs from independent airborne brigades.

Another element initially under-represented in Russia’s military buildup were helicopter units for air support and insertion of troops (particularly VDV or special operations forces.) However, in the last few weeks, numerous combat helicopters have been seen deployed to support of exercises in Belarus or close to the Russia-Ukraine border in Belgorod, including Mi-28N and agile Ka-52 attack helicopters, older Mi-24V Hind gunships, and Mi-8 assault transports.

8.  Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, swelled with reinforcements, has left port on ‘exercise.’

Russia’s Baltic, Pacific and Northern fleets have all dispatched landing craft and warships to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Most importantly, six tank landing ships (LSTs) from Russia’s Northern and Baltic fleets have entered the Black Sea, carrying with them at least one BTG from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade at Kaliningrad. Combined with 6-7 landing ships in the Black Sea Fleet, these have sealift for a brigade-sized amphibious landing force.

In the Mediterranean, Russia has deployed two of its three Slava-class missile cruisers (Varyag and Marshal Ustinov), two Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyers, two frigates, and three cruise-missile armed Improved Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines as well as seven smaller ships.

Russia’s remaining Slava cruiser, Moskva, departed Sevastopol on Feb. 10 with “over 30” other ships from the Black Sea Fleet to conduct “exercises” in the Black Sea.

9. Russia’s ‘High-Powered Artillery’ is rolling into firing position.

Russia’s four military districts each have at least two special fire support brigades.

The heavy rocket artillery brigades count 24 powerful BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launcher systems with a range of 56 miles (90km). Multiple BM-30 units have been sighted in Belarus and Russia’s border with Ukraine.

The other High-Powered Artillery brigades field two different types of self-propelled systems: 2S7M Malkha 203-millimeter howitzers that can bombard targets 34 miles away, and 2S4 Tyulpan (Tulip) 240-millimeter mortars.

The gigantic mortars are shorter-ranged, but particularly suited to obliterating large buildings and fortifications, and have been used in the past to level apartment blocks in Syria, Lebanon and Chechnya, and shatter airport terminals defended by Ukrainian troops in 2014-2015.

Movement of these rare, heavy and powerful weapons to Belarus, Crimea and around Belgorod, Russia are particularly ominous.

10. Russia’s military police is on the move

Rosgvardia (“National Guard”) are Russia’s over 300,000-strong corps of internal security troops. They too have been seen mobilizing near Ukraine’s border. Because Rosgvardia are trained for policing civilian populations, they may be more suited than regular ground forces for controlling civilians in newly occupied areas, and could free up combat units for offensive missions.

11. Logistics for a real war in place.

Military analysts are most readily impressed by displays of logistics. After all parades of big guns and tanks may be held for purely saber-rattling purposes—but without the boring but necessary logistics in place, those tanks and guns can’t roll very far or shoot for very long.

Unfortunately, that’s exactly why the current Russian buildup is seen as more credible than a preceding one that occurred early in 2021. Logistical preparations sighted include medical facilities read to take in hundreds of battlefield casualties, deployment of command-and-control brigades, and movement of pontoon bridging units.

12. Russian air power trickles west

Unlike Moscow’s ground forces, its tactical aerospace force (VKS) has not begun a large-scale redeployment, as concentration to frontline bases could take place rapidly. However, three recent out-of-country deployments have their own tales to tell.

To accompany the 30,000 troops deployed to Belarus, Russia has deployed two squadrons there: one of Su-35S fighters—it’s most capable air-to-air platform—and one of fifteen Su-25 Frogfoot jets specialized in ground attack missions.

Additionally, video footage appears to show MiG-31 Foxhound jet carrying Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles landing at Russia’s Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad.

Allegedly, a total of four or five MiG-31s may have landed there. This deployment is likely aimed at deterring NATO intervention on Ukraine’s behalf, as the Kinzhal has the range to strike most European capitals in 10 minutes or less if launched from Kaliningrad’s airspace. Recent overflights over Belarus by Russian Tu-22M supersonic bombers with their own long-range cruise missiles likely have a similar intention.

Timing constraints on military action

Given the significant risks and costs a war with Ukraine would entail and lack of credible causus belli, some analysts speculate Putin might keep forces in place indefinitely to maintain pressure on Ukraine and/or to await an incident (manufactured or otherwise) to justify a war with Ukraine.

However, several factors limit the viability of that course of action. First, the exercise in Belarus being used to justify Russian deployments there is due to end February 20, forcing Moscow to come up with new pretexts. Keeping troops out-of-region troops deployed in tents during harsh winter weather has also been bad for morale and even health, with Covid outbreaks allegedly rampant amongst Russian troops.

Furthermore, Russia’s conscript soldiers will see their one-year terms of enlistment begin to expire, and new conscripts will require training at base. Putin can of course extend the current cohort’s term of service, but such a move would be unpopular domestically and a hard to sell without an actual war taking place. Though conscripts today make up a large minority of Russia’s military and are generally shunted away from frontline combat, they still remain an important contributor of manpower.

Lastly, delaying an attack means managing the challenges posed by rasputitsa, the particularly muddy conditions in Russia and Ukraine prone to impede traffic during the transition between seasons. While the prominence of the mud factor has arguably been exaggerated in some commentary, it nonetheless may favor February for offensives over April.

The evidence presented by satellite images, TikTok videos from Russian social media users, and government statements all support the same conclusion: Putin has arrayed a sprawling war machine around Ukraine, one that now appears to be moving into final position for combat operations.

Should such a calamitous course be followed, this war of Putin’s choosing would likely result in thousands of deaths, a new refugees crisis, and far-reaching consequences and trauma, most directly affecting Ukrainians and Russians, but with additional negative impacts redounding across the globe for many years to come.