Does Trading All Your First-Round Picks Ever Actually Work?

The NBA, like all sports leagues, can fall victim to a copycat mentality. Someone will pioneer something, and then from there, something that never happened in the previous fifty years will become somewhat regular.

In this regard, there has been a new trend developing in NBA roster construction over the last few years in which, in a bid to bypass what is known colloquially as the Ted Stepien Rule, teams trading for star players offer multiple future first-round draft picks in eligible seasons, and offer unconditional pick swaps in the gap years.

The Stepien rules states that NBA teams are prohibited from leaving themselves without first-round draft picks in future consecutive years, and is named for the former owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers, Ted Stepien, whose short chaotic tenure involved mortgaging the future for the immediate. This proved especially costly when a February 1980 trade of injured reserve forward Butch Lee for uninjured reserve forward Don Ford saw a 1982 first-round pick attached, one which later became James Worthy. The rule, then, essentially exists to protect Stepien-esque owners from themselves.

The Stepien rule applies only to future first-round picks; in its simplest form, then, a team could hypothetically trade away its 2023 and 2025 first-rounders today, irrespective of whether or not they kept their 2022 pick. What they could not do today, though, would be trade away its 2023, 2024 and 2025 first-rounders. Teams therefore have begun to work around this rule by trading away the right to swap picks in the years in between the conveyed picks, and doing so at the highest possible scale.

Trading swap rights is not a particularly recent invention, but what has become more commonplace is trades for stars incorporating both multiple first-round picks and first-round pick swaps conveyed, so as to leverage maximum draft capital. Where only recently it was an unprecedented yield, it is now “the package”, the assumed and/or demanded return for a star or superstar player, and one used with increasing regularity.

It is hard to exactly quantify which deals would qualify as such, and exact parameters would not be especially helpful to what is an inexact science. It seems indisputable, though, that the following should count as examples of such “the package” trades:

Cleveland trades: Lauri Markkanen, Collin Sexton, Ochai Agbaji, their 2025 first-round pick, the right to swap 2026 first-round picks, their 2027 first-round pick, the right to swap 2028 first-round picks and their 2029 first-draft pick

Cleveland receives: Donovan Mitchell

Minnesota trades: Malik Beasley, Patrick Beverley, Leandro Bolmaro, Jarred Vanderbilt, the rights to Walker Kessler, their 2023 first-round pick, their 2025 first-round pick, the right to swap 2026 first-round picks, their 2027 first-round pick and their 2029 first-draft pick (protected top five, else their second-round pick)

Minnesota receives: Rudy Gobert

Atlanta trades: Danilo Gallinari, their 2023 first-round pick, their 2025 first-round pick, the right to swap 2026 first-round picks and their 2027 first-round pick

Atlanta receives: Dejounte Murray

Brooklyn trades: Jarrett Allen, Rodions Kurucs, Caris LeVert, Taurean Prince, the rights to Aleksandar Vezenkov, cash, the right to swap 2021 first-round picks, their 2022 first-round pick, the right to swap 2023 first-round picks, their 2024 first-draft pick, the right to swap 2025 first-round picks, their 2026 first-draft pick and the right to swap 2027 first-round picks

Brooklyn receives: James Harden

Milwaukee trades: Eric Bledsoe, George Hill, the rights to R.J. Hampton, the right to swap 2024 first-round picks, their 2025 first-round pick, the right to swap 2026 first-round picks, and their 2027 first-draft pick

Milwaukee receives: Jrue Holiday, the rights to Sam Merrill

Houston trades: Chris Paul, the right to swap 2021 first-round picks, their 2024 first-round pick (top four protected), the right to swap 2025 first-round picks, and their 2026 first-draft pick (top four protected)

Houston receives: Russell Westbrook

L.A. Clippers trade: Danilo Gallinari, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, their 2021 first-round pick, their 2022 first-round pick, Miami’s 2023 first-round pick, the right to swap their 2023 first-round pick, their 2024 first-round pick, the right to swap their 2025 first-round pick and their 2026 first-round pick

L.A. Clippers receive: Paul George

L.A. Lakers trade: Lonzo Ball, Josh Hart, Brandon Ingram, Isaac Bonga, Jemerrio Jones, Moritz Wagner, cash, the rights to their 2019 first-round pick De’Andre Hunter, an unprotected 2022 first-round pick, their 2022 second-round pick, the right to swap 2023 first-round picks, and either a 2024 or 2025 first-round pick (at the Pelicans’ discretion)

L.A. Lakers receive: Anthony Davis

Brooklyn trades: Gerald Wallace, Kris Humphries, MarShon Brooks, Kris Joseph, Keith Bogans, their 2014 first-round pick, their 2016 first-round pick, the right to swap 2017 first-round picks and their 2018 first-round pick

Brooklyn receives: Paul Pierce, Kevin Garnett, Jason Terry, D.J. White, a 2017 second-round pick

Of those nine trades, how many can anyone confidently say that the team trading “the package” decisively won?

Certainly, there is no disputing that the pioneers of this type of trade, the Brooklyn Nets, lost their deal heavily. The picks and the swap conveyed in that deal yielded James Young, Collin Sexton, Jaylen Brown and, after one more trade, Jayson Tatum, whereas the supposed immediate benefits of the returning veterans were only ever minimal.

Similarly, there is no disputing that Houston’s trade for Russell Westbrook was strikingly unsuccessful. Chris Paul’s rejuvenation saw him become the far superior player, regardless of any of the draft assets.

For some of others, it is too soon to tell, although early indications are strong. In the case of the Donovan Mitchell trade, the hefty return received by the Utah Jazz has been a key part of their surprising season and positive future, while Mitchell has brought the Cavaliers into contention in return. By contrast, while the Jazz enjoyed the same benefits from the Gobert deal, the Timberwolves have reached no such level. And thus far, the Trae Young/Dejounte Murray pairing has not worked as expected, either.

Perhaps the most illustrative deal is the one of Anthony Davis to the Lakers.

In making that deal, the Lakers would have been fairly certain of two things:

1. they were trading away nearly every valuable “future” piece that they had, and
2. they were doing so in order to make themselves title favourites

Because of point number two, point number one can be reconciled. If the trade you are making vaults you to not only title contention, but title favourites, what would it matter how much you gave up in draft capital and future prospects? After all, the future is for those who do not have a “now”.

To that end, it worked. Notwithstanding the problems since then, pairing Davis with LeBron James did indeed see the Lakers win a title, as was always the point. So too did the Buck after trading their own version of “the package” for Jrue Holiday. In both cases, the teams involved doubled down and fired their best possible offer for that “second guy”, the one who would bring them the championship. And they were right; they did.

But what happens to those who don’t?

When such a trade does not make the package-dealing team into championship favourites or near-favourites immediately, history suggests that rarely does that team break even long-term. When those picks are unprotected, as they invariably are, the cupboard is bared, and the avalanche deal cannot be followed by another. If it does not work, there is no second bullet, as the Nets, their own bare cupboard and their seriously long rebuild can attest to.

When lining up a trade for a veteran star, then, be quite sure that the likely outcome is a legitimate shot at the NBA Finals. Not the play-in tournament.