Beijing’s Blockade Of Taiwan Is The Latest Sign Washington Needs To Streamline Its Defense Trade With Allies

China’s live-fire exercises around Taiwan in response to a visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi are being described as a de facto blockade, foreshadowing the strategy Beijing could one day use to force the island nation into submission.

Beijing is not discouraging that interpretation.

Whatever answer Washington might mount to this escalation of regional tensions, it is clear that the U.S. needs to maintain close military ties with other democratic nations in the Western Pacific. Countering China’s rising military power will require something more than unilateral action on the part of the United States.

Fortunately, there are some simple steps that can be taken in Washington to facilitate the efforts of like-minded nations in deterring Chinese aggression.

One of the most obvious such steps is to speed up the process for sharing defense-related technical data with allies. In its zeal to prevent military technology from falling into the hands of bad actors, the U.S. has put in place a regulatory regime that impedes the ability of industry to work with allied nations.

The system is called International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR, and it is administered by the Department of State. Created in 1976 and periodically updated, ITAR includes a “munitions list” that specifies in considerable detail what technologies are subject to limits.

The munitions list doesn’t just regulate trade in military items like tanks and missiles; it also limits international trafficking in technical data that might be applied to the design, engineering or production of military systems.

The regulations are quite demanding. For instance, simply traveling abroad with a laptop containing relevant technical data potentially exposes the bearer to severe penalties—even if there is no evidence the laptop has been opened.

ITAR rules were put in place with the best of intentions, and the State Department argues whatever burdens they may impose on industry are modest compared with the benefits to national security.

But the bureaucratic processes used to review applications for export licenses and other approvals bearing upon the arms trade are time-consuming and arbitrary. It can take a year or longer to secure approval for even routine requests, and when the requests involve anything out of the ordinary the reviews can take much more than a year.

Several companies engaged in selling arms abroad contribute to my think tank. I frequently hear executives complaining about how byzantine the ITAR process is. Although they have learned how frame their requests to encourage a positive outcome, the process tends to be lethargic.

One reason is that since its inception, the ITAR system has tended to assume that the most advanced military systems originate in America. ITAR thus is more geared to protecting sensitive U.S. technology than facilitating cooperation among allies.

If that assumption was ever valid, it is not true today. With the migration of military innovation to dual-use technologies like 5G and artificial intelligence, many of the cutting-edge innovations relevant to military missions now are spawned in the commercial world, and a fair number are developed outside the U.S.

China has mounted a national effort to match and surpass the United States in these information-age technologies, so it is no exaggeration to say Washington is in a race with Beijing to see which nation will dominate global innovation.

That doesn’t mean the U.S. should abandon regulation of military exports, but it does suggest a need to scrub the existing regulatory regime of any features that unnecessarily slow the sharing of vital data or commodities with allies. After all, we’re in a race.

The tripartite security pact known as AUKUS that the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom entered into last year is a good example of how the current system can get in the way. Everybody in Washington knows that that Australia and Britain are among America’s most trustworthy allies, and that any legitimate request for the transfer of sensitive information in the end is likely to be approved.

Nonetheless, the current system takes way too long to formally approve transfers, and companies cannot legally share information until approvals are granted.

In the case of AUKUS, the incoming Australian defense minister has stated that the three countries are trying to fashion an integrated defense industrial base and “technology coalition” suited to the deterrence of Chinese ambitions in the Western Pacific. Said coalition involves sharing data in areas such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, vehicle autonomy, hypersonics and quantum computing.

Having Canberra and London aligned with U.S. strategy in the Pacific is vitally important, but the ITAR system as currently structured is likely to be a continuous drag on making the security pact work.

The solution is to streamline ITAR by creating a fast track for sharing with those allies who are most trusted and most important—countries like Australia and the U.K. If proposed transfers of arms or data are almost certain to be approved in the end, then why subject them to time-consuming bureaucratic processes?

The present system is so cumbersome that it can take literally years to prepare a request for approval, and meanwhile China is gaining on Washington and its friends in the region.

It is time to apply some common sense to this process by recognizing that countries like Australia and the United Kingdon do not need to be subject to the same scrutiny as some other overseas partners. A fast-track mechanism to speed the process is overdue.

Instituting a fast track will cost the U.S. government nothing, and probably enhance the ability of U.S. industry to compete in the global arms market. If the Biden administration really is determined to keep up with China in the Western Pacific, this would be a useful policy innovation.