The UXLink exploit was a multisignature wallet breach that allowed attackers to mint billions of unauthorized UXLINK tokens, crashing price and prompting a new audited Ethereum contract. Immediate fixes include timelocks, hard-coded supply caps, renounced mint privileges and independent audits to prevent repeat incidents.
Multisig compromise enabled mass minting, slashing UXLINK value.
Project deployed a new audited Ethereum contract and removed mint-burn functionality.
Estimated losses range from ~$11M to over $30M; security hardening recommended.
UXLink exploit coverage: multisig breach, estimated losses, new contract fixes and practical smart-contract hardening steps. Read how projects can secure tokens now.
FearsOff CEO Marwan Hachem said the incident underscores the risk of retaining centralized control in projects that present themselves as decentralized.
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Decentralized social platform UXLink said Wednesday it deployed a new Ethereum contract after a multisignature wallet exploit allowed attackers to mint billions of unauthorized tokens and collapse the native token’s market value.
UXLink confirmed the new smart contract passed a security audit and will go live on the Ethereum mainnet. The replacement contract removes the mint-burn function to eliminate the risk of arbitrary supply expansion.
The project confirmed the breach on Tuesday and said a significant amount of crypto was moved to exchanges. Loss estimates vary by source: Cyvers Alerts reported at least $11 million stolen, while security firm Hacken estimated losses in excess of $30 million.
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The UXLink exploit was a multisignature wallet compromise that allowed attackers to execute a delegate call vulnerability, take administrative control and mint billions of UXLINK tokens, causing the token price to fall roughly 90% from $0.33 to $0.033.
According to analysis and expert commentary, the breach exploited a delegate call vulnerability inside the multisig setup. That weakness permitted arbitrary code execution and effectively bypassed intended signer controls, enabling unauthorized minting and administrative actions.
Estimates differ: Cyvers Alerts reported at least $11 million in stolen funds, while security firm Hacken estimated losses exceeding $30 million. The attacker initially minted approximately 2 billion UXLINK tokens and, by some estimates, created nearly 10 trillion tokens overall, driving a severe market crash.
Expert Marwan Hachem of FearsOff pointed to design flaws: a multisignature wallet not hardened against delegate call exploits, lax mint controls and no code-enforced supply cap. Those gaps allowed centralized privileges to be abused once the multisig was compromised.
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