New Platforms For Indo-Pacific Diplomacy

As Western countries begin the process of seizing Russian assets, the scope and scale of Russian “quasi-state” overseas investment is stunning. The patterns of Russian maritime investment are particularly striking. Rather than build a modern Navy, Russia’s state-linked oligarchs built a fleet of quasi-governmental luxury cruisers for diplomatic work. The West has an unprecedented opportunity to employ this fleet for similar purposes.

Russia spent billions building a fleet of luxury yachts for a simple reason. In aggregate, Russia’s high-end cruise ships did great work in advancing Russian interests. And now, as the West sanctions and sweeps up these vessels, Russia’s luxe armada can go to work for the West as roving diplomatic posts or globe-spanning Presidential and Royal yachts.

Russia invested in luxury ships because they realized the return on investment from a luxury yacht was far better for Russia than any comparable investment in a conventional naval platform or diplomatic facility. So, rather than invest in diplomatic outreach or better weapons, sensors, and damage-control systems for the Russian Navy’s enormous Slava Class Cruisers—the same type of ship that Ukraine sunk in the Black Sea—Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, encouraged his friends procure an enormous, free-wheeling fleet of luxury craft.

Putin’s flamboyant fleet served as unregulated floating embassies, offering Russians instant respectability, good security, and access to all the types of people Russia needed to make good things happen for the Russian state.

But Russia’s water party is over.

The few sanctioned Russian yachts still free are racing to Russian ports or seeking some other marginally-respectable safe-haven. Others, trapped in boatyards or otherwise stuck, are getting impounded and seized by Western authorities.

Rather than take a moment to figure out how these unexpected new assets might be employed, Western authorities seem content to just shuffle these one-of-a-kind platforms “off the books” as soon as possible. While commendable, the abrupt divestment is bad business. With the Russian State out of the luxe vessel market, the ships will likely sell for pennies on the dollar.

Don’t Lose The Ships, Use Them!

In early April, the United States KleptoCapture Task Force seized the $90-million dollar “The Tango”, a Netherlands-built superyacht owned by Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg. The mid-sized, 255-foot yacht was launched in 2011, operating with a crew of 22 and capable of supporting a staff of 14 or more. This type of craft—about half the size of an Arleigh Burke destroyer—would be a perfect diplomatic supplement to America’s sparse diplomatic cadre in the strategic but under-represented and oft-ignored set of islands in the South Pacific.

The United States needs extra diplomatic presence in the South Pacific right away. In the strategically-located Solomons Islands—an island chain perched between the United States and Australia, Chinese diplomats exploited Western disinterest in the small, impoverished country, enticing the Solomons Islands into agreements that likely offers China enormous inroads into the area, and, potentially, an avenue to establish a forward military presence there. Lacking effective diplomatic representation, the United States was caught by surprise, and rushed a delegation led by Kurt Campbell, the White House Indo-Pacific coordinator, to the country, promising, among other things, to re-open a long-closed U.S. embassy.

Reopening the Solomons Islands embassy will take too long. But turning “The Tango” into an ersatz floating embassy can be done quite quickly, and American diplomats, sailing aboard the luxury platform, can do an enormous amount of regional influencing in a way that China will be hard-pressed to match.

An innovative floating embassy, moving around several island countries in the Pacific, could have gotten early wind of China’s machinations. But rather than invest in something concrete—as this author has argued for since 2009—or even tend American battle monuments in the region—the State Department, after closing the Solomons Islands embassy in 1993, spent an enormous amount of money “innovating”, deploying a “virtual embassy” for the Solomons Islands—despite the fact that, at the time, only 2% of Solomon Island residents had internet access.

The operational costs of deploying a luxury yacht into the southern oceans is tiny in comparison to the expense of losing out to better-established diplomatic rivals. The State Department will never have access to a well-appointed luxury yacht again. Let’s use it before we lose it.

Use Superyachts As Embassies:

A century ago, when diplomacy was the province of well-heeled U.S. representatives, the U.S. pressed private pleasure yachts into diplomatic service before. But today, modern superyachts have many features that are perfect for diplomatic work in the Pacific.

The ships are secure and commodious. Modern super yachts usually have some type of self-defense/anti-intrusion system, advanced communication capabilities, as well as a private and well-secured “owner’s suite” that might be perfect for a floating ambassador’s residence or office.

The luxury ships are usually impressive architectural statements, crafted to attract notice and awe from observers—something that embassy designers once appreciated.

The ships are built to securely socialize. To get people or gear on and off, most super yachts have some small “tender” boats as well as a well deck or small-boat receiving capability. Others even have helicopter landing or hangar facilities, offering extra reach and support for remote regions that U.S. diplomatic representatives may rarely visit. Some even have “moon pools” and submarines—a capability that might be particularly interesting in certain stretches of South Pacific Ocean.

All super yachts have a comprehensive suite of social facilities, where visitors might relax and enjoy their stay as they are persuaded to advance Western interests. Work-out rooms and cozy common areas can also support the recreational needs of the embarked crew and staff.

The ships can support a good-sized ambassadorial staff. The U.S. Embassy Majuro, perched on the Republic of the Marshall Islands, relies on a staff of 17. But these staffers can only see a portion of the country—While Majuro is the capital, the Marshalls, as a country, is sprawling place. In total, the country includes five islands and 29 separate atolls. An occasional U.S. visit to the outer-lying islands would do a lot to raise America’s stature, helping ensure that the Marshall Islands will keep granting U.S. access to the critical Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site and Space Tracking Station.

There are other benefits. With a few yachts circulating through the Pacific, demonstrating presence, constantly working with locals, and building better ties with the strategically placed and often fragile democracies of Oceania, the boats can help build up local ship maintenance and repair capabilities.

Outside of diplomatic work, the former Russian-owned vessels can be pressed into service as “mother ships” to support other nearby American vessels. In an effort to understand and limit illegal fishing, the U.S. Coast Guard is dispatching small cutters throughout the Pacific. A super yacht with a helicopter, fuel, and a place to rest would be boon as the Coast Guard’s small ships work, often alone, in maintaining “rules-based” order in the often-lawless Pacific waters.

After decades of neglect, there’s a lot of diplomatic work the West needs to do in the Pacific. Let’s use the remains of Putin’s diplomatic Navy to do some of it.