U.S. Troop Withdrawal From Iraq ‘Calm Before The Storm,’ Analysts Warn

U.S. soldiers queue to board a plane to begin their journey home out of Iraq from the al-Asad Air Base west the capital Baghdad, on November 1, 2011. (Photo by ALI AL-SAADI/AFP via Getty Images)

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The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq’s Ain Al-Asad airbase in Anbar and Victoria base in Baghdad ahead of the September 2025 deadline means the first phase of a previously agreed-upon two-phase transition, withdrawing from the federal provinces, is complete. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean that all U.S. troops will be out of the country by the upcoming completion of the second phase of the transition, withdrawing from the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan Region, tentatively scheduled for September 2026.

The recent U.S. withdrawal proceeded “well ahead of schedule” to the extent that it reportedly surprised the Iraqi military.

In September 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense announced it would end the anti-Islamic State coalition mission in Iraq by September 2025 as part of “a two-phase transition plan.”

The second phase would see the U.S. retain a residual presence in the autonomous Kurdistan Region in the north to support continued anti-IS operations in Syria, where the group still poses a significant threat. That phase would continue “until at least September 2026, subject to conditions on the ground and, obviously, consultations among future political leaders of Iraq and the United States,” an official said at the time.

Consequently, it’s unclear whether all remaining U.S. troops will similarly pack up and leave their base at Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan by September 2026.

“It’s likely to remain a drawdown and not a full withdrawal even after the 2026 deadline, which is publicly framed as a ‘full withdrawal’ of U.S. troops from the entirety of Iraq,” Mohammed A. Salih, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told me.

Salih believes it’s possible the U.S. will also withdraw from Erbil next year, but believes “much will depend” on domestic politics in the U.S. The Trump administration may see a complete withdrawal as a “realization” of its campaign issue of ending endless wars.

“Another important factor is the situation in the region and whether the withdrawal will help secure American interests better or not,” he said.

Joel Wing, author of the authoritative Musings on Iraq blog, also sees domestic U.S. politics as a significant factor, noting that the current withdrawal could be “a reflection” of President Trump “not caring” about Iraq in his current term.

“The first time he was president, he was stuck on Iraq ‘owing’ the U.S. for the 2003 invasion and deterring Iran,” Wing told me. “This term, it seems like he has other priorities like tariffs and immigration.”

“The State Department threatened an early withdrawal from Iraq if its parliament passes a Hashd bill,” he said.

The Hashd bill refers to the Iraqi state-sanctioned paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces (also known as Hashd al-Shaabi) Authority Law that several Iran-backed Shia political factions strongly support, but the U.S. staunchly opposes. The Trump administration has warned that the proposed law in its current form would “institutionalize Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty.”

The Iraqi government withdrew a draft of the law in late August amidst the U.S. drawdown, with Iraqi officials citing both external American pressure and internal disagreements.

“Otherwise, it seems like Washington is committed to the timeline,” Wing said. “At the same time, I read that trainers and advisors are not included in the pullout plan, so it seems like some American troops will stay past the withdrawal date.”

Lawk Ghafuri, an Iraqi political analyst, believes the present withdrawal is only “the calm before the storm.”

“Iraq remains the last stronghold in the region that continues to serve as a base for Iranian-backed groups,” Ghafuri told me. “Washington did not act on withdrawal until Baghdad made it clear to the Trump administration that the Hashd al-Shaabi law would not be enacted – something the Shiite alliance itself ultimately abandoned.”

Regarding the late August withdrawal, Wing reckons the U.S. troops merely left quicker than the Iraqis had expected.

“They were surprised, and some parliamentarians worried about the security situation,” he said. “Again, it might just show that the Trump administration wants out of Iraq this time around.”

Salih noted that while the late August drawdown is “a process that has started,” he also pointed out that “people in the know” are saying there’s a preference for “some sort of long-term US military presence” in Iraq.

“It will depend on various factors, including the Iraqi government wanting at least some portion of these troops to remain in some capacity, particularly in the fight against IS, as well as the regional developments and domestic US politics,” he said.

Salih also pointed out that preparing for more attacks by Iran-backed PMF elements has “always been a major consideration” for American decision-makers.

“It’s one of Iran’s key sources of leverage on the U.S. in Iraq and the broader region,” he said. “However, we’ll have to wait and see if the pro-Iran Iraqi militias will actually strike U.S. targets if a new round of Iran-Israel war occurs.”

On the other hand, Wing is skeptical that the U.S. “really worries” all that much about PMF attacks.

“Many of the drones get shot down. The rockets aren’t accurate,” he said. “They are annoyances rather than real threats and are meant as a message from those factions rather than really trying to do harm because they know that will bring American retaliation.”

Various Iran-backed PMF factions operating under the umbrella of the self-styled Islamic Resistance of Iraq launched several drone and rocket attacks against U.S. bases in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Syria following the onset of the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza in October 2023. These attacks markedly decreased following large-scale U.S. airstrikes targeting PMF bases and leadership targets in Iraq and Syria in February 2024 in retaliation for a fatal drone attack on the Tower 22 U.S. base in Jordan on the Syrian border. Furthermore, these factions did not launch any significant attacks during the more recent 12-day Israeli air campaign against Iran in June.

Wing doesn’t believe that a complete U.S. withdrawal would necessarily lead to a resurgence of violent groups like the infamous Islamic State. The militant group took over large swathes of Iraq two-and-a-half years after the last complete U.S. withdrawal in 2011 at the end of the Iraq War.

“The Islamic State is dead for all intents and purposes in Iraq,” he said. “It has failed to rebuild its manpower and networks, which has denied it the ability to carry out attacks.”

Wing concluded by identifying Iraqi Kurdistan as the “most likely spot for any stay behind US forces” since the Kurds are generally more pro-American and would welcome a presence as “a guarantee against any use of force against them” from Baghdad.

Interestingly, the U.S. military has plans for expanding the number of helicopter pads in Erbil airport, in another possible indication that it plans to retain at least some forces past September 2026.

Salih and Ghafuri are pessimistic about the outcome of any potential complete withdrawal. Both analysts foresee dire scenarios similar to and even worse than the aftermath of the 2011 withdrawal.

“A full withdrawal might prove more detrimental than some folks in Baghdad or Washington might be willing to acknowledge at this point,” Salih said.

“We saw the consequences of full withdrawal in 2011, which led to Islamic State’s rise. So, hopefully that lesson has been learned,” he said. “Iraq does need U.S. support to counter the threat of an Islamic State whose attacks in Syria appear to be picking up, slowly but steadily.”

Ghafuri believes Baghdad is now undergoing a repeat of the mistakes that led up to the 2011 withdrawal.

“In essence, Iraqis chose to align with Washington’s demand (to withdraw the PMF law) in exchange for a U.S. troop withdrawal – especially with parliamentary elections looming in November,” he said.

“With this, the Coordination Framework secured a political achievement similar to what (former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-) Maliki pulled off in 2011, when President Obama withdrew US troops and Maliki was elevated as a national hero among Shiite alliances and the Shia community at large.”

In Ghafuri’s view, Iraq faces an even “more dangerous reality” today than in 2011.

“On its western border lies a Sunni-ruled Syria – a power Baghdad cannot ignore,” he said. “That regime harbors sectarian extremist elements, ready to destabilize Shiite Iraq if given the opportunity.”

A complete U.S. troop withdrawal could also unwittingly benefit neighboring Iran at a critical juncture for Tehran.

“The most critical issue, however, is that a U.S. withdrawal now would hand Iran the perfect opportunity to reassert itself,” Ghafuri said. “Tehran, battered and weakened, could use Iraq’s resources and financial system as a lifeline to rebuild both its military capacity and regional influence.”

“This risk cannot be underestimated: Iraq could become the engine that powers Iran’s resurgence.”