U.S. Is In Danger Of Mission Creep In Ukraine

It’s been clear from the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine that there would be terrible consequences if Vladimir Putin were to win big. A successful war of conquest would change power equations in Central Europe, embolden Putin even more, damage NATO, perhaps irrevocably, accelerate perceptions of U.S. decline, and perhaps set the stage for another war of conquest across the Taiwan Strait.

Given these stakes, Washington and its NATO partners stepped up to help Ukraine oppose the Russian invasion. In stage one of this war, they succeeded in foiling Putin’s plans for a quick, decisive win. But this war isn’t over, and Putin could still succeed in gaining additional territory in the east and creating a land bridge of Russian-held territory in the south.

Putin could declare this a victory, despite the heavy military, economic and reputational costs to Russia from waging this war. Alternatively, Ukrainian troops, fortified by military equipment NATO was initially hesitant to provide, could extend Russian losses and reclaim territory in the second phase of this war.

It matters greatly how Ukraine, Russia, and NATO define winning and losing. Many armchair strategists in the United States who advocated ambitious wars in Afghanistan and Iraq now call for Putin to lose decisively. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin seemed to join them by stating, “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things it’s done in Ukraine.” The goal of decisive victory goes far beyond what U.S. and NATO leaders advocated at the onset of this war.

Mission creep happens. The initial purpose of the U.S. war in Afghanistan was to rout Al Qaeda. The initial purpose of the second U.S. war against Iraq was to topple Saddam Hussein. Both missions were accomplished early on. Then the George W. Bush administration changed the goal posts in both wars, in part because “winning” could be short lived without systemic change. Both wars morphed into something more grandiose and utterly unachievable — the transformation of Afghanistan and Iraq into friendly, governable, democratic states.

Mission creep can also cause much sorrow in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Stopping Putin from succeeding in Ukraine is quite different from crippling his military’s ability to wage aggressive war. There’s no need for an ambitious war aim: Stopping Putin from succeeding in Ukraine is, by itself, the functional equivalent of preventing him from making the same mistake twice.

It’s OK for Putin to claim a win in Ukraine that’s an obvious loss. It’s not OK for him to achieve important territorial gains in the east and in the south. What constitutes “important” territorial gains is for Ukraine’s leadership to decide, just as it is Kiev’s decision to assess the level of sacrifice required to deny and reverse Russian gains.

One reasonable definition of loss is that whatever Putin gains from waging aggressive war pales in comparison to Russian losses. These calculations include territory, but extend well beyond where the forward edge of battle congeals.

The pursuit of a decisive win by Ukraine and Putin’s decisive loss would constitute another example of mission creep. Two of the likely consequences of mission creep would be great strains within NATO and greater desperation by Putin.

It’s as essential to prevent the use of a nuclear weapon in this war as it is to deny Putin the functional equivalent of a victory. A mushroom cloud would have profoundly negative consequences for participants and onlookers in this war. Nuclear use would not only be a Hitlerian act; it would also seriously increase nuclear dangers on many fronts.

The odds against battlefield use remain high, but they are reduced the more government officials and armchair strategists advocate mission creep.

It’s necessary for Putin to lose more than he gains in this war. It’s also necessary to avoid mission creep. Its advocates have a terrible track record.