The post $7M Crypto Hack Hits Bitcoin DeFi Project ODIN•FUN appeared first on Coinpedia Fintech News
Crypto’s meme-coin frenzy took another dark turn after ODIN•FUN, a Bitcoin-based meme-coin launchpad, was hit by a $7 million exploit. The attackers pulled off a classic price manipulation stunt with the Satoshi Nakamoto (SATOSHI) token, leaving traders locked out of their funds and the project scrambling to contain the damage.
How the Exploit Unfolded
Cybersecurity firm PeckShield revealed that the attackers deposited SATOSHI tokens into a liquidity pool and then artificially pumped the token’s price. Once the value skyrocketed, they yanked the liquidity, walking away with $7 million worth of Bitcoin. Since the liquidity pool assumed the tokens were genuinely valuable, it released the BTC, and once the attackers drained it, other users found themselves unable to withdraw their own funds.
ODIN•FUN’s Response
ODIN•FUN quickly halted its automated market maker (AMM) trading to prevent any further losses. In response, ODIN•FUN CEO Bob Bodily issued a statement addressing the core issue of the platform’s liquidity AMM, revealing that the vulnerability came from their latest update. He confirmed several malicious actors, mostly tied to China-based groups, exploited the flaw, with most already identified. While the remaining funds are safe, the company treasury cannot cover the losses in full.
Bodily said a top-tier security audit is underway, and operations will resume within a week. Law enforcement in the U.S. and China is involved, alongside major exchanges OKX and Binance. He warned attackers they have a “short window” to return the stolen BTC before facing prosecution.
A compensation plan for affected users is in the works, and Bodily stressed that ODIN•FUN will “earn back” trust, remain operational, and continue building in Bitcoin DeFi despite the setback.
Community Reaction is Mixed
Many, many members cheered the quick action plan. They urged that ODIN•FUN should only reopen trading and withdrawals after a full, independent audit of the entire platform, while appreciating his quick response to the exploit.
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While one X user heavily criticizes Bob Bodily, accusing him of repeating the same empty promises from a previous incident, and calling him a scammer for claiming a compensation plan is in the works.
Part of a Bigger Problem
Price manipulation attacks like this are becoming alarmingly frequent in DeFi. In April, an attacker exploited the Inverse Finance token on SushiSwap, borrowing $16 million against artificially inflated collateral. Polygon’s 0VIX lending platform saw $2 million vanish in 2023 after a similar vGHST token pump-and-borrow move.
This year alone has been costly. Venus Protocol lost $700,000 to an overvalued stablecoin “donation attack” in early 2025, and Cetus Protocol on the Sui blockchain was gutted for $250 million due to a library overflow bug.
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FAQs
What happened in the ODIN•FUN exploit?
Attackers manipulated SATOSHI token prices, drained $7M in BTC from liquidity pools, and locked users’ funds before the platform halted trading to prevent further losses.
Is ODIN•FUN compensating affected users?
A compensation plan is being developed, but the treasury can’t cover full losses. CEO promises to “earn back” trust through audits and continued Bitcoin DeFi development.
Is this type of DeFi exploit common?
Yes – similar attacks hit Inverse Finance ($16M), 0VIX ($2M), Venus Protocol ($700K) and Cetus Protocol ($250M) using price manipulation tactics.