Does America Have a Defense Strategy?

NUUK, GREENLAND – JANUARY 17: People hold Greenlandic flags and placards as they gather by the United States Consulate to march in protest against U.S. President Donald Trump and his announced intent to acquire Greenland on January 17, 2026 in Nuuk, Greenland. Greenlandic, Danish and other European leaders are hoping they can still avert an intervention by the United States to forcefully acquire the island as U.S. President Donald Trump continues to insist the U.S. must have Greenland, suggesting even by military means if necessary. (Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

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It’s been a busy year for U.S. defense policy and practice: deposing the president of Venezuela by force, pressing to seize ownership of a NATO-affiliated territory, and announcing the intention to pursue an enormous, $500 billion increase in the Pentagon budget.

This flurry of activity has led to widespread speculation as to what’s next. In the aftermath of the capture and arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, a number of articles appeared that discussed whether the Trump administration would proceed to grab control of Greenland, attempt to topple the Cuban government, or promote regime change in Iran – or perhaps all three. But since the Trump administration has been anything but predictable, prognosticators should be prepared to shift gears rapidly as events unfold.

Take the case of Venezuela. In the aftermath of the removal of Maduro, President Trump suggested that the United States might need to “rule” Venezuela for as long as a few years, until an acceptable transition government could be formed. And he asserted that U.S. oil companies would invest the billions of dollars needed to upgrade and take control of Venezuela’s oil production capacity. It is not clear whether either of these expensive undertakings will in fact be pursued.

Ruling a country the size of Venezuela would require deployment of a substantial number of troops and administrators, and would not be a cheap proposition. Venezuela’s oil – hard crude – is hard to extract, and it could take untold billions of dollars to restore that nation to peak production capacity. Will U.S. oil companies want to make that kind of investment without some faith that Venezuela will have a stable government five or ten years from now when those investments reach fruition?

\The question of what’s next for U.S. policy towards Venezuela has dropped from the headlines in the face of President Trump’s renewed focus on “owning” Greenland, and the tensions it has created between Washington and America’s NATO allies.

What’s next, indeed. Last Friday at 7 p.m., the Trump administration quietly released its new National Defense Strategy. In theory, the document should help determine whether there is rhyme or reason in U.S. national security policy, or if our leaders are shooting from the hip and hoping for the best.

The subtitle of the new document exudes confidence:

“Restoring Peace Through Strength for a New Golden Age of America.” Parts of it read like a recipe for a more restrained, less interventionist policy, as in the following:

“Past leaders squandered our military advantages and the lives, goodwill and resources of our people in grandiose nation-building projects.”

Upon reading further it becomes clear that the strategy document is not suggesting a reduction in the use of military force, but a shift in focus to the Western Hemisphere, while continuing to pursue influence in the Middle East, in part through continuing arms transfers and military collaboration with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

The document puts the Western Hemisphere as America’s top security concern. China takes second place, and while continuing to suggest that China’s rise could pose dangers to U.S. security and U.S. influence, it also discusses seeking negotiations (from a position of strength) that could initially include increased military-to-military communications with Beijing in support of “strategic stability.”

The final priority emphasized in the proposed strategy is to “supercharge the defense industrial base” by “clearing away outdated policies, regulations, and practices.” Getting rid of excess paper work and unnecessary paper work is a worthy goal. Unfortunately, necessary protections like a robust independent testing office and strong measures to prevent price gouging by contractors have also been weakened, moves which could lead to overpriced weapons that don’t perform as advertised.

The biggest question is to what degree any document will be followed given the unpredictable nature of the Trump administration’s foreign and military policy: attacking Venezuela based on an overstated assertion about its role in trafficking drugs into the U.S. only to have the president say it was really about controlling that country’s oil resources, or spurring an uproar within NATO about the president’s desire to “own” Greenland, even though it could expand the U.S. military presence there and make deals to access Greenland’s minerals without threatening to take it over.

The future of U.S. national security policy is up for grabs. Congress and the public need to have a voice and play a role in establishing priorities and some rules of the road about the threat or use of force. Doing so will be far more consequential than any document.