To Make The Standoff Over The Dnipro River Count, Send Ukraine Amphibious Vehicles

As Russian and Ukrainian forces face off across the Dnipro/Dnieper River, Western militaries are re-discovering the strategic challenge posed by water barriers. Confronted by the 4^th largest river in Europe, the West’s failure to provide Ukraine fully amphibious assault vehicles suggests Western military planners are struggling to meld World War II-era river-crossing tactics into modern 21^st Century war-fighting doctrine.

To retake occupied Ukraine, the Ukraine Army must, at a minimum, present a credible threat to the Dnipro River’s Russian-occupied eastern bank. Even if Ukraine has no intention whatsoever of storming the Russian held side of the Dnipro River, signaling a threat, and tying down Russian units is a smart thing to do.

One way to discomfit Russian invaders in southern Ukraine is the abrupt transfer of old U.S. AAVP7A1 (AAV-7) tracked amphibious assault vehicles. Used by the U.S. Marine Corps to get combat teams of about 20-25 Marines from ship to shore and then inland, off the beach, these relatively old “armored personnel carriers” add instant credibility to the idea of Ukraine forcing a Dnipro crossing—and, later in the conflict, their mere presence will complicate Russian efforts to defend the narrow Perekop Isthmus, a narrow strip of land connecting Crimea to the rest of Ukraine.

At a minimum, the simple act of gathering up bridging resources in the Ukrainian South makes logistical sense, particularly if, as expected, a Ukraine counterattack sweeps down the Dnipro’s eastern bank from the north. With all the bridges across the southern Dnipro either blown or non-functional, a couple of pontoon bridges on Ukraine’s flank will do a lot to ease Ukraine’s future mobility and resupply challenges.

River Crossings Are Tough:

Throwing a bridge across a large river is no easy task. River crossings during a fight are some of the most complicated maneuvers in modern warfare, requiring an entire army to work in concert. The West can offer little help; contested river crossings are challenges that the U.S. hasn’t faced since the Korean War, and America, enjoying air superiority and easy access to helicopters, has focused a lot more energy on refining the art of the speedy “coup de main”, capturing key bridges before they can be destroyed.

To cross a river, a modern mechanized army can’t just pick a crossing site and start swimming. Vehicles need a way to quickly get to—and then from—the riverbed. For a wide river like the Dnipro, the crossing force must deploy a hidden mini-armada of boats and barges for, what is, essentially, an opposed amphibious landing. Engineering vehicles must arrive in the region, ready to prepare navigable paths into and out of the river bottom. Material for a temporary bridge—or bridges—must be brought in and kept hidden. Extra air defense and anti-artillery resources should flow into the area as well.

Complicating matters, the basic geographical requirements for any armed effort to cross a river are well known, making optimal spots for river crossings easy to identify. In essence, prospective river crossings become ideal areas for ambushes.

Earlier in the war, Ukraine converted hasty and poorly planned Russian attempts to cross rivers into killing grounds, and Russia would certainly relish a chance to return the favor.

To keep Russia at bay, Ukraine must be ready to move quickly, employing all the pieces necessary to seize local air superiority, suppress area artillery, land on the eastern shore, grab a foothold, build a bridge, and then advance into the open territory of Southern Ukraine. It is no easy task, but LVTP-7/AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles might make it easier.

Amphibious Assault Isn’t Dead

A good number of American military experts like to scoff that, in modern combat, conventional amphibious landings are dead. But the broad expanse of the Dnieper River, rarely less than 1,000 feet wide as it winds through southern Ukraine, stands in quiet defiance to the best of America’s modern military thinkers.

To get a bridge across the Dnieper, Ukraine must carry out a mini-amphibious landing, grabbing an initial lodgment on the Russian-held side as a temporary bridge gets installed.

This can potentially be done with gear from the legacy Soviet arsenal. Virtually all the infantry fighting vehicles in both the Russian and Soviet arsenals are described as “fully” amphibious, capable, on paper, of “swimming”—or more realistically, wallowing—across water barriers at around 5-8 mph. But, after a year of conflict, the amphibious capability of Ukraine’s hard-pressed armor is likely to have degraded.

Some countries have donated pontoon bridges and boats—the U.S., today, announced it was sending riverine boats and other gear—but, reflecting Western tactical priorities, most of the military vehicles donated to Ukraine to date are not built to support amphibious assaults—they are either too heavy to “float” or their original “amphibious” capabilities were sacrificed for additional armor.

But some pieces needed for a big Ukraine river crossing are coming into place. River crossing doctrine emphasizes the importance of local air supremacy. New donations of Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters, coupled with donated mobile, ground-based air defenses, will be ready to go in a few weeks.

If military planners want to help Ukraine quickly, the recently approved U.S. transfer of 76 surplus AAV-7 assault amphibious vehicles to Greece offers an ideal starting point. As these vehicles are likely nearly ready to be handed over, they could easily be redirected—even temporarily loaned—to Ukraine, unnerving Russia in the runup to a very interesting Summer campaign season.