Russian Drone Strikes Continue. Ukraine Hits Shahed Supply Chains.

KHARKIV, UKRAINE – JULY 30: Dmytro Chubenko of the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office examines the carbon fiber remains of a Russian-made, Iran-designed Shahed-136 drone, known as a Geran-2 in Russia, on July 30, 2025 in Kharkiv, Ukraine. (Photo by Scott Peterson/Getty Images)

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Despite ongoing peace talks, Russia has continued to launch drone strikes against Ukraine, including massive barrages on August 18 and 20 that sent hundreds of drones at targets across the country. These strikes consist of Geran and Gerbera drones, better known as “Shaheds” after the Iranian model they copy. Over the past three years, Shaheds have become a serious threat as Russia increasingly uses them to hit Ukrainian infrastructure and defensive positions. Ukraine has invested heavily in air defenses and jamming systems, but these measures are proving less effective. As a result, Ukraine has expanded its strategy to include strikes on Russian facilities tied to the production and deployment of Shahed drones.

Recent Ukrainian Strikes Against the Shahed Drone Network

Operation Spider’s Web was Ukraine’s most high-profile drone strike this summer, but it was only one of many attacks deep inside Russia. With advances in long-range drone capabilities, Ukraine has struck oil refineries and other key infrastructure across the country. More importantly, it has focused on facilities involved in the deployment, storage, and production of Shahed drones.

As early as summer 2024, Ukraine began striking airfields used to store and deploy Shahed drones. Because of their limited range, these drones must be based close to Ukraine, leaving the airfields within reach of Ukrainian drones. In June and July 2024, Ukraine hit Shahed-related facilities on airfields in Crimea and Krasnodar Krai, causing limited damage. While drones on the ground are easier to target than airborne ones, hardened and dispersed facilities limit the overall impact of such strikes. Through 2024 and into 2025, Ukraine continued to target airfields in these regions linked to Shahed operations. In recent months, however, these strikes have intensified, often using multiple drones to hit and destroy warehouses used for drone storage.

Over the past year, Ukraine has expanded its strike drone capabilities, with the Liutyi drone now able to hit targets up to 2,000 kilometers away. This has allowed Ukraine to reach production facilities deeper inside Russia. On June 15, 2025, Ukrainian drones attacked a Shahed factory in Yelabuga, about 1,000 kilometers from the border. Videos showed fire and smoke rising from the site, but Russian media later reported the factory was still producing large numbers of drones. Social media posts also pointed to another strike on this facility, as well as one in Nizhnekamsk on August 9, though the extent of the damage remains unclear.

While the main assembly facilities are difficult targets given their sheer size, Ukraine has found success striking at the various supply chain nodes that provide the components for the Shaheds. On June 9, 2025, Ukrainian drones hit the VNIIR-Progress plant in Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic, which manufactures electronic modules for Shaheds, forcing a temporary suspension of operations. On July 4, 2025, Ukrainian forces attacked the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry in Sergiev Posad, Moscow region, damaging its electric substation and limiting operation at the complex. This facility makes the warheads for the Shaheds. On August 14, 2025, another strike destroyed a Russian ship carrying Shahed components from Iran. These attacks, along with others against Russia’s industrial base, have generally focused on softer targets and appear to have been fairly successful, causing disruptions to Russia’s ability to produce Shahed drones.

The Benefits of Attacking the Shahed “Network”

Ukraine’s strategy mirrors the approach used by Coalition forces to combat IEDs during the Global War on Terror. At first, Coalition forces relied on jammers and armored vehicles to mitigate roadside bombs, but they soon broadened their efforts to “attack the network” by dismantling insurgents’ ability to produce and deploy them. That strategy proved effective, and Ukraine now seeks to achieve similar results against Shahed drones.

Ukraine initially relied on ground-based air defense systems and jamming to counter the Shahed drones. These methods were effective until Russia adapted. The drones were upgraded with improved electronics to resist jamming, forcing Ukraine to expand its kinetic defenses with helicopters, low-flying aircraft, and interceptor drones. Russia then introduced decoy drones and began mass producing both standard and decoy models to overwhelm defenses. The latest Geran variants appear able to alter their flight paths mid-mission to target Ukrainian defenses directly, suggesting the use of secure remote-control systems or advanced, AI-based navigation.

As with most counter-drone efforts, Ukraine’s defenses have been reactive, adjusting to Russian innovations. While Ukrainian engineers have been resourceful, Russia’s established defense industry gives it an advantage in rapidly producing and refining new systems. To offset this, Ukraine has shifted to a more offensive strategy by striking production, supply, and research facilities. The goal is to weaken Russia’s ability to innovate and field new variants, potentially allowing Ukraine to regain the initiative.

Additionally, by attacking the facilities that build and distribute Shaheds, Ukraine is limiting Russian output and reducing the number of drones that reach the battlefield. This network-focused approach is more effective than relying solely on interception, especially as Russia now launches drones in mass waves designed to overwhelm defenses. By cutting the number of drones available for deployment, Ukraine improves the chances that its defenses can stop those that remain.

The Road Ahead

Looking forward, Ukraine is likely to intensify its strikes on Shahed-related facilities, pushing deeper into Russian territory as its long-range capabilities grow. This strategy could constrain Russia’s ability to mass-produce Shaheds, easing pressure on Ukraine’s air defenses. By targeting production plants, storage facilities, supply lines, and research centers, Ukraine is eroding the foundations of Russia’s drone campaign rather than merely reacting to it.

Regardless, the contest remains fluid. Russia will continue to adapt and harden its facilities, pushing Ukraine to enhance its own long-range strike systems. The long-term effectiveness of this strategy will depend on Ukraine’s ability to sustain deep strikes, disrupt Russian innovation, and cut the flow of Shahed drones before they reach the frontlines.