The Shibarium bridge hack was a flash-loan style exploit that drained roughly $2.4M (224.57 ETH and ~92.6B SHIB) by manipulating validator votes; Shibarium devs paused staking, moved funds to a 6-of-9 multisig, and launched a forensic investigation.
Flash-loan bridge exploit drained 224.57 ETH and ~92.6B SHIB
10 of 12 validator signing keys were compromised; only two validators refused a malicious state
Developers paused staking, moved funds to a 6-of-9 hardware multisig, and engaged Hexens, Seal911, and PeckShield
Shibarium bridge hack: $2.4M drained in a flash loan exploit; read immediate impact on SHIB/BONE and the containment steps taken by developers.
What happened in the Shibarium bridge hack?
Shibarium bridge hack describes a flash loan-style exploit on 13 September that used borrowed liquidity to seize validator influence, allowing an attacker to sign a fraudulent state and drain 224.57 ETH and ~92.6 billion SHIB. Developers immediately paused sensitive functions and began a forensic response.
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How did the attacker manipulate validator voting power?
The attacker executed a rapid flash loan, used the borrowed funds to buy 4.6 million BONE tokens within a single block, and obtained the necessary voting weight to produce a malicious state.
That temporary two-thirds majority depended on the loan-funded purchase; without it, the attacker could not have forged consensus.
Details of the exploit
The attacker leveraged bridge funds and a flash-loan technique to momentarily control voting weight on Shibarium’s Layer 2 consensus.
Within one block they purchased 4.6 million BONE, signed a malicious state, and repaid the flash loan after extracting assets from the bridge: specifically 224.57 ETH and ~92.6 billion SHIB.
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Although funds were siphoned, BONE tokens used in the attack remain locked because validators retain custody of those tokens, limiting immediate liquidation.
Forensic review indicates 10 of 12 validator signing keys were compromised; only K9 Finance and UnificationUND refused to sign the fraudulent state.
The attacker also tried to liquidate about $700,000 in KNINE tokens, but the K9 Finance DAO blocked the attempt. Other tokens (LEASH, ROAR, TREAT, BAD, SHIFU) were not drained.
Shibarium’s developers paused staking and unstaking to prevent further exploit vectors.
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