Russian Jamming Fails To Stop More Drone Attacks

Russia extended its attempts to jam satellite navigation systems after the drone attack on Engels Airbase on December 5^th. Open-source data show a huge ‘bubble’ of jamming signals around Moscow and several other potential targets, including Engels airbase. However, this appears to have been futile a new drone attack hit the airbase again on the 25th, shortly after other drones targeted the Crimea.

According to satellite navigation expert Dana Goward, President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, Russia typically relies on this type of jamming to counter long-range kamikaze drone attacks. While short-range drones are usually under direct operator control, long-range one-way attacks usually rely on GPS or other satellite navigation. Jam GPS and the drone loses track of where it is; it may do some damage but has little chance of hitting the intended target.

The Engels airbase is some 400 miles from the border with Ukraine and hosts Russia’s long-range aviation bomber forces; during the last attack a number of aircraft were damaged. Videos from outside the airbase on the 25th show an explosion at the site but there is no direct evidence of what happened. Russian authorities say they shot down the attacking drone which then crashed into a building, killing three military personnel.

In a separate incident, Russian sources say seven drones launched from Odessa attacked targets in the Crimea. Again, the Russians claim that all of the attackers were shot down, but there is no way of verifying this. Sources quoted by analyst Sam Bendett, note that the drones were able to evade electronic warfare systems and had to be shot down.

The situation closely parallels the continuing drone attacks by Iranian-supplied Shahed-136s hitting Ukrainian power infrastructure: slow, low-cost drones which are effective because they can be launched in large numbers and enough get through to do some damage.

GPS jamming is typically only effective along line-of-sight, so a low-flying drone can only be jammed from a short distance away. Drones like the Shahed-136 carry an inertial navigation unit, a backup system which does not rely on satellite signals. These ‘drift’ and quickly lose accuracy, so they are not as useful as GPS for long-duration missions, but should operate well enough for a drone to make it through a brief spell of jamming. While most Shahed-136s are brought down, this seems to be by gunfire or missiles rather than jamming. It seems likely that Ukraine is using similar techniques in its own attack drones.

The units involved in the Crimea attack are said to be based on Chinese Mugin-5 commercial drones, costing around $10k each – so it may be even cheaper than Shahed-136s, and much cheaper than the missiles needed to shoot them down.

Russian jamming was credited with taking out large numbers of Ukrainian drones at the start of the conflict, though this was not borne out by pictures of actual hardware destroyed, and there are even pictures of drones bombing electronic warfare sites with seeming impunity. In any case, jamming is not the panacea against drone attacks that some hoped.

Russia has reportedly starting moving air defense units into position round Moscow, apparently fearing of an attack around New Year celebrations. If Ukraine is planning a drone Doolittle Raid, the Russians cannot rely on jamming alone to protect them.

“Both sides are finding there are no perfect defenses,” says Goward.