Russia Mulls Restarting Production Of Older Fighting Vehicles To Replace Ukraine Losses

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has burned through Russia’s sprawling inventory of armored vehicles like a wildfire, forcing Moscow to scrounge up rusting, retired Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers out of storage and refurbish them for frontline services.

One category of vehicle prone to heavy losses are its tracked BMP infantry fighting vehicles. Russia’s military would like more of these so it doesn’t have to increasingly turn to less combat-capable alternatives like MT-LB general-purpose APCs or up-armored SUV-style vehicles to transport troops into battle.

In theory this could mark an opportunity for Russia to finally begin procurement of a range of next-generation infantry fighting vehicles it has touted for years: the tank-hulled T-15 Armata, the Kurganets-25 fighting vehicle and the wheeled Bumerang—or to at least replace older vehicles with newer production BMP-3s.

But according to an interview posted by Russia’s TASS state news agency, the Kremlin is apparently looking into having Russian tank manufacturers resume production of “earlier generation” vehicles, likely referring to BMP-2s, a more lightly armed and armored variant introduced in the 1980s.

Perhaps less surprisingly, the BMP-3 manufacturers don’t sound keen on going back to building an older, cheaper model of IFV.


Fighting vehicle pioneers

55 years ago, the Soviet Union revolutionized ground warfare when it trotted out its BMP infantry fighting vehicle in a Moscow parade—basically a tracked, armored vehicle intended to transport up to eight soldiers into battle, but which also packed the firepower of a light tank in the form of a 73-millimeter gun and a joystick-guided anti-tank missile launcher.

While Russia still fields some moderately improved first-generation BMP-1s in service, today it primarily uses two later variants with slightly improved armor and far more effective armament: the BMP-2 with a versatile rapid-firing 30-millimeter cannon, and the BMP-3, which adds a big, low-velocity 100-millimeter gun alongside a 30-millimeter cannon. Following a limited initial production run of 339 vehicles between 1987-1994, the BMP-3 reentered mass production in 2004.

On paper, the addition of the 100-millimeter gun (which can also spit out anti-tank guided missiles) makes the BMP-3 impressively heavily armed for its class, posing a significant threat to entrenched/fortified infantry as well as older tanks and comparatively better-protected Western infantry fighting vehicles.

That said, the BMP-3’s troop-carrying ability is degraded because passengers must awkwardly dismount from a hatch on the hull roof rather than more safely and swiftly from a rear ramp. The 100-millimeter shells for the BMP-3’s big gun also pose a greater survival risk to the crew and embarked infantry if the armor is penetrated.

Nonetheless, the massed firepower of Russian BMPs has proven deadly according to Ukrainian soldiers, who also use BMP-1s and -2s alongside indigenous designs like the BTR-4 with similar armament. British ground warfare analyst Jack Watling found in interviews that the “…volume of 30-mm cannon fire proved devastating in the close fight.”

But even improved BMP models have never been well armored compared to Western counterparts, and the Russian Army has lost hundreds in Ukraine.

As of August 30, 2020 the Oryx blog has documented visual media showing well over 700 destroyed, abandoned and captured Russian military BMPs:

  • 129 upgraded BMP-1(P) retaining original 73-millimeter guns but with improved Konkurs wire-guided missile launcher
  • 16 newly upgraded BMP-1AMs with 30-millimeter turret taken from BTR-82A APC (see below)
  • 366 BMP-2s with rapid-fire 30-millimeter cannons
  • 130 BMP-3s with both a 100-millimeter and 30-millimeter cannon
  • 13 BRM-1K reconnaissance vehicles based on BMP-1 with ground-scanning radar
  • 59 BMPs for which the exact model couldn’t be identified

Other types of armored troop carriers used by Russia have also suffered heavy losses.

  • 185 MT-LB tracked APCs armed with 7.62-millimeter machine guns
  • 92 MT-LBVM tracked APCs armed with 14.5-millimeter machine guns
  • 119 BMD-2s, armed similarly to BMP-2s but with lighter armor used by Russian paratroopers
  • 55 new BMD-4Ms, armed similarly to BMP-3s but with lighter armor, used by Russian paratroopers
  • 194 BTR-82A eight-wheeled fighting vehicles with 2A72 30-millimeter cannons

Of course, total losses are surely higher factoring in all the lost vehicles that haven’t been documented.


Back to the future?

The Kremlin’s apparent request that the Kurganmashzavod factory resume production of older BMP-2s suggests it may seek to avoid the increased cost and logistical and training burdens involved in procuring and operating heavier, more complicated BMP-3s.

However, the BMP-3’s manufacturer appears to be politely deflecting this request. In an interview with TASS, Kurganmashzavod (KMZ) CEO Petry Tyukov warned “…it must be understood that the price of such products [older-generation fighting vehicles] will be much higher than for new serial machines produced as planned, such as BMP-3 and BMD-4M.” He hopes a “reasonable mutual understanding” can be reached with military procurers.

Production of new BMP-2s ended around 2006, though upgrade kits and spare parts has continued. One likely argument is that the overhead cost of reestablishing a production line with all the old tooling would outweigh any saving achieved from producing lower unit-cost BMP-2s.

Of course, that reduced unit cost also likely amounts to much smaller profit margins for each vehicle delivered by the manufacturer too. Analyst Henry Schlottman notes that BMP-2s have been exported for over $300,000 per unit (adjusted to 2022 dollars) compared to $1.1 million for new BMP-3s delivered to Russia in 2021.

Michael Kofman, a prominent expert on the Russian military, also suggests “older generation” vehicles could refer to focusing production lines on upgrading BMP-2s and even older BMP-1 and MT-LB vehicle. In a tweet he writes, “I suspect the main Russian shortfall in armored vehicles is not in tanks, but in IFVs. BMP-1s & MT-LBs are likely to be more plentiful in storage than anything else.”

Currently, Russian company KBP is already contracted to upgrade 540 BMP-2s with “Berezhok” turrets, adding to the original model’s armament an additional AGS-30 automatic grenade launcher, a two twin-launchers of Kornet-M anti-tank missiles, a day/night sight and a 350-horsepower UTD-23 diesel engine to compensate for increased weight.

Meanwhile, additional older BMP-1s could be converted to the BMP-1AM model, which uses the 30-millimeter gun turret from the BTR-82A APC, which also includes a day/night sight.

To be sure, it’s striking that the war in Ukraine is compelling the Kremlin to prioritize short-term volume-production of older types rather than introducing next-generation designs to rebuild its fighting vehicle fleet. Those include the tank-based T-15 heavy APC, tracked Kurganets-25 and wheeled Bumerang—that have been in limbo for nearly a decade.

That likely reflects an inability to afford the setup and units costs to begin mass production of new-generation designs, at least in timely fashion. The costs and challenges of bringing more modern designs into production are now surely aggravated by Western sanctions cutting access to many basic electrical components, requiring pricey and time-consuming workarounds.

A notable feature of the newer vehicles would have been superior crew protection, particularly against mines and infantry anti-tank weapons by incorporating active protection systems, V-shaped hulls, reactive armor and warning sensors.

Instead, Kurganmashzavod is working on upgrading its BMP-3s with additional armored screens that may degrade shaped-charge warheads—a weight-increasing improvement which may be made at the expense of the BMP-3’s amphibious capabilities.

Russia’s military might also show interest in a “next-generation” BMP-3M Manul model offered with improved passenger capacity and survivability, new missiles, sensors, and an uprated engine—but without the BMP-3’s distinctive 100-millimeter gun.

Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2022/08/31/russia-mulls-restarting-production-of-older-fighting-vehicles-to-replace-ukraine-losses/