After an as-yet unexplained delay, Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday declared “partial mobilization” of his country’s army reserves, a move intended to replenish the invading army which has taken heavy casualties in over 200 days of fighting. Perhaps more significantly, he also renewed threats to use weapons of mass destruction.
Putin alleged that NATO representatives have discussed using nuclear weapons against Russia – a claim with no obvious basis – and that he needed to respond.
“To those who allow themselves such statements regarding Russia, I want to remind you that our country also has various means of destruction, and for separate components and more modern than those of NATO countries,” Putin stated, according to a translation by The Guardian. “And when the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, to protect Russia and our people, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal. It’s not a bluff.”
Putin made the same point again later on in his speech:
“The citizens of Russia can be sure that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be ensured – I emphasize this again – with all the means at our disposal.”
The phrase ‘territorial integrity’ is important here. Russian nuclear policy allows such weapons to be used in a conventional conflict only when “it threatens the very existence of the State,” according to doctrine released in 2014. Such weapons would only be used in the case of an attack on Russia, and this week Russia has announced plans for ‘referendums ‘ in occupied territories in Ukraine to officially make them Russian territory. So the implicit threat is that any Ukrainian attempt to regain more territory could be met with a nuclear response.
This looks like a real escalation of rhetoric, but as Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, has written previously, nuclear threats have been part of Putin’s approach all along. At the start of the invasion Putin stated that any nation trying to hinder the invasion would face “consequences that you have never faced in your history.” He went on to publicly ordered his defence minister Shoigu and chief of the general staff Gerasimov “to transfer the army’s deterrence forces to a special mode of combat duty.”
In practical terms this meant nothing, but was simply intended to underline Putin’s determination to use nuclear weapons. From Putin’s point of view, the approach worked: NATO countries were deterred from directly aiding Ukraine, and the supplies of arms and other equipment have been hesitant and accompanied by political worries about ‘escalation’. Even now the U.S. has declined to supply fighter jets and long-range missiles requested by Ukraine.
Whether Putin would actually use nuclear weapons is a complex question. As Freedman notes, they would have little tactical utility in the current conflict. So-called battlefield nuclear weapons are most effective at breaking up large concentrations of armored forces, which are not present. Other possible targets would be civilian infrastructure, but the practical effects of such a strike would be dwarfed by the political impact of Russia having crossed the nuclear threshold.
A Russian nuclear strike would solidify opposition, turn neutrals against Russia, and risk fracturing the alliance with China. It would destroy any chance of a negotiated settlement with Ukraine and turn the conflict into total war with no holds barred, a dangerous situation given Russia’s military weakness. While some hardline elements in Russia might applaud the move, having been calling for nuclear strikes for some time, seeing the “special military operation” turn into a nuclear war would likely lose Putin much of his support inside Russia. And that is even before the U.S. or other powers respond.
But perhaps we are looking in the wrong direction when we assume this is about nukes.
One aspect which has received little consideration so far is that when Putin talks about “all the means at our disposal” he may be thinking of other options. When conventional force failed in Syria, the Russian-backed regime resorted to chemical weapon attacks on civilians to terrorize the opposition. Given such a precedent, chemical weapons might look like an attractive way of raising the stakes while not crossing the nuclear threshold. Again it should be noted that the military impact is likely to be extremely low: chemical strikes in Ukraine would more likely be a way of escalating Russia’s ongoing campaign of strikes on civilian targets. It probably would not help Putin, but at this point he may be willing to try almost anything.
“It’s not a bluff,” Putin insisted, which will of course raise questions over whether it is a bluff. Bluffing or not, he has very few cards left to play. The partial mobilization will not help matters in the short term, and he has already thrown in all the conventional forces available.
Meanwhile those around Putin may also be considering their options. This is Putin’s war, and others might be willing to give up on it rather than facing ever-growing military and economic losses. Talk of a palace coup is louder than ever, and his speech will have done nothing to change that.
Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/09/21/putin-just-doubled-down-on-his-nuclear-threat-what-that-means/