Trump’s Trade Accord Meets Europe’s Nuclear Rebound

Nuclear in EU 27 Countries. Status as of 31 July, 2025.

Qimeng Yang; Taurus Xu; Anna Broughel

In July 2025, the Trump Administration and the European Commission unveiled a trade accord to strengthen transatlantic collaboration as the EU works to reduce its reliance on Russian gas and nuclear fuel. The deal sets a 15% tariff on most European imports to the U.S., down from a threatened 30% tariff, and includes an EU pledge to invest $600 billion in the U.S. economy by 2028. Most notably, Europe agreed to purchase $750 billion in American energy exports, including liquefied natural gas, oil, and nuclear technology and fuels. While the initial handshake agreement does not specify exact volumes or timing of energy purchases, it is notable that nuclear technology and fuels are included in the deal.

These provisions are in line with the Trump administration’s “energy dominance” paradigm, which aims to solidify U.S. leadership in global energy markets through fossil fuel and nuclear exports. The nuclear clause also signals Washington’s confidence in American nuclear vendors (NuScale, GE Hitachi, Westinghouse) and its efforts to rebuild domestic uranium supply chains as a long-term alternative to Russian fuel. Yet the inclusion of nuclear technology in this agreement is not simply an act of U.S. persuasion. Instead, it reflects an opportunistic alignment with the EU which, for the first time in decades, is quickly warming to nuclear energy across broad swaths of the continent.

Europe Reconsiders Nuclear Power

Historically, Europe’s attitude toward nuclear power has been fragmented and, oftentimes, anti-nuclear voices have seemed loudest. Austria never launched its only nuclear reactor due to a 1978 referendum in which the population voted against commissioning the already-built reactor near Vienna. Although Switzerland is not part of the European Union, it is a country with a significant nuclear fleet that voted in a 2017 referendum to gradually phase out nuclear power. Malta, Cyprus, and Ireland have also maintained no-nuclear policies. Germany completed its nuclear phaseout in 2023, closing the final chapter on a political project initiated after the Fukushima disaster. However, the finality of the country’s anti-nuclear stance has been rhetorically challenged by a recent announcement that put SMRs and nuclear fusion back on the agenda. No legal changes have been made, and the retired nuclear power plants will not be reopened.

Notwithstanding the anti-nuclear rhetoric, nuclear accounted for 22.8% of EU electricity generation in 2023, totaling over 619,000 GWh. A continental rethinking of nuclear has accelerated, as the EU seeks to reduce reliance on Russian fuels, maintain its industrial base and standard of living, and meet climate goals under the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement, while advanced reactor technologies mature and geopolitical risks grow. Nuclear is now seen as part of the solution, providing dispatchable, low-carbon electricity with a compact spatial footprint and alignment with geopolitically stable suppliers. Governments increasingly recognize that nuclear investment supports not only energy supply but also job creation, manufacturing growth, and regional development.

Without doubt, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis acted as a wild card that exposed the EU’s vulnerability to fossil fuel supply disruptions. In 2021, the EU imported 45 percent of its natural gas from Russia. By 2024, that figure had dropped to 19 percent, driven by emergency diversification under the REPowerEU plan. The recent EU–US trade accord signals further willingness to reduce these dependencies and explicitly includes the purchase of nuclear technologies and fuels. Energy security has emerged as the primary driver of Europe’s nuclear revival.

Reactor technology has changed. Significantly. The three most infamous nuclear accidents in history (Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima Daiichi in 2011) all involved Generation II reactors and were developed between the 1960s and 1980s. Just as an automobile produced in 1911 lacked seat belts and airbags, these older nuclear designs lacked the layered passive safety systems that are now standard in Generation III and III+ designs. Modern reactors, such as the EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) in France or the AP1000 developed by Westinghouse in the U.S., feature redundant core cooling systems, double containment structures, and automatic shutdown protocols that do not rely on human intervention in the case of a meltdown. Looking further ahead, Generation IV reactors promise even greater efficiency, waste minimization, and safety. Some Generation IV designs employ closed fuel cycles, which reduce the burden of long-term waste storage. In addition to electricity generation, nuclear can be used for hydrogen production, as well as for district and industrial heat applications. In other words, Generation II reactors differ fundamentally from their more recent successors. The engineering advances represent a generational leap in operational safety and system resilience.

New Coalitions, New Directions

Several distinct blocs have emerged in Europe’s nuclear reconfiguration. The traditionally pro-nuclear states, like France and Slovakia, have recommitted to new nuclear projects. While France has briefly had plans to scale down its nuclear fleet, these have been spectacularly reversed. Quite contrary to a phase-down, in February 2022, France announced an initiative to build six new large reactors. The country derived 67.3 percent of its electricity from nuclear in 2024.

Slovakia maintained a 60.6 percent nuclear share in its electricity mix in 2024, produced by five pressurized water reactors. The central issue is that all five of these Slovak nuclear reactors are of Russian design and rely on Russian nuclear fuel, a non-starter after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Slovak nuclear operator contracted with Westinghouse (U.S.) and Framatome (France) to develop and supply nuclear fuel for these reactors.

In general, Eastern and Central Europe have become the nucleus of a new build wave, including both large-scale nuclear and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Poland has announced plans to deploy GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 SMRs alongside its planned large-scale nuclear projects. Romania is working with NuScale to deploy its first SMRs in Doicești, with support from U.S. financing and technology partnerships. Bulgaria is evaluating NuScale SMRs as a potential way to phase out coal. The Baltic states are also exploring SMRs: Estonia’s Fermi Energia aims to deploy a BWRX-300, Latvia is considering collaboration with Estonia, and Lithuania is exploring the feasibility of a Newcleo lead-cooled fast reactor at the decommissioned Ignalina site.

The Age of Nuclear Reversals

Beyond the Eastern and Central European blocks, a second wave of nuclear momentum is forming among countries that have either reversed longstanding phaseout commitments or signaled an openness to do so.

Nowhere is the political dimension of this shift more visible than in Belgium. After decades of ambivalence and legally-binding commitments to phase out nuclear power, the Belgian government reversed course in 2023. The Doel and Tihange reactors, once slated for permanent closure, are now scheduled to operate for an additional decade. The country’s nuclear phaseout law, was formally repealed in May 2025. This reversal followed a shift in the governing coalition, which excluded the Green Party, and was justified on the grounds of supply security and climate resilience.

Spain has similarly reopened the nuclear question. In early 2025, parliamentary motions urged the government to reconsider its plan to shut down the country’s entire nuclear fleet by 2035. The debate in Madrid reflects rising concerns over electricity prices, energy reliability, and the carbon intensity of replacement capacity. After the Iberian blackout earlier in the year, support is growing for a proposal to extend the operational life of existing reactors, though no final decision has been made.

Italy, which abandoned civilian nuclear power after a 1987 referendum, is now exploring a return through Nuclitalia, a public-private partnership led by Enel. The consortium was created to evaluate SMR technologies under legislation passed in 2025. The collaboration is focused on laying the groundwork for a potential shift in Italy’s national energy strategy. In a country where nuclear had long been a political taboo, the return of serious policy discourse marks a dramatic change in tone.

Greece, too, has begun to reposition itself. In 2025, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis publicly acknowledged that nuclear energy may have a role to play in the country’s future energy mix. Though no formal policy has yet emerged, the rhetorical shift represents a significant break from past orthodoxy and signals a new openness at the highest level of government.

Even Denmark, a country with one of the most entrenched anti-nuclear stances in Europe, is beginning to revisit its position. Since 1985, Denmark has had a legislative ban on nuclear power. That ban remains in place, but in 2026, the government is expected to conduct a formal SMR study. The change was prompted by rising electricity demand, particularly in light of green industrial goals and growing power needs for digital infrastructure.

Europe’s shift toward nuclear energy has not occurred in a vacuum. It took a crisis of unprecedented scale to break through the political inertia and force a reassessment of nuclear policies. What was long considered politically untouchable has moved to the center of strategic planning. Even if some countries remain committed to their anti-nuclear course, they are now a minority in the E.U.